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THE STATE OF THE ART: AN INTRODUCTION
Rudolf Arnheim
University of Michigan
As I look back at our conference on
learning in art, my view is momentarily
distracted by the memory of an even
more recent event, a quick journey to
Japan where the provincial govern-
ment of Kanagawa Prefecture had in-
vited me to serve on the jury for their
first international competition of chil-
dren's art. An avalanche of paintings
and drawings had arrived from twenty-
six countries, and as I looked at the
final thousand examples spread for
us on the floor of a large meeting room
in Yokohama, my overall impression
added up to the exhilarating conclu-
sion that modern art education has
arrived all over the world.
This conclusion may have been rash.
The thousand samples I saw were the
remains of many screenings, begin-
ning with the selection by the teach-
ers who had decided to participate in
the competition. We received no in-
formation on the average product of
all those schools. We could tell, how-
ever, by what criteria the selections
had been made, and this in itself was
reassuring. The outcome was delight-
ful. There was freshness and sponta-
neity everywhere. A free use of shape
and color distinguished not only the
work of preschool and early grades
but kept up, with increasing subtlety
and lifelikeness, through those middle
years which we relegate so readily to
the trough of the U-curve. At the level
of junior high school, much difference
in subject matter and, to some extent,
in style distinguished the entries of the
various countries. But even the work
from some of the totalitarian countries,
which in former years suffered from
the deadening routine of "socialist
realism, " testified to the unbridled
imagination of the young and thereby
to the victory of the principles for
which the pioneers of art education
have been fighting through our cen-
tury.
If that is true, it does not mean, how-
ever, that art education has settled in
its final form and now rules unchal-
lenged and unexamined. To judge from
our conference at Champaign, the op-
posite is fortunately the case. I can put
the following few pages to no better
use than to comment on some of the
trends reflected in the proceedings of
the conference.
Art education may be said to have
begun in the last century as the more
or less mechanical training in how to
draw geometrical shapes or copy faith-
fully from various models. The great
break came when it was recognized
that the young mind, when freed and
encouraged, can develop a remarkable
ability of formal control and expres-
sio,n and use it to cope with the sen-
sory complexities of the world. Also,
with the advent of modern art, it be-
came clear that the work of children
enriches the imagery of the entire cul-
ture in ways not available from other
sources. Gradually this wholesome ap-
proach entered the capillaries of the
public school systems, even though it
required more sensitivity and imagina-
tion on the part of the teacher than did
the traditional drill.
Reduced to an oversimplifying rule,
the new doctrine prescribed that the
teacher leave the child alone, even
though to teach nothing is almost as
unsatisfactory as to teach everything.
In reacting against this restriction,
some of the more interesting develop-
ments have occurred in recent years.
Psychologists have entered the scene
and, not content with observing pas-
sively through the one-way screen,
have brought to bear their experimen-
tal techniques on some of the unsolved
problems of child art. It had been rec-
ognized that the mere analysis of the
finished product left many questions
unanswered. Much could be learned
from watching the children do their
work and from questioning them about
its meaning. Also, longitudinal studies
illustrated the development over time
in an individual child's pictures. Be-
yond that we now have active experi-
mentation, of which some of the con-
tributions to the present symposium
offer significant samples.
There was, first of all, the possibil-
ity of questioning the children them-
selves about aspects of their drawings
on which, up to then, we had only the
speculative interpretations of adults.
Why were they doing things the way
they were doing them, and which solu-
tions of graphic problems looked right,
which looked wrong? Children could
be asked, furthermore, to do things
they were not doing spontaneously.
The results are quite enlightening. Two
caveats may not be out of place at this
point. First, if by experimental fiat chil-
dren are induced to do things that they
would not do on their own, the results
should be welcomed as additions to
our knowledge of children's potential,
but not thought of as corrections of
what we have known about their spon-
taneous behavior. Forcing pussy wil-
lows or forsythias to bloom early does
not correct what we know about their
natural calendar. Similarly, there is
good sense in children's clinging to
early conceptions at a certain stage of
their natural development, even though
by some manipulation they can be
made to leap ahead of their time.
This connects with my second ca-
veat, which concerns professional eth-
ics. Experimental psychologists have
become sensitive to the well-being of
their subjects. In art education, in-
struction needs to be carefully geared
to the readiness of students for cer-
tain techniques or tasks that can be
imposed upon them but risk interfer-
ing with the full exploration of earlier
ways of functioning. In the arts, short-
cuts tend to be harmful. Since many
experiments are in fact instruction, the
experimenter should have access to
the experience of good art educators
in order to be able to tell which kinds
of task are likely to be harmless or even
helpful and which might cause dis-
orientation.
This is not intended to mean that
every intervention at all is to be frowned
upon. Such a radical attitude was all
but unavoidable among the early pio-
neers of art education if they wanted
to break up the conventional routines.
It is true that the same onesidedness
showed up also, and less helpfully, in
the pioneers' theorizing. They had ar-
rived at the fundamentally important
vision of perceptual form growing in
lawful stages and in an almost biologi-
cal fashion, from the simplest to the
most complex; and it is in the nature
of the dialectic process that the vision
tended to be dogmatically exclusive.
Mental growth came to be presented
as endogenous maturation, indepen-
dent of, and even in spite of, external
influence.
It is against this onesidedness that
opposition has necessarily arisen, and
to judge from some recent tendencies,
environmentalism attempts to take over
with a vengeance. It is one thing to
point out that, from the very beginning,
the organism grows in interaction with
the resources of the outer world and
that art work, whether figurative or not,
makes sense only as a means of cop-
ing with the person's inner and outer
life situation. It is quite another thing
to maintain that development in the
arts is essentially a matter of external
influence and that this is what it ought
to be. Such statements are dangerous
because it takes very little for many an
insufficiently trained art teacher to re-
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vert to mechanical copying from the
model and thereby to undo what art
education has accomplished in all
those decades of struggle.
The question "to copy or not to
copy" obscures the problem. No chil-
dren have ever practiced drawing with-
out looking at nature and "copying"
what they saw; they are quite likely
also to examine pictures by other chil-
dren or in books or the mass media
and to be influenced by them. What
matters, it seems to me, is the attitude
in which they respond to the models.
Are they trying to replicate mechani-
cally line by line and proportion by pro-
portion, or are they taking the model
as a suggestion for a free invention of
their own, a product of their judgment
and imagination, presented in their
own language of form? When in a re-
cently successful manual on how to
draw, the author spends many pages
on ways of freeing students from intel-
lectual schematization only to teach
them at the end of the book how to
obtain "correct" dimensions by mea-
suring with the pencil held at arm's
length, we are in a sad way indeed.
There is one more issue I would like
to mention because it, too, came up at
the symposium. It is the question
whether or not the paintings and draw-
ings of children are "art." This ques-
tion seems to have introduced a
pseudo-problem. It has led, on the one
hand, to overlooking differences that
must be acknowledged and, on the
other hand, to claiming nonexistent
distinctions. Such confusion is inevi-
table as long as "art" is considered a
container in which certain objects be-
long while others do not. Any such
classification is arbitrary and harmful;
it may decree that when children draw
landscapes for art class they are doing
art," but when they are drawing flow-
ers for nature study they are not. That
same classification may decree that
up to a certain age children do not
make art but above that age they do,
or that bad pictures are not art but
good ones are.
It is useful to establish that the work
of older children has qualities lacking
in the work of the younger ones, or
that children's mental conception of
the nature and purpose of their paint-
ings differs from that of adult artists;
but such findings should not be used
for classification based on arbitrary
criteria.
Art education may be said to have
begun in earnest when it was under-
stood that the ability to create and ap-
preciate expressive form is universal.
Expressive form pervades everything
man and nature produce, and just as
the "work of art " is nothing but the
finest flower of an ability stirring in
every young child, so the professional
artist differs in degree but not in kind
from the child who decorates his room
or dresses up for Halloween. As usual
in human thinking, recognition of what
things have in common must precede
thQ appreciation of differences.
Thoughts such as these were awak-
ened once again by the contributions
to the Champaign symposium. It is by
controversy and confirmation that work
in art education progresses.
Rudolf Arnheim
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103
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THE MIND, ART AND HISTORY
Martin Engel
National Institute of Education
This is the keynote address. The word
"keynote" is, of course, a figure of
speech. As we all know, in music the
keynote is the tonic or "home tone"
which sets the harmonic relationships
for the whole piece. It is the A which is
played by the concertmaster in order
for the orchestra to tune up together.
Such a congruent tuning-up makes it
possible for the conductor to come on
stage to great applause and begin with
the opening bars of the music itself.
Please forgive the conceit of this ex-
tended metaphor but such a tuning-up
is the task that I have set for myself,
even though I can scarcely carry a tune.
I would like to attempt to bring to-
gether two domains of interest to me.
The one with which most of you are
much more familiar than I is cognitive
processes. The other domain repre-
sents my earlier professional commit-
ment as a teacher of art history. I hope
that you will tolerate this autobiograph-
ical orientation, as well as the fact that
what I want to describe — discover may
be a better word — comes to me, as
Lewis Thomas put it, more as a "strong
hunch rather than a scientific asser-
tion."
I intend, then, to explore two models,
one derived from history, and the other
from cognitive psychology with the
hope that there is a meaningful link
between the two, and therefore an in-
tellectual chain of continuity between
my previous and my present career.
My effort to conjoin these two mod-
els will lead me to consider a rationale
for the concept of artistic style whereby
the form of the work of art expresses the
underlying meanings which inform the
character of the historical age in which
the art object or experience was pro-
duced. Furthermore, that meaning is, I
believe, a cognitive construct. It is
what the mind knows. Let me state my
point another way as a matter of intro-
duction.
History can be divided into periods,
and each of these periods is given
meaning which is uniquely character-
istic of that particular period. These
meanings are universal as well, but
that is another discussion. Further-
more, these meanings are expressed
through structures inherent in the va-
riety of symbolic forms or languages
of which mankind is capable and of
which the arts are a major example.
Where do these symbolic languages
come from? They are the externaliza-
tion of that most basic human process,
cognitive functioning. It is in this sense
at least, that art, making it and discern-
ing it, is an act of intellect.
Perhaps as much an attempt to clar-
ify my thoughts for myself as for this
audience, I offer a series of assump-
tions and assertions for which I believe
there exists some evidence:
Cognition is the mental process of think-
ing and knowing.
The major expression of all mental pro-
cessing is behavior.
Mental structures are manifest in hu-
man behavior.
The patterns of human behavior have
discernible meanings.
One major aspect of human behavior is
symbolic construction and expression;
in short, symbolic behavior.
Discernible meanings are embedded
within symbolic systems. Symbolic pro-
cesses are the externalization of mental
functioning.
Keynote address; Symposium for Research
in Art, University of Illinois: October 7, 1980.
Symbols and symbol systems have indi-
vidual meanings that are reflexive, and
collective meanings that are interper-
sonal, or social.
The collective meanings of symbolic
systems change over time and in differ-
ent locations; they are contextual.
The constructins of the mind, the con-
cepts or meanings, are contextual.
The patterns of such collective mean-
ings become the community, society,
culture and, retrospectively, history.
Underlying the varieties of human activi-
ties incorporated within a time and
place, are fundamental patterns of cul-
ture.
These patterns can be identified, de-
scribed and symbolized.
The organization, form, pattern and style
of symbolic systems incorporate the
meanings of the patterns of culture.
Meaning, in history, is embodied in sym-
bolic systems.
These meanings are generated by and
received by the individual as well as the
collective mind.
Mental structures determine the struc-
tures and meanings incorporated in
symbolic systems.
History is the sequence of patterns
of behavior, given meaning, and there-
fore a structure in the patterns of cul-
ture that we symbolize. Though each
mind is significantly different, as a con-
sequence of social context, significant
similarities permeate all minds partici-
pating in that place/time context. These
collective cognitive similarities are
manifest in the symbolic systems gen-
erated within the social context, includ-
ing the arts. Symbolization is the link-
ing of the individual mind, its social
context or ecology, and history. The
rest of what I intend to say is an elabo-
ration upon this series of premises.
For a number of years before my
midlife change to bureaucrat, I taught
art history from the framework estab-
lished by Schliemann, Burkhardt and
Wollflin, and generally based upon
the historical conceptions of Kant and
Hegel. This framework has a certain
philosophical respectability and has
appeared in the thought of such di-
verse thinkers as Gianbattista Vico and
Wilhelm Dilthey. They have supported
the idea that, within the inexorable flow
of the past, periods of time acquire a
set of characteristics that distinguish
them, in retrospect, one from the other,
as a consequence of collective human
behavior formulated into the society
and culture of that time-period. The
Age is determined by and determines
the collective mind, the spirit-of-the-
age, or the Zeitgeist. It is the embodi-
ment of a specific Weltanschauung or
way of understanding and viewing
one's world. While the describable
character of any period of time may
be attributable to what Collingwood
called "the creative historical imagi-
nation," it is the case that empirical
evidence undergirds such visions of
cultural coherence.
When we speak of the Renaissance,
the Romantic Era, the Romanesque . . .
we assume a set of characteristics
which enjoy a paradigmatic unique-
ness as well as unity: a pattern or set
of patterns manifest in the varieties
of human activities subsumed under
such terms as economics, theology,
politics, science or the arts. They are
the patterns of culture and appear in
the philosophies, languages and other
social dynamics of a particular time.
If my superficial description bela-
bors what may seem obvious (histori-
cal platitudes familiar to any fresh-
man), my purpose and justification will
lead me to construct a rationale for the
concept of style whereby the form of
the work of art expresses, symbolizes
if you will, the underlying meaning
which is the character of that age. That
meaning is a cognitive construct: It is
what the mind knows.
Erwin Panofsky^ alludes to periods
of time as distinguishable portions of
history. These portions are given a
unity discovered by the historian
through "intrinsic analogies" within
overtly disparate phenomena such as
religious movements, social and politi-
cal currents and the arts.
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Karl Jaspers^ explains this even more
succinctly:
In the movement of human affairs
there are, to our cognition, many lines
which run separately from one another
and subsequently meet — or particular
lines, which, although they recur typi-
cally, represent only features of the
whole, not the whole itself.
Thus there is the circumscribed se-
quence of a particular set of cultural
phenomena. A few generations cohere
in typical stylistic sequences or devel-
opments of thought, from their origin
to their disintegration.
The coherences to which Jaspers
refers are also described by others as
organic wholes, powerful cohesions,
historical unities with a common char-
acter. Let us consider another author
who seeks to operate within the con-
text of the history of ideas. W. T. Jones^
argues for what he calls "operative
generalizations" which impose a cul-
tural coherence. He says: ". . . often
many sets of specific generalizations
share a common style and . . . this
common style, because it pervades
many different specific backgrounds,
characterizes the thinking, and so the
behavior, of whole societies."^ Jones
proceeds to identify not only the con-
tent of such generalizations, but, more
importantly, the form. "By 'form' we
mean, for instance, the style or manner
in which a story is narrated or a logical
argument is developed." The impor-
tance of the form is such that it illumi-
nates "...the underlying drives that
characterize a culture." Jones rests his
position upon a philosphical justifica-
tion to which I subscribe. He states that
"...
I happen to hold that in cognition
the mind is not in relation to an inde-
pendently and objectively existing real-
ity but that it is structuring and orga-
nizing the reality that it knows. "^ Fur-
thermore, Jones separates himself from
Kantian necessity, universality and es-
sential categories by stressing tne con-
textual and relativistic nature of these
cognitively produced generalizations.
They are the cultural, social and psy-
chological variables.
When Wollflin described the unify-
ing force inherent within a certain age,
such as the Renaissance or the Ba-
roque, he stated that: "The transition
from Renaissance to Baroque is a clas-
sic example of how a new Zeitgeist en-
forces a new form."^ He felt that the
aim of art history was to: ". . . conceive
style primarily as expression, expres-
sion of the temper of an age and a
nation as well as expression of the
individual temperament."'' Wollflin's
Principles of Art History constitutes a
foundationstone for the historical con-
nections being developed here. He al-
ludes to the ". . . mode of perception
which lies at the root of representative
arts in the various centuries. ' The
position assumed by these authors and
affirmed in this essay is that the char-
acter of a period of history is manifest
in its generalizations and style and
such expressive forms are not whimsi-
cal or arbitrary but are determined by a
collective mind and will.
The great semiotic philosopher Ernst
Cassirer also took pains to establish an
interaction between symbolic modes,
the coherence of a period of the past
and the historian's role in reading the
meanings inherent in that culture's
various codes:
The historian not only studies the
spoken and written languages of man-
kind; he tries to penetrate into the sense
of all the various symbolic idioms. He
finds his texts not merely in books, in
annals or memoirs. He has to read hiero-
glyphics or cuneiform inscriptions, look
at colors on a canvas, at statues in mar-
ble or bronze, at cathedrals or temples,
at coins or gems. But he does not con-
sider all these things simply with the
mind of an antiquary who wisnes to col-
lect and preserve the treasures of olden
times. What the historian is in search
of is rather the materialization of the
spirit of a former age. He detects the
same spirit in laws and statues, in char-
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ters and bills of right, in social institu-
tions and political constitutions, in reli-
gious rites and ceremonies.^
It has been the task of historians to
translate, or paraphrase the meanings
imbedded in various symbolic modes
of the arts. Thereby they create verbal
correspondences between the meaning
residing in the style of medieval archi-
tecture, for example, or manuscript
illumination and music, as well as in
the style or conceptual framework of
medieval scholastic thought.
Heinrich Wollflin established five
basic formal components of the visual
arts. These five components, or tools of
analysis, reveal a set of visual charac-
teristics in a work of art whereby it be-
comes possible to attribute a period
style. He showed how, when certain
formal attributes appeared in the paint-
ing or statue, the work was typically
Renaissance; but these formal ele-
ments were historically to evolve quite
dramatically into those formal/stylistic
aspects subsequently defined as Ba-
roque.^
While Wollflin did not venture into
the larger arena of imbuing these stylis-
tic elements with cultural generaliza-
tions or meanings — stating what the
significance of Renaissance or Baroque
style is to the intellectual forces of that
time — he was, nonetheless, among the
early art historians to apply analytical
tools to "reading" works of art de-
rived from the formal and structural
elements rather than biographical or
iconographic references. Indeed, his
analysis of the linear versus the paint-
erly, the stress upon either the plane
or recession into pictorial space, em-
phasis upon either complexity and
multiplicity, or simplicity and unity,
upon either closed or open forms —
these polar formal elements and their
attribution — were most fruitfully inter-
preted when the two compared works
of art were held constant for subject
matter. It mattered much less who did
it, or what it was, than how it was
done, because that answered the ques-
tion of what did it say.
Let me pause for a moment to make
my intended path explicit. There is a
legitimacy to the position that a cul-
ture, or period of time, may be said to
have a certain paradigmatic coher-
ence; this coherence has a describable
character; this describable character
is manifest in the variety of symbolic
modes which we segregate (and aggre-
gate) into disciplines such as lan-
guage, science, religion, economics or
the arts; the non-verbal modes such as
architecture and music are as expres-
sive of such basic meanings as is prop-
ositional verbal discourse; and these
meanings reside in the form. It now
needs to be suggested that the form
and the techniques that generated
them; the skills, control and will to
produce them; and, most important,
the creation of meaning to inform this
symbolic system, derive from — are
expressed by — the individual mind or
intellect, and this Is what we call cogni-
tive process.
Conjure up in the mind's eye three
overlapping circles. Each circle repre-
sents an element in an interactive sys-
tem. Circle one stands for the mind,
the intellect, or our cognitive pro-
cesses. The second circle stands for
the symbolic codes generated by those
cognitive processes, and the third cir-
cle represents both reality as we posit
It, and history, or the reality of the past.
Many historians have moved through
at least two of the three circles in order
to link them. W. T. Jones, to whom we
referred previously, argues for the con-
nection between ideas and their em-
bodiment in various symbolic codes,
the repetition thereof containing the
qualities of a period of time. Seeking
to establish a valid description of the
Romantic Period, Jones analyzes a rich
variety of disciplines, including the
arts. He says:
Though ideas themselves are not
physical objects, they are communi-
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cable only through some sort of sym-
bolism. Since these symbols — the
written marks on paper, the colored
pigments on canvas — are physical ob-
jects, they are easily identifiable. ... So
far, therefore, ... we are justified in tak-
ing the symbols as standing in some
definitive relation to the ideas commu-
nicated in them . . .
Instead of merely identifying a par-
ticular physical object whenever it oc-
curs on the printed page, the analyst
must decide what the author means: he
must read, not merely recognize . . .
the object of study has subtly changed;
it is no longer a physical object (a par-
ticular configuration of lines on a piece
of paper); it is now the idea of which
these squiggles are the sign . . .^°
It is noteworthy that a historian
would take pains to construct the
ground for his historical description
in terms which seek to justify the con-
nection between data and analysis,
that is, the interpretation of data de-
rived from symbolic material warrant-
ing interpretation on stylistic and for-
mal grounds. The analogical rather
than the explicit symbolic codes need
to be "read." I would contend, how-
ever, that recognition is reading and
that the object remains physical even
when imbued with ideational signifi-
cance; this is the very point of symbols.
Phillip Morrison of MIT, in the second
annual Bronowsky lecture, developed a
case for two fundamentally different
modes of internal representation or
modeling. One kind he labeled digital,
referring to the use of letters and
numbers, language, mathematics, and
those codes wherein the morpheme
has no iconic or representational con-
nection with the referent. Thus letters
and words in print have phonetic but
not iconic meaning. The graphic car-
dinal numbers stand for, but do not
appear like, the elements they repre-
sent. These letters and numbers
become oral and then the written lan-
guage which, in turn, stands for phe-
nomena.
Yet, we know that the roots of writ-
ten language are deeply imbedded in
a visually representational schematic
array of images. While this is not the
place to develop the argument, we
would do well to consider the connec-
tions between the written word and the
pictorializing from which it evolved.
Most pictures may be, in order to be
read, much closer to how the written
word operates in our mind than we
ordinarily believe, and vice-versa.
The other symbolic mode that Morri-
son described in his lecture is the ana-
logic. To clarify this distinction, he
compared two kinds of clocks. He dem-
onstrated the traditional circular face
with its sweeping hands as deriving
from the need to recreate and symbol-
ize the motion of the planets and stars
as they orbit in their concentric circu-
lar universe: a model and microcosm
of the Ptolemaic cosmos. In contrast to
this dial-faced analogy of heavenly mo-
tion, Morrison showed a contemporary
digital device, now found on walls and
wrists. These watches and clocks con-
ceal, or are entirely without, wheels
and internal rotary motion. Both kinds
of clocks give the same information,
although the one of rotary motion also
models our moving universe. Thus, by
virtue of their form and the way the
mechanics are designed, they present
two totally different modes of symbol-
ization. In physics of molecular biol-
ogy, the analogic/digital contrast may
be noted by the physical and analogi-
cal model of rods and balls, while the
algebraic formula presents the digital
version of this information.
In the present discussion we are par-
ticularly interested in this distinction
between those languages which pre-
sent abstractions in the form of ab-
stractions — ideas cast into mathe-
matical form or prepositional prose,
free of the figurative — and the arts
on the other hand, wherein reality and
abstractions and ideas about reality
are woven into the fabric of palpable
iconic forms; they are embodied in
physical phenomena, material sub-
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stance, or the verbalized figurative
images thereof. The symbolic analogic
power of the arts resides in their real
or implied physicality; the rhythms,
dissonances and cadences of music,
the paint on canvas, the stone and
bronze, the steel and glass, the body's
motion — in short, the real — makes
believe it is something else, in addition
to being itself. Therein, contingent
upon how these physical events have
been organized, the meaning is cap-
tured and, upon our perception of the
artistic phenomenon, released.
The stones and structure of the me-
dieval cathedral become the analogic
embodiment of Scholastic Rationalism
and its dialectical fusion with revela-
tion. Giotto's frescoes reveal, by formal
analogy, the emerging Renaissance
secularism, a sense of physicality and
a return to humanism. One can see this
in the discovery and representation of
the body's bulk, weight and dramatic/
emotional gesturing and expression.
The layers of meanings are discern-
ible if not verbally paraphrasable. They
can be, indeed must be, knowable. A
work of art that does not make sense,
that is, purport meaning, is nonsense.
One major layer of meaning with which
any work of art is imbued, derives from
the mind-set of the place and time in
which it was produced. That layer of
meaning is inherent in the conjoining
of subject and form, style and tech-
nique, adherence to rules and conven-
tions, and departure therefrom.
Writing about the analogic relation-
ships of concurrent styles, Wylie Sy-
pher contended that the art object or
experience is a representation, a por-
trayal "emancipated" from reality. The
instrument of that emancipation is the
artist's "style," the schema, composi-
tion or "form" in which he makes his
statement, the structure or organiza-
tion he imposes upon the object or
experience to which he refers."
Sypher proceeds to link the artist's
style to technique, pointing out that
the formal patterns of the work of art
are modified or limited by craft and
medium, and these formal patterns
themselves come to acquire symbolic
meanings. As he puts it, "Technique
influences form, and form . . . influ-
ences the techniques of representa-
tion." (See footnote 3.) Sypher's link-
age of style and technique, by which
I understand him to mean the produc-
tive process of symbol creation and
use, is central to his argument:
Technique is not merely a technical
feat: if it is a way of representing what
is seen or experienced, then it involves
the whole cultural and social world that
influences the artist to try to represent
reality as he does. If style is a mode of
representation, yet the artist is bound
to represent the kind of world in which
he lives, to which he belongs. ^^
The French structuralist, Roland
Barthes (1977), identifies the pictorial
image as an "analogon, " and like Mor-
rison, sees such analogies or meta-
phors as symbolic messages. The
analogic dimension is the denoted
component, but the technique and its
consequent style are imbued with the
connotation of the message, and hence
its meaning. Since the technique and
style of the medium contain the "mes-
sage, " the semantic of the work of art
resides in its syntax, or morphology.
A number of theorists, such as War-
tofsky, stress the interactive nature of
the process wherein the production of
symbolic forms of art are determined
and simultaneously determine the un-
derstood meanings of the experience
derived from the milieu. Thus, the ar-
tist's modes of thought and his per-
ceptions are determined by the impact
of his culture to which he contributes
in a cognitive ecology. We learn to read
the meanings imbedded in the highly
charged artistic symbol, as we learn
to see through the lens of the cultural
artifacts of a period. As Oscar Wilde
suggested: Life imitates Art! Our visual
activity as welt as our auditory pro-
cesses, their organizing and symboliz-
ing powers, are formed and trans-
Mind, Art and History
formed by our experience with the
body of symbolic material which con-
stitute our environment. We see what
we choose to see, we choose to see
what and in the way our milieu permits
us to see, and what we see is what we
symbolize for ourselves and for each
other.
It may be useful to return, for a mo-
ment, to the historian's framework and
consider a description of a whole se-
ries of historical periods, to character-
ize the underlying cultural message
meanings and the forms that symbolize
and express these. Let us develop an
extensive example of historical mean-
ings by identifying the sequence of his-
torical phases of Western Civilization
by their leading or dominant ideas. Wil-
liam Fleming, ^3 jn his Arts and Ideas,
provides us with just such an interpre-
tation. Thus, the Hellenic period could
be understood in terms of intellectual
perspectives which have been labelled
Humanism, Idealism, and Rationalism.
In this exercise in the art history of
ideas, the several arts each, in content
and style, embody the basic meanings
subsumed under these labels. The fre-
quency of appearance of certain stylis-
tic trends, and the disappearance or
absence of others, provides the ac-
cumulation of clues — evidence — that
inspires such a compelling interpreta-
tion. The use of modular elements in
the sculpture of Polycleitus or in the
Parthenon, the affirmation of human
scale, the famous subtle variations and
deviations from the straight lines of the
Parthenon, the elements of "proper
magnitude" in Aristotle's Poetics, and
other such stylistic elements all inform
the three ideational forces whereby
we can understand fifth and fourth cen-
tury B.C. Greece.
The succeeding period, the Helle-
nistic, was vitalized by a historical trans-
formation illuminated by the ideas of
Individualism, Realism and Empiricism.
Polycleitos gives way to the soft sen-
suousness of Praxiteles. The constraint
of reason in the Parthenon alters to be-
come the propagandistic monumental-
ity of the Pergamese Altar of Zeus.
We can describe the Roman era in
terms of its domination by the compul-
sion for organization and utilitarian
values and attitudes. The roads, the
caestra-planned cities, the aqueducts,
the symmetry of architecture, the walls
and apartment houses all testify to
these ideas. The Early Christians, on
the other hand, displayed an obsession
for mystical and authoritarian percep-
tions of Christ and their church. The
Monastic Romanesque was dominated
by a penchant for asceticism and a hier-
archical conception of life which per-
vaded the feudal world as a secular as
well as a church body politic. The ema-
ciated figures of the saints on cathedral
facades, the organization of the manu-
script page, the massive masonry of
the churches themselves betray these
values.
Scholasticism in the Middle Ages is
identified as the dominant mind-set of
the Gothic Era, vitalized by the theo-
logians' effort to reconcile Reason and
Revelation, or Scholastic Realism, Ideal-
ism and Nominalism. This reconcilia-
tion could be called the Scholastic
Synthesis and may be noted both in
the structures of the argument of St.
Thomas as well as in the complex and
dynamic structures of the vaulted
Gothic Cathedrals.
As medievalism evolves into the sun-
light of the Renaissance, we note the
emergence of a new humanitarianism
and interest in nature. By the time of
the Florentine quattrocento, these in-
terests have ripened into a scientific
frame of mind, coupled with a highly
individualistic self-assertion. These
traits are exemplified in a typical paint-
ing by Piero Delia Francesca entitled:
The Flagellation of Christ. What is pre-
sumably a religious painting is, in fact
by virtue of its style and organization,
anything but. The obsession with lin-
ear perspective reflects the preoccu-
pation with the rational re-construction
of space, a scientific interest. The three
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figures in the foreground loom large;
they are the patrons. Christ is diminu-
tive and in the background. The impli-
cation is obvious. Three Renaissance
portraits daring to use the agony of
Christ as background setting!
The classical humanism which dom-
inates the intellectual ferment of the
Renaissance transforms into the mili-
tancy and mysticism of the counter-
reformation Baroque, while the swell-
ing of aristocratic absolutism is seen
as both grandiose and controlled by
artistic academicism. Set a Botticelli
side by side with a Caravaggio or a Tin-
toretto. Linear clarity has been re-
placed by a turbulent dark storminess.
Calm balance gives way to theatrical
spotlighting and plunging diagonals.
The times have changed dramatically
and the style, not the content, ex-
presses this change. Reading the style
tells us the meaning of these historical
changes.
This historical parade remains vague
and arbitrary only until one traces,
through concrete examples, the evolu-
tion of form. Using the same subject
matter throughout such a series of his-
torical periods, we can trace the for-
mal, organizational, stylistic variations
which portray totally different mean-
ings, thereby making each art work
symbolic of the ideational/intellectual
forces which animate the quality and
character of the period in which that
work was created. Donatello's bronze
David, at the beginning of the Renais-
sance, is a modest exercise in adoles-
cent realism when compared to the
monumental Michaelangelo David of
the High Renaissance. Yet, both are
studies in balanced classical calm
when compared to Bernini's David
which embodies explosive turbulence,
swirling motion and a dramatic play of
light and dark, characteristic of the
theatricality of the later Baroque and
its attempt to agitate the emotions. Al-
though we have delved extensively into
only a few periods of Western Civiliza-
tion, these are most familiar to us.
Other periods of time, other cultures,
other civilizations could serve our pur-
pose just as well.
The work of art, as a symbol, is con-
ceptually — cognitively — meaningful
within its context, both as personal
and collectively apprehended icon.
The formulas for the carvings of the
Egyptian or Archaic Greeks communi-
cate a cultural intention, not a clumsy
ineptness; they signal a powerful mes-
sage, not a primitive inability to por-
tray likenesses. The Kouroi of the 8th
century B.C. are as "like " as they need
to be.
A major purpose of pictorialization
is to maximize the presentation of in-
formation. For children, "primitives,"
or cultures that are ignorant of the
possibility of what we could call the
quest for photographic illusion, other
modes exist for presenting and sym-
bolizing such information. Indeed, an
overview of the world's body of art sug-
gests that so-called realism is by no
means the pre-eminent style or form
for making visual statements.
Arnheim has demonstrated that most
peoples seem to prefer a variety of
schematic, diagrammatic, and emble-
matic formats. Map-like images and
ideographs appear to be the preferred
mode of pictorial construction if one
takes both a historical and global per-
spective. The most salient view of ob-
jects, the most readily recognized
shape, form or profile lends itself op-
timally to the transmission of informa-
tion regarding objects or relationships
of objects.
Children taught shading and linear
perspective will often perform this skill
to please adults, but revert to distorted
design-like profiles and silhouettes,
ignoring the third dimension, in the
drawings in which they please them-
selves. From this point of view, there
need not be a sharp demarcation be-
tween the abstract phonemes and dig-
its which embody no visual reference
to the outside world to which they ad-
dress themselves, and pictorializing,
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even as extreme as the illusionism of
trompe-l'oeil. Children and their com-
ics, the medieval monks and their fu-
sion of words and pictures in manu-
scripts, the Japanese and Chinese
combining calligraphy of poetry and
pictures of mountains, clouds and
pomegranate trees, are obviously com-
fortable with such blendings of codes
in their symbolic presentations.
Whether the morpheme is derived
from externally perceived images —
the ideograph or the picture — or
whether it evolves into the phoneme
and numerical code of verbal dis-
course and mathematics, it needs to
be read in order to derive from it its
information and the meanings of that
information.
Nor does craft, skill, practice, disci-
pline and experience need to be absent
in the production of these arts in those
cultures and periods that have not dis-
covered or have chosen to ignore the
illusionistic mode of image making.
Earlier paleolithic cave painting was
startlingly realistic (note the subtleties
of the Lascaux bison), while later Neo-
lithic art is far more emblematic and
pattern-like. Sand painting, masks.
Runic stone carvings, tapestry weav-
ings, or cathedral ornamentation in-
corporate sufficient reference to visual
reality within the framework of abstract
style to transmit the visual information
that they contain.
The contention of Roger Fry and
Clive Bell that art is significant form,
must be followed by the question, sig-
nificant of what? Langer's description
of the work of art embodying the forms
of feeling, such as tension and resolu-
tion, is essentially correct but inade-
quate. That is to say, the work of art
is about a great deal more than that.
It is rooted in and therefore refers to
— means — its historical context and
reality. The specific character of mind
is knowable and presentable in the
symbolic form most appropriate. Such
knowing might be conscious, like Re-
naissance self-awareness, or buried in
the collective unconscious, like Ro-
manticism's violent reaction to a per-
ceived excess of reason inherited from
the Enlightenment. The consequence
of that reaction generated the mind-set
reconstituted in the arts during the
period 1750 and 1850 which we iden-
tify as the Romantic Period.
Lest our emphasis upon the visual
arts imply that other artistic media fail
to attract similar historical/cognitive
interpretations, we would do well to
consider an artistic medium inherently
devoid of representational images ex-
cept for the programmatic or descrip-
tive examples which, after all, will not
disprove our contentions. In a provoca-
tive passage from an essay entitled:
On Thinking About Thini<ing, Lewis
Thomas'''^ seeks to make a connection
between mental operations and the
production of music:
Music is the effort we make to explain
to ourselves how our brains work. We
listen to Bach transfixed because this is
listening to a human mind. Tlie Art of
tile Fugue is not a special pattern of
thinking, it is not thinking about any
particular thing. The spelling out of
Bach's name in the great, unfinished
layers of the fugue at the end is no
more than a transient notion, some-
thing flashed across the mind. The
whole piece is not about thinking about
something, it is about thinking.
I am inclined to disagree somewhat
with Thomas. Tfie Art of the Fugue is
about a special pattern of thinking. It
embodies the symbolization of think-
ing to be sure, but thinking about
something. Bach was not only the ulti-
mate Baroque composer. He was, at
another level, a conservative academic
working in a stylistic mode that was or
was soon to become obsolete, hie was,
and therefore his art is, a product of
the Age of Reason. The Art of the
Fugue, The Musical Offering, the 48
Preludes and Fugues of The Well- Tem-
pered Clavier, embody an encyclo-
pedic, textbook approach, rational,
analytical, comprehensive and an ef-
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fort to cast in the wordless language
of music a final taxonomy of all pos-
sible contrapuntal devices. Given its
obsessive logic and rational organiza-
tion, The Art of the Fugue becomes the
archetypal symbol of the Enlighten-
ment, analogous to Diderot's Encyclo-
pedie, Newton's Principia, and the im-
mense popularity of complex clocks,
and thus a kind of musical symbolic
logic, at once universal yet specific
to its age.
Using the Wollflin comparative frame-
work, and generalizing from an exten-
sive array of examples, Manfred Bukof-
zer, in his famous study of Baroque
music^^ asserts that the history of
artistic styles is the history of ideas;
he finds that while the music of the
Renaissance is characterized by a re-
strained representation of the words,
the Baroque thrived upon affective
imitation of words, wherein the text
dominated the melodic line and har-
monic sequences. While dissonance
enjoyed only a restrained use in Re-
naissance music, appearing on weak
beats rather than strong chords, and
was used primarily in transition be-
tween important chords, the Baroque
employed dissonance much more lav-
ishly, on strong beats, within chord
sequences, and resolved them down-
ward and upward, not exclusively
downward as in Renaissance music.
Clearly, from these stylistic elements
alone, it is possible to recognize the
greater degree of tension and dramatic
complexity embodied in the Baroque
style.
Since Baroque music is strongly
founded upon a basso continue, or
thorough-bass as the unifying line, the
various voices are not evenly balanced,
as in Renaissance music, but instead
are polarized between extremes of
high and low. Renaissance music re-
lies on the diatonic melody developed
within a narrow tonal range, while Ba-
roque music involves diatonic, chro-
matic and very wide ranges. Just a few
bars from Palestrina of the Renais-
sance, to the early Baroque music of
Monteverdi or Gesualdo will illustrate
these differences.
Renaissance music stresses a modal
counterpoint governed by the melodic
lines operating only secondarily to-
gether; Baroque music portrays the
development of a tonal center such
that the counterpoint is much more
dependent upon dominant tone and
harmonic relationships in each ensuing
chord. The development of tonality,
which provides a tonal gravity to the
harmonies in Baroque music, parallels
the discovery and formulation of grav-
ity in the physical world: that is, the
dynamic energy field that attracts the
various elements toward a center.
In Renaissance music the chords are
by-products of part writing, while in
Baroque music and due to its tonali-
ties, the chords are a series of self-con-
tained entities. Renaissance music is
dominated by the rhythmic device of a
uniform "tactus, " mathematically pro-
portioned, and not unlike the linear
perspective of the visual arts, while
Baroque music is driven by the rhyth-
mic aspects of the verbal material, or
other sources extrinsic to the music,
such as rippling streams, ascending
mountains, echoing caves and the like.
The invention of the recitative and the
opera coincides with the Baroque, thus
enlarging the symbolic repertoire of
an age seeking symbolic articulation
of its attributes.
Within the gradual evolution of the
rules which govern the creation of mu-
sic or the visual arts and upon which
an understanding of such arts
depends, changes in technique and
therefore style, are not random or co-
incidental. Rather, they are symbolic
expressions which embody the
changes of the milieu and the meanings
inherent in those changes. The pre-
occupation with a classicistic orderli-
ness and an attempt to see Nature
imbued with the dignified harmony and
balance, apparent in the writings of
Ficino, Alberti, or Pico della Mirandola,
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affirms the Renaissance in its various
symbolic manifestations. One hundred
and fifty years later, the dramatic and
theatrical swirls and diagonals, ex-
aggerated rhythms and intense chiaro-
scuro, the extended metaphors and
metaphysical conceits, the undulating
church facades and flamboyant rich-
ness of the painterly style of the Ba-
roque is echoed in the shift from a
Ptolemaic series of concentric crystal-
line spheres and circular orbits, to the
elliptical complexities of Kepler. For the
Renaissance, the earth was in the
center, like Leonardo's famous ex-
tended human figure set mathemati-
cally within a circle and square — per-
fect geometric shapes. The earth is set
to one side, among the planets, by Gali-
leo, Tycho Brahe and their successors,
and in Tintoretto's Last Supper, the
table hurtles diagonally into the
darkness, Christ barely discernible.
How different than the same subject by
Leonardo!
Stylistic differences emerge across
space as well as time. Perugino's me-
ticulous Renaissance landscape, filled
with linear detail, symmetrical, calm
and harmonious, lucid and simple, be-
comes something very different in the
hands of the much later Rubens. His
landscapes are robust, torrential whirl-
ing, dazzling shifts of forward and
backward elements, vast canvases that
shout the rough textures of the paint
and the elemental vitality of the fleshy
peasants that populate them. The Flem-
ish, aristocratic Rubens is the embodi-
ment of Baroque painting. But so is
his contemporary, the Dutchman, Rem-
brandt, whose landscapes are much
more introspective studies, domesti-
cated and cultivated when compared
to those of Rubens. Rembrandt gives
us sketchy suggestions bathed in
warm lights and soft, deep shadows,
the image of Bourgeois culture. Hol-
land and Flanders, geographic neigh-
bors, were culturally alien in many
ways. Two different kinds of Baroque
society occurred simultaneously; one
was an absolutist Catholic monarchy,
and its artist thought on the grand aris-
tocratic scale. Holland was animated
by a powerful, prosperous, yet tolerant
and enlightened . middle class. The
scale was domesticated and, instead,
introspection and character analysis
were more appropriate. Rembrandt's
sixty self portraits are not the conse-
quence of self-adoration. They repre-
sent the same analytical introspective
exploration found in the deep recesses
oiSt. Jerome in his Cell and other Rem-
brandt interiors. Though Rubens and
Rembrandt might very well choose the
same iconographic theme — the same
subject matter — each artist develops
his representational schema quite dif-
ferently, not only as a matter of per-
sonal style, but because of cultural
differences, the meanings of which are
contained in the organizational skele-
ton fleshed out with sensory and for-
mal components, fused into a coher-
ence of meaning and style.
Each artist/symbol izer, working within
the conventions, rules and techniques
of his medium, alters his material, giv-
ing it originality. The form emerges
from the conceptual/perceptual orga-
nization of the mind, to be cast into
the structure of the symbolic form and
made meaningful by virtue of the inter-
nal and externally stimulated and stim-
ulating experience in the world.
Time and space, the environment of
the human organism, are the primary
cognitive conditioners. Different mean-
ings and different modes of symboliza-
tion — the artistic variations — derive
from biological and environmental dif-
ferences. "Homo Faber, " man the ob-
sessive symbol maker, echoes his men-
tal constructions on the walls of the
deep recesses of caves, on the acropoli
of ancient cities, on the plucking of
strings or the weavings of baskets, on
the ornaments which adorn the lobes
of tribal ears or hang as battle scenes
on castle walls.
And now my circle begins to close.
Thinking and knowing — cognition
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— is an input/output process which
takes place for each individual within
a collective cultural context. The ve-
hicles for this interchange are the rich
varieties of symbolic modes which the
mind generates, including the various
arts. The eye recognizes another face
because it must. This recognition works
soon for the newborn and in a short
time works as well on the mirror, photo-
graph, sculpture or drawing as it does
on that from which the likeness was
modeled. In addition, it recognizes
meaningfully, the sensory and formal
components within which the likeness
is shaped. Expanding this notion from
the experience of a single drawing,
melody or gesture, to a group, indeed
a whole body of expressive symbolic
phenomena, their meanings shape our
thoughts, conceptions, perceptions —
the structure of our knowing. Artistic
symbolization is the link between our
inner and outer worlds; it informs and
unifies them. Thus we learn, know, pro-
duce knowledge and come to know
more.
The mental structures which we pro-
duce in our minds and which consti-
tute the framework of our cognitive
lives, are echoed in the symbolic forms
our minds create and discover. In-
formed by the content of our concep-
tions, mediated by our perceptions,
vitalized by a variety of concurrent pro-
cesses, we mentally shape meanings
in response to meanings which we
have previously received and associ-
ated with those structures already re-
siding within our minds.
Whether we are painters or archi-
tects, poets or composers, theologians
or scientists, we manipulate the mate-
rials and codes of our craft in accord
with conscious and unconscious dic-
tates of our mental capabilities. We
organize and reorganize, present and
represent, construct and reconstruct,
search and research in accord with a
bombardment of information that we
voraciously yet selectively absorb. Our
milieu, whatever and whenever, is ra-
dioactive with meanings embedded in
all the codes that we receive. Works of
art are particularly rich, especially if
we have the instinct, knack, training
and or discipline to translate and inter-
pret their meanings.
Just as we make art, so we make his-
tory. Both are fictions. Both are sym-
bolic constructs which reiterate the
possible structures of our minds. What
is possible is limited by what we per-
ceive and conceive and what we make
of these preceptions and conceptions.
When, in the work of art or in a particu-
lar construction of history, we discover
what, in a sense, we already knew,
such experiences are not unlike musi-
cal cadences, math problems that come
out even or the AHA! of a discovery and
understanding; our minds vibrate with
the acquisition of increased mental
structuring.
Wylie Sypher, approaching the prob-
lem of object, style and history, recog-
nizes the creative act as one of cogni-
tive transformation:
We shall, of course, assume that the
artist in any medium does not present
us with objects themselves or experi-
ence itself, but instead with a represen-
tation or portrayal of objects and experi-
ence; that is, the object or experience
appears in art only after it has been re-
duced or emancipated from actuality.
The instrument of reduction or eman-
cipation is the artist's style, the schema,
composition, or "form" in which he
makes his statement, the structure or
organization he imposes upon the ob-
ject or experience to which he refers.
Art filters life. Between us and actual-
ity the artist or writer places a special
style or technique-of-representation.^^
Missing from Sypher's explanation is
the cognitive process wherein the mind
fabricates the structure of the knowl-
edge whereby we can perceive and
know the actuality to which he refers,
on the one hand, and read about it in
the artistic symbols which, in their
form, style and composition, present
that structure.
We are all very different, yet very
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much the same. Because of this, it is
possible for us to tell each other new
things, and at the same time to under-
stand them. In our minds, we continu-
ously construct models of reality, as
well as plan and control our behaviors
within that reality. As we symbolize
and share the meanings that reality
has for us, and as we accommodate
our behaviors among one another, fix-
ing these collective behaviors in sym-
bolic form, we create communities,
societies and cultures, in short, his-
tory. The rituals, myths, codes, laws,
traditions, icons, objects of everyday
use, ornaments and decorations, the
forms into which we cast our knowl-
edge for preservation and transmis-
sion, the legends, fables, songs,
stories, fictions, science, religion and
art, exist not to make our lives more
pleasant, though that is sometimes a
significant consequence. While it may
be so, Nature and Art do not exist be-
cause they are beautiful. We make art
because it is meaningful, and among
the many meanings that we create, for
both Art and Nature, beauty is included.
History is a mental construction, a
cosmic scheme for explaining and
understanding reality, especially so-
cial reality, and its existence in time.
Voltaire said that history is a fiction
that we all agree to. Like art, it obliges
our suspension of disbelief in order to
apprehend its meanings. Our under-
standing of our own times and of those
past derives from the rich wealth of
evidence which we have created. This
evidence is imbued with meanings in-
herent in the formal structure of the
evidential artifacts. The form of the
artifacts derives from our symbolizing
capacities. These symbolizations are
the representational externalizations
of our individual conceptual construc-
tions, our thoughts, wishes, lies,
dreams, beliefs, ideas. These concepts
embody, as cognitive structures, the
perceptions of experience derived from
external data and internal processing,
including the experience of reading
and understanding symbols created by
ourselves and others.
How does the mind now compre-
hend previous historical constructs,
given the deterministic constraints of
the present? It seems to me that the
past is a cognitive construction of the
mind in the present. We create and
constantly recreate our past, shaping
and reshaping it in terms that are the
consequence of the present. While the
physicality of the symbolic object may
have changed very little, meanings to
its own time have evolved in concor-
dance with the changing temper of the
times. All artists are art historians,
whether they admit it or not. They learn
their craft and its traditions, its tech-
niques and symbolic powers, accept-
ing, altering, rejecting its lessons. We
can read the meanings in the symbolic
vehicles of the past, not because we
know more than did the creators of
those expressive events, but because
with the distance of time, comprehen-
sive visions become possible, and each
succeeding generation adds its own
layer of meanings which alter all pre-
vious layers.
Modern abstract, non-representa-
tional art, in its many styles and con-
figurations, is meaningful as much by
what it does not incorporate as by
what we do perceive as we confront
the object. The same may be said for
the apparent strangeness of modern
music. The rapidity with which such
radical changes took place in the re-
cent history of art, the phenomenal
diversity of materials, organizational
schema and meanings, themselves be-
tray a significant attribute of the milieu.
The total style change that we may
trace in the prodigious output of Pi-
casso, wherein every ten years saw a
completely new visualization, reflects
the rapidity of change of his and our
times and a complexity of intellectual
and cultural forces, simultaneously
vying for recognition. Einstein's rela-
tivistic universe and the interpenetra-
tion of matter and energy, space and
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time, have their analogous dynamic
reiterated in the ambiguous relation-
ships of fragmentary facets of the Cu-
bist figure. The Freudian and Jungian
world of deep-seated emotional forces,
and of mythic and primordial totemic
images are analogously reconstructed
in Picasso's expressionistic, mask-like
portraits and distorted human and ani-
mal forms. It is no coincidence that at
the same time that the Impressionists
were seeking mechanistic methods of
recording, at high speed, the effects
of light upon the atmosphere and col-
ors of the external world, the camera
was being developed, and Zola was
creating a fictional form based upon
clinical observation and documenta-
tion which assumed a scientific "ob-
jectivity."
Like the cellular differentiation into
bone, muscle or nerve tissue as the
blastula develops into the various
components of the human embryo, so
the mind increasingly specializes its
symbolic capabilities. Apart from its
universality, which is not at issue in
this essay, the mind, at any one time,
is historically determined to express a
basic set of meanings regardless of the
mode of symbolization.
This wandering through history and
the human mind had Its beginnings
during my undergraduate days as a
student of William Fleming. He set me
on an intellectual journey with con-
cepts that he stated in the following
way and his words provide an appro-
priate conclusion:
. . . the end result of the artist's la-
bors, springing as it does from the same
social source and in turn addressed to
it, must have a certain unity. When these
aesthetic phenomena are viewed as an
interrelated whole, it begins to be pos-
sible to speak of a style, which might be
defined as a synthesis of the outgrowth
of man's changing ideas as expressed
in the symbolic language of the arts and
consisting of certain features shared by
them all. The arts thus become a lan-
guage in symbols and images by which
man communicates his ideas of order
and the meaning of life . . .^^
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For most of human history, there seems
to have been little interest in the draw-
ings of children; in fact, it is difficult
even to locate instances of drawings
made by children over one hundred
years ago. As part of the general inter-
est in child development over the past
century, however, interest in this topic
has quickened. And since drawings are
among the easiest products of child-
hood to collect, many parents, educa-
tors, and psychologists have saved the
drawings which have come their way.
As a result of this activity of collec-
tion, observation, and analysis, we
know a good deal about the types of
drawings that children of different
ages are likely to produce, at least
within Western society. And, although
it has been criticized of late (Golomb,
this volume), a consensus has emerged
on the principal "stages" of early draw-
ing. Transcending sheer description,
two other approaches — the clinical-
affective and the cognitive-procedural
— have dominated discussions by psy-
chologists on the nature and informa-
tiveness of children's drawings.
From a clinical perspective, draw-
ings have been seen as clues to the
child's affective life or even as clues
to hidden pathology (Alshuler and Hatt-
wick, 1947; Coles, 1967; Erikson, 1963).
In the hands of a skilled clinician, such
an approach can be extremely valu-
The research described in this paper was
supported by grants from the Spencer Foun-
dation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the
National Institute of Education (G-78-0031).
able. Nonetheless, it is not without its
dangers, particularly when applied in
a rigid, 'cookbook " fashion. The child
who draws all of her figures at the bot-
tom of the page may well be expressing
a sense of powerlessness; on the other
hand, she may be painting at an easel
which is positioned too high for her to
reach above the bottom of the page.
Similarly, the child who uses a great
deal of black may be expressing nega-
tive feelings. On the other hand, it is
possible that he always reaches for the
paint in the jar on his left. If this is
simply where the black paint is habitu-
ally kept, then his paintings will take
on dismal hues. In brief, the clinician
must be careful to determine that those
aspects of children's drawings to be
interpreted were produced where al-
ternatives existed, and that they emerge
with some regularity across contexts.
Those who have adopted a cognitive
approach to children's drawings have
used drawings as measures of intelli-
gence (Goodenough, 1926), as indica-
tions of the child's conception of space
(Freeman, 1980; Piaget and inhelder,
1956) or of his ability to follow a set of
sequential rules (Freeman, 1980; Good-
now, 1977). While this approach differs
in many ways from the clinical ap-
proach, in at least one way it is similar.
From both the clinical and the cogni-
tive orientation, drawings are seen as
Additional unpublished graphic materials
supporting this research are available from
the editorial office of the Review of Re-
search in Visual Arts Education.
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clues to something else (presumably
of greater or more permanent interest
within the child).
Only rarely have drawings been ex-
amined in terms of their own intrinsic
interest, for example, as objects dis-
playing (at least potentially) some aes-
thetic properties. In an early set of
studies, Meier and his associates (1933,
1936, 1939) raised the question of
whether children's drawings possessed
some of the properties of adult art
works, such as composition and bal-
ance. Schaefer-Simmern (1948) exam-
ined the organizational principles
which underlie drawings by young chil-
dren and by others unschooled in
graphic depiction. More recently, Arn-
heim (1974) and Golomb (1973) have
analyzed children's drawings in terms
of the child's incipient grasp of the
rules of the graphic medium. Each of
these lines of study is quite promising,
but, with the exception of Golomb
(1973; this volume), none of them has
been pursued in controlled experimen-
tal settings, and they have not yet been
examined within a systematic program
of research.
At Harvard Project Zero, we and our
colleagues have been investigating the
aesthetic status of children's drawings
and their relationship to works of art
produced by adult artists. In particular,
we have searched for evidence that the
drawings of children genuinely exhibit
those properties thought by connois-
seurs to be central to, and defining of,
works of art
—
properties such as ex-
pressivity, consistent style, and bal-
anced composition. Our inquiries have
begun with the scrutiny of collections
of children's drawings and with "on
line" observations of children draw-
ing. But it has become clear to us that
the issue of the aesthetic status of chil-
dren's drawings can only be pursued
in depth if, to our collection of spon-
taneous drawings, we add drawings
made under controlled experimental
conditions. And so, much of our recent
work has involved efforts to assess the
aesthetic status of children's drawings
in situations where there is a genuine
likelihood that the drawings may fail
to exhibit artistry. Rather than assum-
ing that children's works are — or are
not — artistic, we have made this ques-
tion the topic of our research.
It may be useful to trace the steps
whereby we arrived at this approach.
In our preliminary observations, we
noted that children's drawings appear
to follow a U-shaped pattern of devel-
opment with respect to their aesthetic
qualities. Preschool children produce
drawings that are spirited, original,
and aesthetically appealing, drawings
that are indeed worth a second look.
The child at this age is unconcerned
with realistic representation, and his
works often bear a striking resem-
blance to the works of adult contem-
porary artists (Figure 1). Elementary
school children draw less frequently
than do preschool children. And when
they do draw, their works are much
more predictable, more conventional,
more realistic, and altogether less strik-
ing and original than those of pre-
schoolers. Children of this age want
to master the graphic conventions of
their culture, and in the West this
leads to an interest in the conventions
of 'realistic representation (e.g., per-
spective, shading, naturalistic use of
color, neatness and accuracy). In their
obsessions with mastering the rules of
representation, children in the middle
childhood years produce works that,
while more "correct" than preschool
drawings, often appear less aestheti-
cally pleasing: by their very conven-
tionality, they have become ordinary.
While the drawing of a 4 year old might
resemble a Picasso sketch, the draw-
ing of a 2 year old would rarely call to
mind such a comparison.
Only a few individuals emerge from
this conventional stage — those who
go on, as adults, to become artists. The
adult artist, having already mastered
the conventions of drawing during late
childhood and adolescence, may now
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Figure 1. Left: Drawing by a preschool child.
Right: Drawing by Pablo Picasso.
begin to violate these conventions.
And, in so doing, he produces works
that, at least in our era, bear an un-
canny resemblance to the works of
the preschooler.
The striking sinnilarity between the
drawings of the preschooler and the
adult artist has led us to ask whether
this similarity is superficial or deep.
We have asked whether various aes-
thetic aspects of the child's work are
intentionally produced, or whether they
are better viewed as "happy accidents "
which the child could not repeat at will.
To answer such a question, one cannot
simply scrutinize spontaneously pro-
duced drawings. Rather, experimental
interventions are necessary. In what
follows, we describe several experi-
ments motivated by the observation of
the similarity between the art of the
child and the art of the adult master.
We first took a closer look at the ap-
parent decline in aesthetic appeal in
children's drawings during the elemen-
tary school years. Has the child who
has entered the "conventional" stage
of drawing actually lost the ability to
create the kinds of striking drawings
made a few years earlier? Or has he
retained this ability, but simply chosen
to draw differently? Can the literal age
child, who ordinarily creates careful,
accurate, highly conventional drawings
with minimal expressivity still create
the less realistic, freer, more original
type of drawing produced so effort-
lessly in the preschool years (Fig. 1)?
Or is this early freedom lost to the ele-
mentary school aged child?
In an attempt to answer this ques-
tion, we studied a group of 9 and 10
year olds at the "heights of conven-
tionalism" (Winner, Mendelsohn, Bar-
ron and Gardner, 1980). We asked
these children to make a drawing and
did not stipulate what it had to be. We
then showed them several drawings by
preschoolers. We did not tell the chil-
dren that these were preschool draw-
ings, but simply said, "I want you to
look at some drawings that somebody
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else did." We asked the children to
look very carefully at these drawings,
because after a while we intended to
take these drawings away and ask
them to make a new drawing just the
way "this other person would have
done it." Thus, if the child had initially
drawn a house, we asked him to draw
another house, but this time, to draw
it in the style of the preschool models.
After we had collected all the drawings,
they were scored by two "blind" judges
along a number of dimensions, such as
overall unity, balance, fluidity, origi-
nality, realism, and "appeal."
The findings of this study were re-
markably clear. The elementary school
children were indeed able to capture
certain aspects of the preschool draw-
ings, but only the most superficial
ones. Their drawings failed to exhibit
fluidity, unity, originality, and aesthetic
appeal. Figure 2 illustrates a typical
response. On the left is the child's ini-
tial drawing, an interior scene with a
table and a window. The picture is
rather carefully drawn, and one can
see that the child has begun to master
the rules of perspective. On the right
is the same scene drawn after having
seen the preschool models. Perhaps
the first thing to notice is that the
child's second picture is messier. The
messiness of preschool drawings seems
to be the most noticeable aspect to
elementary school children. In fact.
our subjects often said, "I'm making
this messy on purpose. I know how to
draw right, but I'm doing this to make
it look like those others." Another thing
to notice is that in the child's second
drawing, the form of the window is dis-
torted. Presumably this is because he
is trying draw less realistically, a qual-
ity which he notices in the preschool
models. However, in the process, the
picture loses its overall unity and
balance.
Another common solution was to
capture not the messiness but the non-
realistic aspect of preschool works.
Many children simply altered this one
aspect of their drawings, superimpos-
ing it on the rest of an otherwise unal-
tered picture. Thus, one child changed
his initial standard brown house to a
house with a fanciful design on its fa-
cade; another child altered the smooth
lines of a car so that the contours be-
came unrealistically jagged.
Perhaps, one might argue, the chil-
dren in our experiment realized that
they were being asked to draw like
younger children. If so, perhaps their
preconceptions about younger chil-
dren intruded. That is, 10 year olds
certainly know that younger children
are messier and less skillful. Thus, in-
stead of really observing how the pre-
school drawings were constructed, 10
year olds may have simply drawn ac-
cording to their preconceptions about
Figure 2. Left: Spontaneous drawing by 10 year old.
Right: Drawing by same child after viewing preschool models.
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how preschool children draw. How-
ever, the children were also shown pic-
tures by adult artists such as Miro,
Klee, and Picasso, and were asked to
redraw their initial drawings in these
styles. Very similar results were ob-
tained from this condition. While the
children did not see these pictures as
messy, they saw them as unrealistic.
In fact, their lack of realism was their
most salient property. Thus, the chil-
dren altered their spontaneous draw-
ings in just this way. For instance, one
child who had originally drawn a brown
dog altered his drawing by making a
red and yellow dog. Nothing else, how-
ever, was changed. While he had cap-
tured the non-naturalistic quality of
contemporary art, he had failed to
capture its "flavor" and appeal.
Thus, it appears as if children in the
literal stage have actually lost the abil-
ity to do what they so effortlessly did
a few years ago. They can recapture
only superficial aspects of preschool
art. Their drawings remain rigid and
stylized. To be sure, we cannot prove
that the ability to draw freely and ex-
pressively is lost. Perhaps we should
have directly pointed out the aspects
of the preschool works to attend to:
their fluidity, their unusual use of color,
etc. However, within the confines of
our task, we were unable to elicit
drawings that had the charm and the
originality of the preschool child's
drawings. None of the elicited draw-
ings in the style of the preschool child
would ever be confused either with
actual preschool drawings or with
works of adult artists.
But just what is this gift that is lost?
To what extent are preschool children
in control of this gift, and to what ex-
tent are their works simply "happy ac-
cidents?" This brings us to a second
question raised by the existence of the
U-shaped curve: what is the relation-
ship between preschool art and later
mastery? U-shaped curves have been
found in a number of domains [e.g.,
language (Bowerman, 1979); problem-
solving (Richards and Siegler, 1979;
Stavy, Strauss, Orpaz, and Carmi, 1979);
metaphor (Gardner and Winner, 1979);
and face recognition (Carey, 1979)]. In
each of these cases, investigators have
reported an early high performance
followed by a decline and a subse-
quent return to the initial high perfor-
mance. However, in none of these
cases can the two high points of the
curve be equated without intensive in-
vestigation. Even though the perfor-
mances at the two high points appear
similar, equivalent performances may
well be the product of very different
underlying processes.
We have been trying to determine
the relationship between works pro-
duced at the two high points of the U-
shaped curve. To pose this question
is, in fact, to pose the question hinted
at above: to what extent are children's
drawings works of art? To answer this
question, one needs some criteria by
which to determine whether something
is or is not a work of art.
The attempt to discover a set of
criteria which distinguish art from
non-art has had a long and vexed philo-
sophical history. Definitions have often
been conflated with value, thus exclud-
ing bad art from the domain of art. Or
they have proved too general, including
non-aesthetic as well as aesthetic ob-
jects under their rubric. For instance,
defining art as "harmonious form"
would force us to include much of
nature within the realm of art; and de-
fining art as "self expression" would
necessitate including as art direct
expressions of emotion, such as a
shout of anger or a peal of laughter.
However, recently, considerable
progress has been made in terms of
describing properties that are central to
works of art, and that are neither too
general nor too value laden. In what fol-
lows, we will consider three such
properties: repleteness, expression,
and balance, each of which tends to be
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found in adult works of art. The ques-
tion we will ask is: Can these properties
be found in the graphic output of the
very young child?
Repleteness
According to the philosopher Nelson
Goodman (1968), works of art function
symbolically as do many non-aesthetic
objects such as maps, traffic lights and
names. No inherent properties dis-
tinguish aesthetic from non-aesthetic
symbols: the same symbol can function
in or out of the arts. But when a symbol
is functioning as a work of art, it
typically takes on several character-
istics. One of these is repleteness.
To illustrate, imagine a zig-zag line.
Told that this is a line from an electro-
cardiograph, we attend simply to the
relative dips and peaks of the line.
Accurate and full reading of this symbol
demands that we attend to nothing
else. However, Goodman asks us to
now consider this line as the outline
of a mountain in a pen and ink land-
scape drawing. Immediately, many
other properties of the line catch our
attention. Now what becomes impor-
tant to notice is not only the contour
described by the line, but also all of
its other physical qualities — the
minutest variation in its width, its
texture, its color or lack of color. Thus,
when producing and reading a line as
an aesthetic symbol, many more of
its properties become relevant. Be-
cause more of its properties become
relevant when the line functions aes-
thetically, it is called relatively replete.
Do children's drawings possess this
property? When children vary the
thickness of their lines, is this done
intentionally? Do they realize that
the physical properties of the line are
important to note, that they are part of
the meaning of the drawing just as
much as what the line represents?
In order to answer the question, it
does not suffice simply to look at
spontaneously produced drawings:
there is no way to know whether such
properties as variations in line quality
were placed there deliberately or
accidentally. Thus, some experimental
intervention is called for. Carothers
and Gardner (1979) designed pairs of
drawings identical in representational
content but differing in line quality.
For instance, in one picture the lines
were thick and dark and the shading
was achieved by horizontal "bar" lines.
In the contrasting picture, the lines
were thin and light and the shading
was effected through cross-hatched
lines. ^ Each drawing had a blank space
on the right, and 7, 10, and 12 year olds
were asked to add a person in this space
"the way that the child that did the
drawing would have finished it." Chil-
dren were shown the two members of
a pair together so that the contrast
between them would be evident. "If
you see any difference between the two
drawings," they were told, "try to make
your drawings differ in the same way."
Two different types of pairs, varying
according to different properties of
line, were used.
If children are sensitive to the prop-
erty of repleteness, then they should
realize the properties of the line matter.
Thus, they should complete each draw-
ing'using the same line quality as in
the rest of the drawing. Of course it
is possible that they might perceive
the difference, and even recognize its
importance, but yet be unable to pro-
duce it. Thus, after children had made
a completion for each member of a
pair, one picture was taken away and
two possible completions were pre-
sented. Children were asked to pick the
one completion that they thought was
done by the same person who drew
the picture.
The results of this study were very
clear-cut. Seven year olds demonstrated
little sensitivity to repleteness in either
the production or the perception tasks.
Figure 3 shows two completions by a
7 year old. Their line quality is identical,
yet the one on the left was a completion
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/Figure 3. Left: Seven year old's completions for repleteness task.
Note identical line quality.
Right: Twelve year old's completions for repleteness task.
Note different line quality.
of the picture with light lines, and the
one on the right was a completion
of the picture with dark lines. And on
one of the perception tasks adminis-
tered, 7 year olds chose randomly.
Ten year olds were able to perform
at a high level on the perception tasks,
but were just beginning to be able to
succeed on the production tasks.
Twelve year olds, on the other hand,
could not only perceive repleteness
but could also produce it. Figure 3
shows two completions by a 12 year
old: as can be clearly seen, the line
qualities of these two completions
are qualitatively different.
After the experiment was over, the
experimenter discussed the task with
each child. These discussions revealed
that, when told to search for differences
between the two pictures, 7 year olds
sought differences such as an extra
finger, or a shoe in one but not in the
other picture. Finding no such differ-
ences, and blind to the difference in
line quality, these children proceeded
to produce identical completions and
to often choose randomly on the multiple
choice tests. This study suggests that
between the ages of 7 and 12 years,
drawings are transformed in their very
nature. They are transformed from non-
aesthetic to aesthetic symbols.
Expression
Goodman (1968) makes a distinction
between several kinds of symbolization.
One type is denotation, through which
a symbol refers to something in the
world. Denotation is a form of symbol-
ization widely used both in and out of
the arts: maps denote; names denote;
and in the arts, representational paint-
ings denote. (Graphic representation
is a form of denotation.) However, while
denotation is a common property of
the arts, it is not a necessary one: music
rarely denotes; neither does a Mondrian
painting. But this does not mean that
these works are not symbolic. Rather
than symbolizing through denotation,
these works symbolize through ex-
pression. For instance, an abstract
painting expresses moods and non-
visual sensory properties. A mood of
sadness, at least in our culture, is
often expressed by the use of dark
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colors and droopy lines, gaiety by
bright colors and sprightly lines, loud-
ness by jagged lines or bright colors.
In these cases, the means of conveying
is metaphorical. While a painting may
be literally blue, it is only metaphorically
sad or loud. Because all works of art
express but only some denote, expres-
sion can be said to be a mode of sym-
bolization more central to the arts
than denotation.
To investigate when children become
able to deliberately manipulate line,
color, and form to metaphorically
convey non-visual properties, we car-
ried out several studies. In the first of
these, using the same paradigm as in
the repleteness study described above,
7, 10, and 12 year olds were shown
a pair of drawings similar in represen-
tational content but different in ex-
pressed mood (Carothers and Gardner,
1979). The "sad" picture displayed a
man on a cloudy, cold day walking
past a closed store. The contrasting
"happy" picture displayed a man on a
sunny day walking past an open, wel-
coming store. 2 On the right of each
page there was again a blank space in
which children were asked to draw a
tree and some flowers. As in the re-
pleteness study, children were shown
both members of a pair together so
that the contrast between them would
be evident.
We asked children to draw a tree
rather than, for example, a person, be-
cause we wanted to elicit an expressive
rather than a denotational solution.
If children had added a person, they
might well have drawn a smiling or a
frowning face. This would constitute
denoting a sad person but not express-
ing sadness metaphorically. As in the
repleteness task, after the children had
finished their own drawings, they were
given a multiple choice test. The "sad"
picture was removed and children were
asked to select one of two completions
for the happy picture — a drooping,
leafless tree (incorrect) or an upright
tree teeming with leaves and blooming
flowers (correct).
The results were very similar to those
obtained in the study of sensitivity to
repleteness. Seven year olds were not
able to produce expressively sad or
happy pictures. As can be seen in Figure
4, their completions for the two con-
trasting members of the pair did not
differ. And on the multiple choice task
they chose randomly. When they did
happen to choose correctly, and when
they were questioned as to this choice,
Figure 4. Left: Seven year old's completions for expression task.
Note the lack of difference between them.
Right: Twelve year old's completions for expression task.
Barren, gnarled tree with wilted flowers completes the "sad " picture (right);
blooming tree and flowers complete the 'happy" picture (left).
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they said, "I chose this because it's
drawn better," or "because it looks
more like a tree. " Never did they say
they chose it because it looked happier.
Ten year olds had no difficulty with
the multiple choice test, but were only
just beginning to be able to perform
successfully on the production test:
half were able to distinguish their two
completions appropriately. Twelve
year olds succeeded on both tasks.
Figure 4 shows a 12 year old's solu-
tion to the task.
One might argue, perhaps, that this
task is too indirect. Perhaps children
are capable of expressing moods, but
the subjects in our experiment did
not realize that this was what was being
asked of them. With this in mind, one
of our colleagues (Ives, 1980) simply
asked children directly to draw a happy
tree and a sad tree. He also asked them
to convey non-visual sensory properties
by drawing a quiet tree and a loud tree.
He found that when asked in this direct
manner, even 4 year olds could some-
times achieve expressive solutions;
but they were much more likely to do
so for the non-visual sensory property
of quiet and loud than they were for
the emotional properties happy and sad.
Figure 5 shows a metaphorical solu-
tion to the quiet and loud tree task.
Here the child has used size to convey
auditory volume. While children were
occasionally able to express auditory
properties by finding their metaphorical
visual analogue, when asked to express
moods they almost always invented a
representational solution, drawing
happy or sad faces on the tree. The
vast majority of pre-school solutions
to the loud-quiet task were also repre-
sentational rather than expressive
(e.g., shouting faces or musical notes
to convey loudness). After the age of 5,
representational solutions steadily
declined and expressive solutions
steadily rose.
In another study carried out in our
laboratory, we studied children even
younger than 4 (Scarlett, Fucigna,
Finkelstein, 1980). In this study, chil-
dren between the ages of 18 months
and 5 years were asked to make a "scary
house. " The earliest solutions to this
task revealed that very young children
(under 5) failed to respect the boundary
U
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Figure 5. Four year old's "quiet" tree (left) and "loud" tree (right).
Note the expressive solution.
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between themselves and their drawings.
Thus, they sometimes drew a standard
house, simultaneously growling at the
experimenter in order to scare him.
These children failed to respect the
rules of the visual medium and intro-
duced non-visual means of expression.
Thus, it appears that when asked
to express a mood or a non-visual
property in a drawing, children first
do so with their own bodies rather than
through their drawings. They then
adopt a representational solution,
indicating that they have confused
expression with denotation. But in the
late preschool years they begin to
express metaphorically in their draw-
ings. Sensitivity to expressivity, thus,
seems to emerge somewhat earlier
than sensitivity to repleteness. This
may be because expressivity is a more
direct manifestation of the child's own
emotional state. Moreover, the medium
of drawing may lend itself more directly
to expression than to repleteness.
Expression is, in brief, a less analytic
aspect of the arts: to achieve replete-
ness, one requires more of a detached,
studied attitude vis-a-vis the medium
than is called for in order to achieve
expression.
Balance
A third property of works of art, one
stressed by Rudolf Arnheim (1974), is
balance.^ A graphic composition may
be organized in several ways. It may,
first of all, be unbalanced, with the forms
and hence the weight so unevenly dis-
tributed as to create a sense of restless-
ness and tension. Works of art are rarely
so unbalanced; occasionally, however,
a contemporary artist may intentionally
create an unbalanced work in order to
convey tension.
Balanced compositions may be or-
ganized in a number of different ways.
They may be balanced by an even and
uniform distribution of forms across
the page, as in a checkerboard pattern.
They may be balanced through a sym-
metrical arrangement of forms, so that,
sliced along one or more axes, the
picture divides into mirror images. And
finally, pictures may be balanced
through a dynamic, asymmetrical
organization of forms (Arnheim, 1974).
For instance, a large form may be ade-
quately off-set by a much smaller form,
if the smaller form is painted a brighter
hue. A sense of balance can thus be
created because brightness makes
forms appear larger and thus heavier.
Or, to cite another example of dynamic
balance, several forms grouped closely
together on the right side of the page
may be balanced by just one of these
same forms to their left if that one form
is isolated, because isolation lends
the appearance of greater weight.
We asked whether children do in
fact balance their drawings, and if so,
what type of spatial rules they use in
order to achieve balance. Four, six,
and ten year old children were given a
series of more and less structured draw-
ing tasks. We also gave them a prefer-
ence task in order to determine the type
of spatial arrangements preferred at
different ages.
Spontaneous and completion tasks.
Children were first asked to draw two
piclures: a scene (house, tree, and some
birds) and a design (the Spontaneous
Task). Next they were asked to com-
plete a series of both representa-
tional and nonrepresentational un-
balanced drawings (the Completion
Task). Drawings were scored as either
unbalanced; balanced through filling
in all the space; balanced through sym-
metry; or balanced through a dynamic,
asymmetrical arrangement.
We expected that balanced drawings
would increase in frequency with age.
However, contrary to prediction, for
both Spontaneous and Completion
Tasks (and for both representational
and nonrepresentational drawings),
balanced compositions exceeded un-
balanced ones at all ages. Thus, 4
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year olds proved just as likely to balance
their pictures as did older children.
With respect to the type of balance
achieved at different ages, we expected
symmetrical solutions to give way to
dynamic ones, since the latter seem
more difficult to achieve. This ex-
pectation was not fulfilled, however.
While symmetrical solutions did in-
crease with age, replacing the frequent
4 year olds' solution of filling in all the
space, no shift was found in the use
of dynamic balance. At all ages, about
a quarter of the drawings produced
were dynamically balanced.
But is there really no difference be-
tween the 4 year old's dynamically
balanced organization and that of the
10 year old? It seems to us that there
may be an important difference. It
seems quite possible (although it
remains unproven) that the 4 year old
achieves dynamic balance accidentally.
Although it is difficult to achieve
symmetry by accident, it is much more
possible to achieve dynamic balance
unintentionally, since its rules are more
flexible. It is our best guess that the
preschoolers are striving for symmetry;
failing, due to technical limitations,
they often achieve dynamic balance
instead. One piece of evidence in sup-
port of this speculation comes from
the preference task, to be discussed
below, in which 4 year olds revealed
less attraction to dynamic balance
than did older children.
Copy tasks. Children were next asked
to copy unbalanced pictures. We
wanted to know whether there was a
tendency to correct an unbalanced
model by making the copy more
balanced than the model. Here, strik-
ing results were obtained. Of all ages
studied, 4 year olds were most likely
to increase the balance of the model.
While they did not really adhere to the
task of faithfully copying, they did pro-
duce a more balanced picture than the
model. Six year olds revealed an op-
posing tendency. They decreased the
model's balance, squeezing the forms
even further over to the left. Ten year
olds faithfully copied the model, main-
taining the same degree of lack of
balance in their copies. However, when
they did fail to copy accurately, their
mistakes were always in the direction
of greater balance. These results sug-
gest that in 4 year olds, the tendency
to balance is stronger than the ability
to copy faithfully. Six year olds, in
attempting to conteract this tendency,
lean too far in the opposite direction.
By the age of 10, the tendency to bal-
ance is outweighed by the ability to
adhere to the task.
Preference task. Finally, children
were asked to choose their favorite
picture, given a choice of four: sym-
metrically balanced, dynamically bal-
anced, unbalanced — too heavy on
the right, and unbalanced — too heavy
on the left. All ages preferred balanced
to unbalanced pictures, and symmetri-
cal to dynamic balance. The findings
of the preference task revealed that
children like certain types of balance
before they can produce these types
themselves. While 4 year olds produced
fewer symmetrical pictures than did
older children, they preferred symmetry
as strongly as did older children; and
while older children did not produce
a greater number of dynamically bal-
anced pictures than younger children,
they preferred this type of balance more
often than their younger counterparts.
If preference does indeed precede
production, one would expect even
older children to begin to produce more
dynamically balanced drawings. We are
now looking at the drawings of older
children and adults, and our prelimi-
nary results support such a prediction.
Conclusion
We began our consideration of the
aesthetic aspects of children's drawings
by noting certain similarities between
preschool and adult graphic works.
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To determine whether these similarities
were simply superficial, we investi-
gated the extent to which preschool
works possess properties character-
istically found in adult works of art.
This led us to investigate three proper-
ties: repleteness, expression, and bal-
ance. It should be noted that these
properties are characteristic of all
types of art, not just those twentieth
century works that happen to bear a
resemblance to preschool works.
Therefore, our investigation in no way
rests on the existence of a similarity
between preschool and adult art, al-
though this similarity stimulated the
question motivating this study.
Our studies suggest the following
tentative conclusions. Even though
preschool drawings look like adult
works of art, and even though they
could be slipped into an exhibit of
contemporary art and passed off as
adult works, they are produced by
very different underlying processes.
The preschooler is not in control of
the property of repleteness. He does
not realize that all of the details matter,
that all are relevant. Sensitivity to re-
pleteness increases linearly with age.
This is somewhat of a paradox. At the
preschool age, when children's draw-
ings appear aesthetic, children are not
sensitive to repleteness; and at the
elementary school age, when children's
drawings appear less aesthetic, chil-
dren are becoming increasingly sensi-
tive to repleteness.
A similar paradox obtains with ex-
pression. The ability to convey moods
metaphorically increases steadily
with age, even though it appears as
if "conventional stage" children have
lost this ability in their spontaneous
works. Thus, contrary to our initial study
in which elementary school children
were asked to draw like preschool
children and failed to recapture the
flavor of preschool drawings, here is
another line of evidence that older
children have not lost but are steadily
gaining. The paradox is that, while
preschool drawings appear more ex-
pressive than "conventional stage"
drawings, it is the 10 year olds who are
in control of this property while the
preschoolers are not. Thus, in these
two cases, elementary school children
have skills that they are not putting
to use in their spontaneous works.
And preschool age children appear to
have a skill that they in fact do not have.
As for balance, the story is somewhat
different. Clearly, preschool children
prefer balance to unbalance, and will
go to great lengths to balance their
pictures, even if it means incorrectly
copying a model. But the fact that
even when directly copying an unbal-
anced picture they produce a balanced
one, suggests that the 4 year old is
not really in control of balance: rather,
balance seems to be in control of the
child. Thus, unlike the adult artist, the
preschool child may well be unable to
choose to produce an unbalanced pic-
ture in order to express tension, for
example.
Thus, although preschool works bear
an uncanny resemblance to certain
twentieth century masters, these two
bodies of work are really very different.
Of course, this does not mean that
preschool drawings should be ex-
cluded in toto from the realm of "art."
No sharp boundary between art and
non-art can be drawn. What we main-
tain here is that preschool works tend
to possess fewer of those properties
that are characteristic of adult works
of art. However, it remains possible that
preschool children do in fact genuinely
produce replete and expressive draw-
ings, but, when given an experimental
task, they fail to understand what is
expected of them and thus their per-
formance deteriorates. The extent to
which the present results are task-
dependent remains to be determined.
Despite the probable differences
between preschool and adult art, there
may yet be a special kinship between
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the child artist and the adult artist.
This kinship may take several forms.
Four year olds resemble adult artists:
in their willingness to violate norms,
in the intensity with which they go
about the task of drawing, in their will-
ingness to explore for hours at a time,
and in their inventiveness and play-
fulness with the medium. Moreover,
these modes of behavior do not seem
to be entirely unconscious: young
children appear to be delighted with
their playful attitude and to value adult
reactions to their violations of graphic
norms. And perhaps there is a reason
for this difference between the child
and the artist on the one hand, and the
rest of us on the other. Whereas most
of us, with age, come increasingly to
rely on verbal language to express
ourselves, and thereby to abjure non-
verbal symbol systems, the child and
the adult artist are working out themes
that they either cannot deal with — or
choose not to deal with — in the "nor-
mal" symbol system. Some of these
themes are conceptual (e.g., the nature
of spatial relations) and some are af-
fective (e.g., aggression, conflict,
tension). Paradoxically, it is to this
selective inarticulateness that all
lovers of art are in debt.
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Footnotes
1. Stimuli used are reproduced in Ca-
rothers and Gardner (1979).
2. Stimuli used are reproduced in Ca-
rothers and Gardner (1979).
3. While Arnheim has written a great deal
about balance in works of art, he has not
attempted to make the argument that the
presence of balance distinguishes art from
non-art. In fact, he argues that no such dis-
tinction between art and non-art ought to be
made (Arnheim, personal communication).
However, we have taken the property of
balance which he stresses and have used it
in our own theoretical framework in our at-
tempt to determine the relationship between
preschool and adult art.
Ellen Winner and
Howard Gardner
Harvard University
Graduate School of Education
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Art in nhildrpn's Drawlnns 31
RESPONSE TO WINNER AND GARDNER
Brent Wilson
The Pennsylvania State University
In their paper Ellen Winner and How-
ard Gardner have indeed marked the
boundaries of an important area of
inquiry into children's drawings. Their
questions relating to the artistic and
aesthetic status of the graphic work of
young people have generally been ig-
nored by psychologists and art educa-
tors alike. But of course when one
inquires into the aesthetic and artistic,
one has entered the domain of the
philosopher and historian of art as
well. It is upon this ground that Winner
and Gardner must be criticized.
First let us attend to some historical
facts. Winner and Gardner point to
similarities in a child's easel paintings
and a painting by Helen Frankenthaler
as evidence of the possible heights of
artistry achieved by preschool chil-
dren. But of course it is only in the
century of abstract expressionism that
we would note such a superficial simi-
larity. The child's non-representational
works bear little resemblance to Giotto,
Leonardo, Rembrandt or even today's
Richard Estes. The similarity seems
nothing more than a mere and passing
coincidence in the history of art. Fur-
thermore, when the works are pre-
sented in nearly equivalent postage
stamp sizes and in black and white
reproduction, they bear only a few of
the qualitative, technical and stylistic
differences that we would see if we
were to compare Frankenthaler's eight
or ten foot canvases with the child's
tempera paintings on 18 x 24 inch
newsprint paper.
These comparisons are important
because much of the weight of Win-
ner's and Gardner's argument for view-
ing graphic development as a U-shaped
curve lies in the contention that an
artistic height has been achieved by
the pre-schooler in art-like productions
that are viewed as expressive, spon-
taneous and inventive. When these fea-
tures diminish (if indeed they do) in
the graphic productions of older chil-
dren, these works are said to have
"less aesthetic appeal," may also sig-
nal an actual loss of ability to create
the "striking drawings made a few
years earlier." At this point we might
ask, are the proper questions being
asked, and has a proper factual and
philosophical foundation been pre-
pared?
The philosophical position in which
Winner and Gardner ground their in-
quiry is that of Nelson Goodman.
Goodman has seen the futility of an-
swering the question "what is art?"
observing the more appropriate ques-
tion to be "when is art?" For Goodman
art is when repleteness and expression
occur to which Winner and Gardner
add balance. When a production has
these features, apparently it has the
basic attributes for qualification as art.
Of course it may still not be considered
art. Winner's and Gardner's older sub-
jects could reproduce these features,
and yet what they produced could cer-
tainly not be considered an occasion
for art.
Art is a conventional classification,
or better, a series of classifications —
tribal art. Renaissance art, classical
art, folk art, comic art, advertising art
and, yes, even child art. Furthermore,
a look at the history of art reveals how
artifacts, which once neither fit into
particular conventional classifications
nor were considered to be art at all,
have, through changes in perceiver's
attitudes or in provenance of the work,
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acquired a new or different artistic
status; mere illustrations have become
prized paintings, ritual objects have
become exquisite sculptures. Artists,
too, can alter their works in order to
move them from one classification to
another. Thus through changes in the
handling of media or subject matter,
the illustrator becomes the fine artist-
painter. Holding to our idea of classi-
fications, we may also observe the
preschool child artist becoming the mid-
dle childhood artist and then the ado-
lescent illustrator, cartoonist, and oc-
casionally even the adolescent painter.
In short, art is not just one thing; it is
lots of things, and what Winner and
Gardner have observed without fully
stating it is that sometime around the
age of 10 children are able develop-
mentally to produce two of the symp-
toms of a few kinds of essentially adult
types of art.
But what of the graphic productions
of the preschooler to which Winner
and Gardner attribute so much — us-
ing words such as: "inventiveness,"
"playfulness," "violation of norms,"
"unpredictability," "unconventional,"
"spirited," "original," and "aestheti-
cally appealing"? Surely some of these
adjectives apply, but others seem to in-
dicate a misunderstanding of the de-
velopmental conditions under which
the preschool child produces graphic
work. They see preschool productions
as less predictable and conventional
than those of older children. Yet the
early productions are surely the most
predictable because, as Winner and
Gardner say of balance, "the 4 year old
is not really in control of balance:
rather, balance seems to be in control
of the child," likewise, the young child
is the most highly biased of all graphic
producers — biased to make the sim-
plest forms possible, to order forms
at right angles, to fulfull the intrinsic
demands of a particular format, etc.
Thus their work is the most utterly pre-
dictable of all graphic productions!
And to call the productions of pre-
schoolers unconventional is at best
a misnomer. Winner and Gardner char-
acterize the graphic agenda of middle
childhood to be one of acquiring con-
ventions; therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that preschoolers do not pos-
sess these conventions. Preschool
work may be somewhat preconven-
tional when considered in light of adult
graphic conventions; to be unconven-
tional in the artistic sense is to have
acquired conventions and then to have
broken them. Preschoolers surely can-
not break conventions that they are
not yet able to produce.
Other qualities of the graphic pro-
ductions of preschoolers may also be
attributed to somewhat erratic motor
control and to their ability to be satis-
fied with configurations that conform
only vaguely to some exterior graphic
production model.
I see little evidence for the claim for
the existence of the U-shaped devel-
opmental curve in graphic production.
Perhaps with more inquiry some few
aspects of graphic competence may
be found to decline for a period of
time. Nevertheless, the evidence from
the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress and from Winner and
Gardner's inquiry is that the highly
complex matter of graphic develop-
ment is a steady process. The fact that
Winner and Gardner might even con-
sider that the productions of five year
olds have more artistry than those of
ten year olds seems to reveal more
about the inquirer's aesthetic tastes
in art than the facts of graphic devel-
opment. My taste is for middle child-
hood and adolescent art. Perhaps that
is why I have a bias against the U-curve.
Brent Wilson
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania 16802
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RESPONSE TO WINNER AND GARDNER
Elizabeth C. Clarke
Syracuse University
The following thoughts are written in
response to "The Art in Children's
Drawings," an outline of a paper pre-
sented by Howard Gardner and Ellen
Winner at the Symposium on Repre-
sentation and Metaphor. The relevance
of these thoughts may vary to the ex-
tent that Gardner and Winner's paper
actually reflects their outline and
presentation of it.
According to Gardner and Winner's
outline, their paper focuses on two
issues: Is there a regular progression
in the development of children's art?
and What is the relationship between
children's art and the art of contem-
porary adult artists?
The present discussion will focus on
the question of progress in children's
art. First, because children's artistic
progress is central to art education.
Second, because, as I will try to point
out, the relationship of children's art
to adults' art is implicit to Gardner and
Winner's concept of development in
art. Consequently, it is not an issue
that they have effectively separated
from the interpretation of their devel-
opmental data.
fn the outline of their paper, Gardner
and Winner assert that there is "con-
siderable evidence to document a regu-
lar progression in the development of
graphic art. Moreover, the progression
follows a U-shape curve." They explain
that the drawings of preschoolers,
which appear highly expressive and
original, possess a charm and aesthetic
appeal indicative of artistic ability,
while the drawings of older elementary
school children, which are conven-
tional and predictable, possess less
charm and aesthetic appeal indicating
a decline in artistic ability. In the pre-
sentation, a selection of slides were
shown to demonstrate that the ability
to produce aesthetically appealing
drawings reappears only in adults who
go on to become professional artists.
In developmental psychology, Gard-
ner and Winner's finding of a U-shape
progression suggests remarkable and
highly significant results. This is be-
cause, as T. G. R. Bower (1979, p. 303)
has observed, "the belief that behav-
ioral growth is a continuous process
with the child necessarily getting bet-
ter and better at any task as he grows,
is the foundation for a great deal of
effort in developmental psychology.
. . . indeed, the whole concept of I.Q.
depends upon the assumption."
Piagefs theory of intellectual devel-
opment certainly describes a process
in which cognitive abilities occur in
sequentially fixed stages toward the
direction of highest order. Moreover,
there is general agreement among psy-
chologists that Piaget's highest order,
end-state of cognitive development is
perhaps a genetic epistemologist, or
if not, at least a western-trained scien-
tist. And, in spite of the problems of
cultural bias inherent in any concept
of a psychological end-state, the no-
tion of an end-state is generally re-
garded as a logical necessity for deter-
mining progress.
Gardner and Winner's research ap-
pears to be based on a Piagetian model
of cognitive development. Consistent
with that model, they maintain an im-
plicit concept of the highest order of
artistic development. For Gardner and
Winner, the end-state of artistic devel-
opment appears to be Abstract Expres-
sionism.
Abstract Expressionism can be iden-
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tified as Gardner and Winner's end-
state for artistic development on the
basis of their interpretation of the for-
mal properties of "expressivity" and
"charm" which characterize the draw-
ings possessing "aesthetic appeal."
These properties correspond in super-
ficial appearance to the properties of
selected adult work. The selected adult
work conforms to the style of Abstract
Expressionism.
The appearance of specific formal
properties are taken by Gardner and
Winner to indicate artistic ability, while
the absence of these properties is
taken to indicate inability, in spite of
the fact that there are other properties
present which might be interpreted to
indicate a different aesthetic appeal,
and certainly another artistic ability.
Because these specific formal prop-
erties appear in the early gestural
drawings of young children, and not
in the constructionist drawings of
older children, Gardner and Winner
reason that it must be because of a
decline in artistic ability, that may
never be regained. Clearly, it is their
reasoning which leads to such re-
markable results.
If Gardner and Winner had inter-
preted their data differently, they
might, as Bower (1979) did, reconsider
the concept of development itself. In
the science of psychology, experimen-
tal results are often used to confirm or
refute a theoretical belief. Results con-
trary to important theoretical beliefs are
usually interpreted to have methodo-
logical problems or to be anomalous.
Or, had Gardner and Winner identi-
fied a different style of art as the end-
state of artistic development, they
would have obtained different data.
Indeed, because children's perfor-
mances in art are so generally pre-
dictable to art-educators, many might
predict, for example, that if one held
Color-Field as the end-state of artistic
development, then two and three year
olds would demonstrate "artistic abil-
ity," while the representational draw-
ing of older children would indicate a
"decline. ' Or, if one held Pop-Art to
be the highest order of artistic devel-
opment, the drawings of ten year olds
would indicate "ability" and drawings
possessing different properties, say
calligraphic line quality, would indi-
cate "less ability.
"
The point is this: a developmental
psychologist could have derived al-
ternative interpretations from the same
data; or used the same tasks to gener-
ate entirely different data. Since one
of the rules for evidence in the sci-
ence of psychology requires that a set
of data possess the ability to confirm
certain theoretical beliefs and resist
alternative, conflicting interpretation,
it is unlikely that either psychologists
or educators will concur with Gardner
and Winner's claim that they have con-
siderable evidence to document a U-
shape progression in the development
of artistic ability.
There are several questions raised
for art educators by the research of
Gardner and Winner; What theory has
been tested? What new knowledge has
been gained? What insights do we
have about children, art, or develop-
mental psychology that we did not
previously have?
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REPRESENTATION AND REALITY: THE ORIGINS AND DETERMINANTS
OF YOUNG CHILDREN'S DRAWINGS
Claire Golomb
University of Massachusetts at Boston
I would like to address three distinct
though related issues that are at the
heart of our understanding of child
art: What are the origins and antece-
dents of the early representational
forms, for example, of the tadpole
figures? More specifically, do we
accept the developmental patterns out-
lined by Rhoda Kellogg who delineates
a necessary, perhaps even inevitable
progression from scribble forms to
placement patterns, to emergent
shapes, to diagrams and, finally, to
multiples of combines and aggregates?
A second and related question con-
cerns the determinants of early repre-
sentational figures. Are these figures
non-pictorial in intent, as Rhoda Kel-
logg claims, and a natural elaboration
of earlier practiced patterns, or do they
represent the child's best efforts to
capture a likeness to the visual world?
What animate and inanimate models
does the preschool child develop? Are
these models graphically differenti-
ated, and if so, how?
The third question addresses an old
issue, namely, that of the cognitive
deficiency of the young child's draw-
ing. The notion that child art is merely
a special case of conceptual immatur-
ity, typical of the mental functions of
young children, has received much at-
tention. In an earlier version, Luquet
and Piaget evoked the concept of "syn-
thetic incapacity" to explain the child-
ish drawings and their peculiarities.
More recently, it has become fashion-
able to analyze the drawings as per-
formance errors and Norman Freeman
has reformulated the problem in terms
of "production" deficits.
These three questions focus on basic
representational issues, namely, on
the origins of representational activity
in drawing, the transition from pre-
representational action to symboliza-
tion, the evolution of the first represen-
tational forms, and the determinants
of early graphic models. For didactic
purposes I have dealt with these ques-
tions separately, and explored them in
several empirical studies.
Our first question concerns the an-
tecedents of representational graphic
activity. Rhoda Kellogg (1969) has
devoted herself to this issue and for-
mulated an interesting thesis. She
perceives the scribbles and scribble-
pattern formations that children tend
to produce between the ages of two
and three years as crucial antecedents,
as necessary elements in the graphic
vocabulary that children evolve. She
has catalogued the scribbles into 20
basic ones, which form the units for
the next phase when children use vari-
ous outline figures or crossed line pat-
terns labeled "diagrams"; next, the
child combines these six units (dia-
grams) into more complex ones called
"combines," and she eventually reaches
a combinatorial stage of "aggregates"
that provide the means for the crea-
tion of figures, devoid as yet of pic-
torial likeness to real objects, but able
Paper presented at the National Symposium
for Research in Art: Learning in Art, Repre-
sentation and Metaphor. University of Illi-
nois, Urbana, IL, October 8, 1980.
Additional unpublished graphic materials
supporting this research are available from
the editorial office of the Review of Re-
search in Visual Arts Education.
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to represent them in some fashion. Ac-
cording to Rhoda Kellogg the ability
to make shapes can be seen in the
child's earliest scribble-formations,
which need to be exercised until eye-
control combines, alters, and recom-
bines the forms. It is an autonomous
process, innately determined, and in-
dependent of the impact of the visual
world. It is a process that proceeds in
a somewhat piecemeal fashion, anal-
ogous to block building, namely, from
a simple form to a more complex one
that combines the simple features.
Thus, Kellogg considers the non-pic-
torial scribbles and the emergent pat-
tern formations as the immediate pre-
cursors of the forms drawn later, when
the child deliberately and intentionally
represents objects. The child's earliest
recognizable drawings are character-
ized as non-pictorial, derived from
mandala and sun-schemas, and con-
structed quite independently of the
visual characteristics of the object. To
summarize Kellogg's position: Child
art evolves from non-pictorial designs,
unaffected by the visual attributes of
the object.
Rhoda Kellogg's account raises an
interesting question: Are we dealing
with a truly descriptive account of a
developmental phenomenon, or with
an adult's imposition of her preferred
taxonomy on children's drawings? Is
this taxonomy developmentally mean-
ingful, and does it clarify the repre-
sentational origins of the drawings?
The answer to this question seems to
me rather negative. I think that Rudolf
Arnheim's (1974) account, with his
stress on preferred perceptual-motor
patterns which single the circle out for
special attention, has much to recom-
mend it. The circular form bounds the
inside area, which attains a solid-look-
ing and figural quality, and thus
becomes useful for representational
purposes. Rudolf Arnheim sees the
evolution of the clear circular outline
and the single one-dimensional line as
the starting points for the development
of representational forms, whose
graphic differentiation is prompted as
well as guided by a visual representa-
tional logic. Almost from the very be-
ginning there is a tension between the
utilization of simple and preferred
forms such as the circle and the line,
and the need to do justice to the looks
of the objects. The forms which the
child uses to represent his first ob-
jects, are indeed forms of equivalence
— they serve a symbolic function —
and in some fundamental way they
must do justice to the referent. If we
observe the child at work and listen
to his comments, we notice his dis-
comfort when the drawing fails to meet
his standards of likeness. To correct
this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the
child uses words to bridge the gap be-
tween what he has produced and the
meaning it fails to convey, between his
perception of the object and his inade-
quate representation thereof. "We find
a whole range of verbalizations de-
signed to close the gap between per-
ception and representation (Golomb,
1973, 1974, 1977). Indeed, verbaliza-
tions change and decline as a func-
tion of increased graphic competence,
which tells us something about the
child's desire to capture a likeness to
tl^e object, a finding that does not
support Kellogg's account. It is inter-
esting to note that in "Analyzing Chil-
dren's Art" Rhoda Kellogg reports a
very low incidence of such important
precursors of the human figure as the
mandala and the sun-schema: a range
of only 1.6-9.6% for the mandala and
an even more limited range of 2-4% for
the sun-schema (p. 193). These very
low numbers and the identical mean
ages of 43 months (p. 192) for the first-
drawn sun-schemas and the first-drawn
humans do not support the notion of
stage progression in this case. Finally,
Dale Harris (1971), Malka Haas (1978)
and Susanna Millar (1975) have each
provided some evidence that children,
deprived of the opportunity to use
paper and pencil, seem to engage in
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only limited and short-lived scribble
exercises. These children appear to
skip the 'design" stage altogether,
and within a few trials they evolve the
familiar human figure representations.
Dale Harris collected his data from
children in the South American Andes.
The earliest trials yielded a very re-
stricted scribble repertoire, consisting
only of circular whirls or loops, sepa-
rately distributed over the page. The
next step already produced tadpole
figures. Malka Haas' collection of draw-
ings made by Bedouins from the Sinai
desert demonstrate that preschoolers
and adults who had never before been
exposed to paper and pencil, evolved
the human figure in a few trials, and
without extensive scribble or diagram
explorations. Finally, Susanna Millar's
work with blind children also demon-
strates this ability to create forms of
equivalence without previous scribble
experience.
If we truly want to understand the
evolution of representational abilities,
we ought to turn to young children in
the process of discovering graphic
possibilities, i.e., to children who make
the transition from scribble-forms to
figural representation. With this aim
in mind, we designed the following
study: Linda Whitaker and I asked 250
children between the ages of 2 to 7
years for a series of drawings, begin-
ning with two "free" drawings, merely
requesting the child to draw a picture
of anything she liked. Next, each par-
ticipant was asked for pairs of draw-
ings: a mommy and a baby, a giraffe
and a kitten, a snake and a worm, a
tree and a flower, a bird and a fish,
a house and a car. The order of the
presentation of the tasks was counter-
balanced, and the serial position of
the two items making up each pair
was consistently alternated. Each child
was tested individually and a complete
record of his actions was obtained.
Children who responded to the as-
signed tasks (those that requested the
drawing of specific objects) with scrib-
bles, were given several drawing-on-
dictation tasks: a mommy, cat, house,
and tree. The age range of our sub-
jects included at the lower end 2 year
old toddlers, clearly prerepresenta-
tional children. It was hoped that they
would provide us with an insight into
the questions we raised previously,
namely, the origins of representational
activity and its developmental course.
Analysis of the scribble-patterns pro-
duced by our 2 to 4 year olds revealed
some difficulty with Kellogg's scoring
criteria. A number of scribbles could
not be reliably identified, for example,
the decision to classify parallel vertical
lines as "single" (S-2), multiple vertical
(S-6) or zigzag (S-12) was frequently
quite arbitrary. A similar difficulty arose
with the identification of spiral lines (S-
15), multiple line overlaid circle (S-16),
multiple line circumference (S-17) or
even circular line spread out (S-18).
More serious was the finding that scor-
ing the end product without obtaining a
complete record of the drawing pro-
cess led to low inter-scorer reliability.
When good protocols were available,
inter-scorer agreement reached 70%.
However, since much scribble action
was produced without visual attention
to the paper and crayon, the value of
this scoring system must be seriously
questioned. Altogether, the scribble
patterns obtained in our study fall into
two broad categories consisting of
(1) whirls, loops and circles, and
(2) multiple, densely patterned paral-
lel lines.
When we turn to the major results
of our study, we find that most of the
children who produced energetic and
somewhat unruly scribble patterns on
the free drawing tasks, evolved sepa-
rately delineated contours when spe-
cific objects were requested. The in-
structions seemed to mobilize the
child's efforts and elicited visually
guided action. Of our 2 year old scrib-
blers, 39% produced at least one (1)
representational drawing either on-
request or on-dictation, a number which
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increased to 80% for our 3 year olds.
These children produced "pictorials"
without progressing through Kellogg's
sequence of prerequisite stages. The
prerepresentational child may, at times,
have a varied scribble repertoire (not
observed in our study); however, when
he struggles to create a figure-on-
request, this repertoire is not very use-
ful. The dictation task, for example,
demands on the spot solutions, and
the child's graphic inventions, under
the pressure of the task, shortcir-
cuits the need for lengthy practice with
scribble-patterns, implied shapes,
emergent diagrams, and combines. It is
a significant finding that only very few
drawings in the age range of 2 to 4
years could be classified as a "de-
sign," and even diagrams were ex-
ceedingly rare, a mere 4%. However,
several children drew distinct letters
of the alphabet, and identified them
as such.
As the foregoing analysis suggests,
it seems to me that the account of the
early beginnings is somewhat reversed:
as the child evolves some basic graphic
forms beyond the scribble patterns, as
she succeeds to control the unruly
scribble motions, the forms become
immediately useful for the representa-
tion of objects, and their meaning is
then determined by the whole figure.
Thus, the first pictorials, as Kellogg
calls them, or the first clearly recog-
nizable representations, as I would call
them, are not derived from earlier dia-
grams, combines and aggregates. It ap-
pears that the building block approach
to the origins of representational art in
children is not very useful, and that
it tends to describe the symbolic-
transformational process which child
art is, as a somewhat senseless, almost
mechanical process. When we exam-
ine the work of children who make the
transition from scribbles to represen-
tational forms, we discover that their
prime concern is with visual likeness
to the object. The symbolizing ten-
dency to link the drawing to its referent
establishes graphic order, it demands
graphic articulation, and it governs the
process of further graphic differentia-
tion. Forms are utilized, but they are
subordinated to the demands of the
task, i.e., to the meaning of the figure.
This analysis is not intended to belittle
the value of experimentation with the
medium. On the contrary, a visual-
graphic dialogue between what the
crayon produces and the eye interprets
is essential for representational prog-
ress. Our analysis merely emphasizes
that the search for the origins of repre-
sentation in the child's scribble actions
is a futile pursuit.
This brings us to our second ques-
tion which examines the evolution of
graphic models for several animate
and inanimate objects. We would like
to know how graphic differentiation
proceeds and how it relates to the
visual characteristics of the object.
Analysis of our data indicates the
impact of instructions on the drawing
process. Drawing-on-request elicited
in our 2 year olds a tendency, already
previously mentioned, to control the
unruly whirls, and to produce single,
ovalish looking shapes, with the ex-
ception of the response to the snake
and worm tasks, which produced single
vertical, horizontal or diagonal lines.
Humans were drawn by 22% of our 2
year old subjects, who usually com-
posed a global circle with facial fea-
tures with or without limbs. The other
tasks yielded only a small number of
representational figures, 5% for fish
and cats, respectively, and 13% for
trees and flowers.
In our 3 year old youngsters we ob-
served a dramatic increase in the draw-
ing of representational figures: 65%
— snakes, 42%— humans, 42% —
flowers and trees, 38%— cats, 23%
— birds, 19% — fish, 15% — giraffes,
houses and cars, respectively. The hu-
mans, cats and giraffes were repre-
sented, primarily, by a global animate
tadpolish figure, which in most cases
did not yet graphically differentiate
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among them, although occasionally, ear
markings, whiskers and diagonal necks
appeared. The snake model, however,
became unmistakably "snakish" with
its separate head, elongated slim body
and exclusively horizontal orientation.
Fish were drawn with a horizontal
ovalish body and sideways orientation.
The graphic differentiation of birds
lagged somewhat behind, but several
drawings were endowed with "wings."
Houses and cars were drawn, infre-
quently, and were marked by a ten-
dency toward rectangular and triangu-
lar forms.
The 4 year old children appeared
quite confident about their drawing
ability and we rarely encountered a
child who refused all tasks. Represen-
tational competence seemed to be in-
creasing with 88% drawing humans,
81% — snakes, 77%— birds, 65% —
giraffes, 65% — fish, 58% — cats, 92%
— trees and flowers, 73% — houses,
and 58% — cars. Figures began to look
like the objects they were intended to
represent, with at least 50% of the chil-
dren adopting suitable, graphically
distinctive models for the represen-
tation of humans, animals and man-
made objects. No longer were the chil-
dren satisfied with a global "animate"
model. The vertical length dimension
of the human body and the graphic
differentiation of its major parts were
stressed (see Figure 1). Cats got whis-
kers, triangular ears and a horizontal
body, frequently with a tail. The giraffe
boasted some of the characteristics of
this animal, namely, a long slender
diagonal neck, ears, horn-stumps and
spots, and was usually represented in
a sideways orientation (see Figure 2).
Fish and birds came to resemble their
real-life counterparts (see Figure 2),
houses became almost exclusively
angular (79%), while cars began to re-
semble VW models, trucks and fire
engines (60%). Only in the four year
old group did children draw designs
on the free drawing tasks (31%). The
designs were still quite simple in their
' cf r-i^ He hBS
A H,.ii-«<.t1? , HP
Figure 1. The human figure becomes graphically differentiated along the vertical axis
and is represented in full frontal view.
40 Claire Golomb
f'^Uu
^1r
pm;l
^
Figure 3. Designs called "combines" on the
free drawing task of a four year old.
Figure 2. The giraffe is now graphically
marked by its long neck, horn-stumps and
spots, while cats sprout ears and whiskers
as defining characteristics.
construction and could best be char-
acterized as "combines" (see Figure
3). Usually, the child spontaneously
Interpreted his designs and assigned
some meaning to them, for example,
a crossed square became a "cage."
Occasionally, a child asked the exam-
iner if she knew what the figure was.
The developmental progression ob-
served In the work of the 4 year old
children became more pronounced for
5 and 6 year olds. Humans and animals
were now almost exclusively drawn in
their preferred graphic orientations
which highlighted the visual charac-
teristics of the object: in the case of
the human — a frontal view, in the case
of most animals — sideviews, and in
the case of the bird — frequently aerial
views (see Figure 4). With few excep-
tions, the mean graphic differentiation
scores for the different figures did not
increase between the ages of 5 to 7
years. Instead we see an increase in
single outline drawings which attempt
to encompass all the parts of the fig-
ure in one sweeping line, and efforts
to lend more solidity to the outlined
figures by shading and coloring tech-
niques. Compositional improvement in
the organization of the figures was
also observed and "scenes" and "nar-
ratives" became more prevalent, with
here and there an attempt to deal with
different perspectives. Designs de-
clined to a mere 10% of the total pro-
ductions on the free drawing tasks,
and consisted mostly of simple geo-
metrical forms.
The previous findings suggest that
the objects in the real world rather
than the practice with designs deter-
mine the selection of representational
forms and models. The forms children
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Figure 4. Sideviews of animals predominate and become the preferred orientation.
use when they construct humans, ani-
mals or houses are few and simple
ones. While previous practice with
forms may facilitate their use, the
child's representational intention ulti-
mately determines the choice of pat-
terns, whether previously practiced
or newly invented. This is nicely dem-
onstrated in the draw-a-flower task by
a 5 year old. In this task the child em-
ployed new graphic forms not utilized
on the ten preceding ones: She first
drew the "grass" using a zigzag pat-
tern; from the center of the lawn arose
the flower on its stem, with petals ex-
tending in a radial somewhat pointed
pattern. To analyze this drawing in
terms of scribbles and combines would
reduce this symbolic act to the level of
prerepresentational thought.
This brings me to the third question,
namely, the cognitive deficit hypothe-
sis and its current status as "produc-
tion problem."
According to Norman Freeman
(1976a, 1976b, 1977a), the drawing task
requires two types of ordering or se-
quencing: a spatial ordering along a
vertical axis and a temporal ordering
in terms of what comes first, second
and third. In regard to the spatial or-
dering, the head and legs serve as
two poles, providing end-anchors for
the figure. How does Norman Freeman
account for the missing trunk of the
tadpole figure, and the frequently miss-
ing arms? Freeman suggests several
possible serial position effects: (1) Pri-
macy and recency effects would favor
the first and the last item in a series
which would be ordered as follows:
head — body — arms — legs. (2) An-
other serial position effect considered
by Freeman is pair-formation, with
the attention being paid to the first
and accentuated member of each pair,
for example, head — trunk, legs —
arms. As these examples demonstrate,
Freeman relies heavily on a presumed
verbal order which may guide the
drawing process and account for the
omissions. Inadvertently, perhaps.
Freeman also adopts a "copyist" no-
tion of art, since this interpretation
implies that something is missing and
that an error has been committed.
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Freeman has also been concerned
with the misplaced arms syndrome
(1975, 1976a, 1976b, 1977b). His study
of the body proportion effect suggests
that the localization of arms is a func-
tion of the size of the circle. If the top
circle is oversized, the arms will ex-
tend from the head; if the bottom cir-
cle is oversized they will extend from
the trunk. Freeman conceives of the
serial order and body proportion ef-
fects as production problems — as
planning problems that are the results
of incomplete or faulty translation
rules — but do not indicate concep-
tual confusion. However, whether we
call it synthetic incapacity, conceptual
immaturity or production deficit, these
terms refer to the cognitive limitations
of the preschooler.
End-anchor effects or performance
errors in the recall of a newly learned
series have also been examined by
Tom Trabasso and his associates
(1979). In a series of studies these au-
thors have attempted to link the recall
of actions performed on various body
parts to the child's imperfect drawing
of the human figure. Trabasso con-
tends that the child as well as the
adult integrates new information into
a linear order which, in the case of
the human body, leads to internal spa-
tial mapping of the learned parts onto
a vertical axis. When tested for reten-
tion, this process of mapping favors
the end-points, i.e., the recall of head
and legs. Thus, Trabasso first equates
learning of new material and its reten-
tion in short-term memory with the
child's internal representation of the
human figure; he then links this inter-
nal representation to the graphic out-
put of the human figure drawing. This
interpretation, however, seems unwar-
ranted, since Trabasso has neither
tested the child's inner spatial repre-
sentation of the human figure nor his
knowledge of its parts. The child's
knowledge of the human body is quite
extensive and much more detailed than
his drawings indicate, a finding well
documented by Golomb (1973, 1974,
1977a, 1977b). Wallach & Bordeaux
(1976) and Bassett (1977). Moreover,
in the drawing task the child's inner
representation of the human body need
not be his only source of information
since the body of the adult examiner
and that of the child are in plain view
and can be inspected, a condition un-
paralleled in the retention tasks studied
by Trabasso. Finally, when drawing,
young children do not simply follow
a linear progression from the top to
the bottom, i.e., from the head to the
legs (often omitting the feet even
though they are the natural end-
points). Children frequently inspect
their drawing, return to the top or
middle parts for the addition of fea-
tures and embellishments, while also
offering verbal corrections, addenda,
and interpretations. Thus, inferences
about internal representations from
children's drawings should be made
with utmost caution (Kosslyn, Held-
meyer & Locklear, 1977).
Freeman's and to some extent also
Goodnow's (1977) search for simple
rules that determine the output, the
desire to find a formula or routine that
can automatically account for the de-
fects of the product, ignores the basic
question of what the children's inten-
tions are, and what graphic meanings
they are trying to convey.
In order to examine the presumed
relationship between the verbal and
the graphic ordering of parts, between
the child's tacit knowledge of the hu-
man body and its graphic representa-
tion, and to clarify the meaning of arms
attachment to the global circle, the
following experiment was designed.
Forty children, ages 3 to 5 years were
given a series of tasks extending over
3 days. The tasks assessed graphic
representational reversibility, the ver-
bal order of body parts, drawing with
specifications, completion tasks and
representational judgment tasks. The
common denominator for all tasks was
the representation of the human body
Representation and Reality 43
under various instructional and task
constraints. All the children were
tested individually by Debbie Farmer
who administered all the tests.
On day 1, the reversibility tasks were
administered. Each child was first
asked to draw a person, our standard
task. Three additional drawings were
then requested: (1) draw a person —
begin with the legs, (2) draw a person
— begin with the arms, and (3) draw
a person — begin with the tummy.
On day 2, the child was first asked
to list verbally all the parts of the body
known to her, and next she was in-
structed to dictate to the examiner all
the parts she (the experimenter) might
draw if she were asked to draw a per-
son. Subsequent to the verbal tasks,
each child was once more instructed
to draw a person followed by three
draw a person tasks that specified an
item or bodily part: (1) draw a person
with a flower, (2) draw a person with
a big fat tummy, and (3) draw a person
with a big black coat.
On day 3, children were presented
with several sets of prepared drawings.
Task 1, a completion task, consisted
of drawing arms on three separately
presented armless and faceless fig-
ures, each of which consisted of two
attached circles and legs. The propor-
tion of head to body varied as follows:
Figure 1, top circle 2" in diameter,
bottom circle, 1"; Figure 2, top circle
1", bottom circle 2"; Figure 3, each
circle IV2". The legs in each case were
^V2" in length. The order of the pre-
sentation of the figures was counter-
balanced. The instructions were as
follows: "Someone started to draw this
person and forgot to add the arms.
Please, draw the arms." Task 2 con-
sisted of a single sheet of paper on
which 4 humans were drawn, and
called for the child's judgment. The
figures were identical with the excep-
tion of arms placement. The latter
varied as follows: Figure a, extension
from the center of the torso; Figure b,
extension from the center of the head;
Figure c, extension from the intersec-
tion of head and torso; Figure d, exten-
tion from the top of the head. Subjects
were asked the following questions:
"Which one looks best? Can you tell
me why?" "Which one looks worst?
Can you tell me why?" Task 3, also a
judgment task, consisted of three sets
of paired figures, each one composed
of a top circle with eyes, a bottom cir-
cle, and legs. The left figure in each
set consisted of a large top circle, 3"
in diameter, and a small circle 1" in
diameter. The right figure in each set
consisted of the identical circles, with
the placement of the top and bottom
circles reversed. In the first set, the
arms extended from the top circle, in
the second set they extended from the
bottom circle, and in the third set from
the intersection of top and bottom cir-
cles. These sets of paired figures were
also presented in a counterbalanced
order, and the child was asked for his
judgment: "Which one looks best?
Can you tell me why?" "Which one
looks worst? Can you tell me why?"
The figures used in the completion
and judgment tasks represent varia-
tions on Norman Freeman's comple-
tion figures (see Figure 5).
The results for the reversibility study
are quite surprising. All our subjects
performed equal to or better on the
reversibility tasks than on the standard
draw a person task. Of the 3 to 4 year
olds, 66% performed better on the re-
versibility tasks than on the standard
draw a person task. Of the 4 to 5 year
olds, 56% performed better on the re-
versibility tasks. Not a single subject
performed worse. Varying the task de-
mands also improved the organization
of parts, increased their number, and
facilitated the adoption of new forms.
The effects of task specification were
also positive: 42% of the children main-
tained their score, 42% showed an im-
provement, while only 16% showed a
decline in scores.
The two verbal order tasks yielded
different results. Almost all subjects
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Figure 5. Freeman's completion figures.
(89%) offered a different verba! order
on the two related tasks which clearly
conflicts with Freeman's notion of a
fairly uniform verbal sequence that
guides graphic production, and does
not confirm Trabasso's assumption of
a standard internal representation of
the body that yields comparable print-
outs on different tasks. Also, the num-
ber of parts named or dictated usually
exceeded the number of drawn parts.
For example, the body or its equivalent
was included in 70% of the verbal de-
scriptions while its graphic counter-
part appeared in only 28% of the draw-
ings. The variability in the different
types of verbal sequences was high,
and even "favored" sequences were
modest in frequency; for example, the
head-body-legs-arms order appeared
in 11% of the sample, while the order
head-body-arms-legs occurred in only
5% of the verbal productions. Alto-
gether, a flexible graphic order that
proceeds from top to bottom, but per-
mits additions subsequent to the draw-
ing of the legs, seemed to characterize
the drawings of most children. This
graphic order appeared to be more
consistent than the verbal one.
,The judgment of arms placement
task yielded unambiguous results. 70%
of the children selected the "correct"
figures as the best looking (Figures
a & c), while 85% agreed that arms ex-
tending from the head region did not
look well. Those few subjects who se-
lected Figure d, with arms extending
from the top of the head, explained
their choice in terms of "hair," while
those selecting the figure with the
arms extending from the center of the
head, transformed the lines into "ears."
Thus, all the subjects responded to
the prepared figures in terms of what
appear to be graphically and anatomi-
cally reasonable judgments.
Judgment of paired comparisons
elicited the children's resistance to this
task. They appeared conflictive, shifted
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their judgments, and required a great
deal of encouragement on the part of
the examiner before they offered a
judgment. Indeed, the responses were
equally divided among the paired fig-
ures, with an equal number of subjects
preferring the figure with the huge
head or the huge torso. Very few chil-
dren made consistent choices. Most
children would select a huge head as
the best and the worst figure over the
series of tasks. We can better appre-
ciate the children's discomfort when
we acknowledge that these figures are
disproportionate, aesthetically dis-
pleasing, and even grotesque. The
figures do not permit an adequate so-
lution to the task. This dilemma is
nicely illustrated in the comments of
a youngster who, forced to make a
choice, selected the figure consisting
of a huge head and a tiny body with
arms extending from the top circle,
as the best figure (see Figure 17, set
1): "This is cuter, the arms are not on
his head — almost!" On the second
figure of this set composed of a tiny
head and a huge body he commented:
"This is the worst because the arms
are on the head."
The arms completion test yielded
fairly predictable results. When the
top circle was the larger one, 72% ex-
tended the arms from this form. When
the top circle was the smaller one, this
shrunk to 17%. When both circles were
identical in size, 78% of the children
preferred to extend the arms from the
second circle. Once again, these fig-
ures do not permit graphically reason-
able solutions, in their extreme ver-
sions, they represent artifacts, and are
basically unacceptable to the children.
The children's comments indicate that
they tended to "transform " the figures
to suit their conceptions. In most
cases, where the top circle was the
larger one, children interpreted this
part as a "big belly." Several turned
the paper around or stated that the
figure was upside down.
In summary, I venture to say that
the reversibility study does not sup-
port the production deficit hypothe-
sis. Contrary to this hypothesis, an
unsuspected cognitive flexibility, here
termed reversibility, was demonstrated,
a finding which forces us to reconsider
the extant versions of the cognitive
deficit hypothesis of children's draw-
ings. Not only was the production pro-
cess reversible, under the constraints
of the instructions additional parts
were drawn, and the graphic forms
changed to accommodate the new de-
mands. If the "problem" is not one of
serial order, and perhaps not even of
limited processing capacities, per-
haps we are back to the concept of
visual graphic logic (Arnheim, 1974;
Golomb, 1974), and ought to explore
its implications more fully. Earlier
studies have shown that the issue of
the "missing parts" rests on a copyist
notion of art, and fails to do justice to
its representational nature, in the 20th
century it has become easier for stu-
dents of child art to abandon the sim-
plistic conception of art as a faithful
copy of the object, and we are not
likely to hold Klee and Picasso to stan-
dards of realism and completion.
Nevertheless, copyist misconceptions
still abound and are at times truly puz-
zling, as is the case when arms are
supposed to be drawn from the center
of the second, vertically aligned circle,
regardless of its size. This conception
does not follow from the principle of
anatomical fidelity (arms do not ex-
tend from the region of the navel) nor
does it rest on the aesthetic rule of
balance which would favor the larger
circle, regardless of its position on
the vertical axis.
The completion and judgment data
tell us an informative story. When the
figures are grossly disproportionate,
the children face an acute conflict.
The figures do not look right, and even
though the experimenter may define
the top circle always as the head or
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face, the child does not necessarily
agree with that statement. Essentially,
the figure completion and judgment
tasks of this study have no adequate
solution, and the child either wavers
(as most did), or he silently redefines
the task. If he attaches the arms to the
huge top circle, it usually becomes a
head-belly conglomerate. The selec-
tion of the best/worst figures, when
arms attachment was varied while
maintaining head-body ratios con-
stant and graphically meaningful led
to unambiguous results, and demon-
strates that the child's knowledge is not
at fault; given reasonable problems, the
child's solutions are also reasonable.
For the student of child art, the implica-
tions ought to be clear — design
figures that are graphically meaningful
to the child.
The findings of (1) a precocious rep-
resentational ability in 2 year olds who
scribble on the free drawing task but
represent a human on the assigned
tasks (39% on-request or on-dicta-
tion) and (2) the complete reversibility
of the human figure drawings of 3 year
olds require a thorough reassessment
of our conception of the cognitive abil-
ities of preschoolers. Apparently, un-
der the constraints of specific task
demands, we can tap usually as yet
dormant abilities.
Our findings indicate that the evo-
lution of representational forms is
more than combining earlier practiced
shapes and sub-routines, more than
the sum of graphic exercises. It is the
object and its visual characteristics
that codetermine the graphic organiza-
tion and choice of forms. This is not
to say that child art, overnight, be-
comes realistic. We can clearly see
that forms are used economically,
that the tendency toward simplicity
predominates for a long time, that
simple and basic forms have to serve
multiple functions and leave the mean-
ing of the figure somewhat ambiguous.
But the urge to represent has a refer-
ent out there in the real world, and it
guides the process of differentiation
to an important degree. I would like
to suggest that the child's drawing is
determined by the search for meaning
and likeness, but that it is also con-
strained by the child's experience with
the medium, by his interest, motiva-
tion, attention span and playfulness.
In the words of a 4 year old girl: "I
am making a mommy ... 1 toe, 2 toes,
3, 4, 5 ... I even made toes! Five toes
on one foot and 6 toes on the other. I
just thought it would be funny . . .
Look at the mommy, I'm making some
skin for her . . . the paper is skin . . .
I'm just pretending . . . the lines are
the shirt, I just pretend."
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RESPONSE TO GOLOMB
Michael Day
University of Minnesota
My comments will be restricted to the
first part of Professor Golomb's paper
which refers to Kellogg's work. I agree
with Claire Golomb that Arnheim's ex-
planation of children's early drawing
development makes good sense, and I
share Golomb's reservations regarding
the explanation outlined by Rhoda Kel-
logg. I admire very much Golomb's in-
novative approach to research in the
drawing of young children. Especially
impressive are the drawing on dictation
tasks and elicitation of drawings across
age groups. These are very useful
techniques for discovering what chil-
dren are thinking and what they are
capable of accomplishing at a given
point in their development.
Professor Golomb's analysis of Kel-
logg's theory is interesting and wel-
come. However, it should be recognized
that Kellogg's views on children's
artistic development, beyond the useful
collecting and cataloging of many draw-
ings, have not been very influential in
the field of art education. I searched
the authors' footnotes and bibliog-
raphies in seven recent anthologies of
writings on the arts, aesthetics and
education, all in the mainstream of art
education, literature,'''''' and I found
Kellogg's name mentioned only three
times, once by myself and in all cases
in regard to her collection of children's
art. The seven books included 121
articles or excerpts and well over 1,000
references, including one article with
190 footnotes and one reference to Kel-
logg's work.
Golomb challenges Kellogg's posi-
tion that, in Golomb's words, "child
art evolves from non-pictorial designs,
unaffected by the visual attributes of
the object."^ In fairness to Kellogg,
her own statement is not so unqualified
as Golomb's version. Kellogg writes:
"However, the general evolution of
shapes in children's art suggests that
the process is largely independent of
such observation. In any case, the
shape-making tendency of children is
so strong and pervasive that it seems
to be innate, whether or not it is brought
out by experiences other than scrib-
bling. "^
Golomb then attempts to demonstrate
by her research that children's early
drawings are pictorial and are "forms
of equivalence" made in response to
the visual environment. The case that
Golomb makes is interesting but not
very convincing. She appears to make
the same type of imposition of her
"preferred taxonomy" on children's
drawings of which she accuses Kellogg.
She comments, "If we observe the child
at work and listen to his comments, we
notice his discomfort when the drawing
fails to meet his standards of like-
ness. "'° We do? If we can interpret
the young child's physiognomy to
convey "discomfort," how do we know
it is because the drawing fails in some
way? How do we know that he has
standards of likeness and that the
drawing has failed to meet these stan-
dards?
In this paper Golomb does not seem
to recognize the kinesthetic aspect of
scribbling or mark-making for children.
Eisner points out that "the rhythmic
movement of the arm and wrist, the
stimulation of watching lines appear
where none existed before are them-
selves satisfying and self-justifying.
They are intrinsic sources of satisfac-
tion.'"'^ Children do seem to enjoy the
making of marks, lines and colors.
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with pencil and crayon. Children who
spend time marking and scribbling do
eventually draw shapes and name the
shapes. These shapes very often are
found within the context of scribbles
on a paper. Parents who are aware of
the beginnings of children's graphic
symbolic behavior have been able,
by carefully observing their child, to
identify their child's first named scrib-
ble. This type of evidence supports
Kellogg's contention that forms of
equivalence or symbols emerge out of
children's presymbolic marking pro-
duction. Normal children who are pro-
vided the opportunity at early ages
progress from scribbles to symbols.
From Golomb's paper it is difficult
to ascertain exactly what points she
is attempting to make. She mentions
the child's verbalization "to bridge the
gap between what he has produced and
the meaning it fails to convey, between
his perception of the objects and his
inadequate representation thereof. '"'^
What is the point of this direction in
the paper? Golomb is apparently re-
ferring to symbol-making children and
does not appear to be in conflict with
Kellogg on that point.
Golomb cites Harris, Haas, and Millar
to describe unusual cases of persons
deprived of marking materials who
progressed quickly to symbol-making
with very brief attention to scribble
exercises. These cases suggest that
it is not necessary, under some circum-
stances, to progress through Kellogg's
sequence from scribble forms to place-
ment patterns, to emergent shapes, dia-
grams, combines and aggregates. But
does Kellogg insist that even persons
who have developed physically and in-
tellectually beyond the normal ages
for scribbling must start at the begin-
ning of the sequence? Does Kellogg's
theory allow for very rapid progress
through the sequence by more mature
persons? Golomb fails to clarify Kel-
logg's position and, consequently,
makes little progress in refuting it.
The significance of Professor Gol-
omb's research approach is centered
in her brilliant decision to ask children
about their drawings and to elicit
their response to drawing tasks. By
asking several age groups to perform the
same drawing tasks, she demonstrates
their progress in drawing. However, in
the interpretation of the data Golomb
makes unwarranted theoretical leaps.
Because the children utilized their
graphic repertoires to attempt to draw
objects when requested to do so,
Golomb concludes that "their prime
concern is with visual likeness to the
object.'"'^ I suggest that the concern of
the children was strongly influenced
by the required task. Even the instruc-
tion to the children to draw "a picture
of anything you like" has a strong repre-
sentational bias.
Golomb did discover that, under
certain conditions, some children who
initially scribbled in response to the
drawing request could produce a repre-
sentational drawing. I don't believe
that this discovery indicates that these
children had not produced representa-
tional drawings prior to the experi-
ment along with their scribbles. What
is not considered is that children have
multiple concerns regarding their draw-
ing; that making a scribble can be re-
warding for the child as well as making
a symbol. Little seems to be gained by
demonstrating that prerepresentational
children are really representational and
are primarily concerned with visual
likeness to an object. If this is the case
then they are not prerepresentational,
by definition.
In summary, I was disappointed that
the issues were not more clearly drawn
and that the significance of the study
and the implications, either psycho-
logical or educational, were not dis-
cussed in any length.
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RESPONSE TO GOLOMB
Kenneth Marantz
Ohio State University
Although useful research probably
should raise many questions in its
attempt to supply answers, surely these
questions should be about the material
or ideas under investigation, and not
be about the research procedures them-
selves. I fear, in the case of Professor
Golomb's study, my questions must
be focused on her assumptions, biases
and methods more than on the much
stickier problems immersed in the well-
springs of children's drawings. I seem
to have at least one such query for each
of her pages, but I'll only introduce a
few that are, for me, particularly juicy.
Early in the study Golomb comments
on the use of "words to bridge the gap
between what he [the child] has pro-
duced and the meaning it fails to con-
vey, between his perception of the ob-
ject and his inadequate representation
thereof." Her interpretation, stated as
fact, makes no effort to examine the
possibility that the verbal-graphic ex-
perience is a unity and that the ex-
perience is more of a transient drama
than an attempt to gain mastery over
graphic representation; the "meaning"
of the drawing may change every hour
on the hour. Nor does Golomb take
into account what the "object" is that
youngsters are seeking to make a "like-
ness" of. In using a giraffe, for example,
as one of her test examples, can she
believe that 2 and 3 year olds have di-
rectly experienced that animal? Is
she taking for granted experience with
ABC books or other sources of pictures?
Does the evolution of graphic imagery,
as described by Kellogg, depend upon
cultural norms, so that Western kids
indeed do evolve in a fashion suggested
by Kellogg's stages (surely not to be
understood as absolute!), because they
are visually raised on a multitude of
graphic images? Might Golomb's refer-
ences to Bedouins and Peruvian In-
dians, in which they "skip" the scribble
stages in order to produce tadpoles,
reflect graphically impoverished cul-
tures rather than a destruction of Kel-
logg's insights? In what ways, to return
to my first point, do the early prattlings
of infants appear to be attempts to
capture the word symbols (parallels
of graphic likenesses) of their aural
environment? What role does "play"
fulfill in youngsters' scribbles and even-
tual production of representational
pictures? Are such images idiosyn-
cratic in character or can conventions
and stereotypes account for the vast
majority of them? In other words, has
Golomb's bias (can we really call it an
assumption?) about the representa-
tional nature of the urge to draw kept
her from a more open examination of
alternative answers to her original
questions?
I wonder what would have happened
if the 250 young children were given
different drawing tasks? Say that they
were asked to draw an "angry" or to
make a picture of love? Suppose that
the instructions requested a hypogriff
or a bandersnatch instead of a worm or
a tree? What likeness would such draw-
ings seek? Again, the bias is clear,
that there is always an external referent
that the child seeks — a visual armature
Note: This commentary is made in response
to a paper sent in advance of the Sym-
posium. In fairness to Professor Golomb,
some of the points found questionable may
have been clarified or amplified during her
presentation and subsequent discussion. My
overall concerns, however, remain intact.
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over which to mold his drawing. Of
course, this is a prejudice found in our
culture, exemplified by such contri-
vances as coloring books and reading
readiness materials. Maybe drawings
aren't made to be the verbal surrogates
demanded by teachers and parents
and researchers like Golomb. In other
words, perhaps the design of this study
was limited to uncover one kind of ac-
tivity that children are expected to en-
gage in (note the forceful and contrived
instructions given by the researcher
to the kids) rather than in the more
natural messing around that youngsters
engage in on their own. Why not examine
these more freely produced images: the
finger marks on the foggy window pane,
the stick-made scratches in the seaside
sand, the doodles drawn in the spilt
chocolate milk? By setting up the sterile
laboratory, can we really expect to
discover how the wild animal develops?
Thus, while no disciple of Kellogg,
particularly when she insists on seeing
universal characteristics of graphic
development, I believe Golomb has set
her up as a straw woman in order to
knock the stuffings out of her. By totally
ignoring (at her own admission) the
constraints of "the child's experience
with the medium, . . . his interest,
motivation, attention span and play-
fulness," what are we to make of her
claims? Most problematic, for me, is
the cavalier attitude about the nature
of art itself that I infer from this report.
Somewhere, Golomb has been led to
believe that drawing is art and that
child art is a "symbolic-transformation
process" whose "prime concern is
with visual likeness to the object." If
she were content to deal with the more
simple matter of the development of
graphic images, representational
images or symbols or pictures, my
unease would be a bit less than it is.
However, there is the direct call to
art that stirs my own set of prejudices.
Take her Task 2 which has the four
so-called humans drawn on it. "Aes-
thetic judgment" is called for because
the child is asked "Which one looks
best
. . . Which one looks worst . . .?"
How can one be so misguided by the
concept of aesthetic judgment? Per-
haps the subject could give an ana-
tomical response and reject them all
as pretty silly figures. Surely what is
most apt to happen is a psychological
report. Show me four young women and
ask me the question and I doubt that
my response would have much to do
with aesthetics. Indeed, we find out
that "all the subjects responded to the
prepared figures in terms of what ap-
pear to be graphically and anatomically
reasonable judgments." Again, why the
need to interject aesthetic preferences?
Don't we have plenty of very question-
able aesthetic preference studies on
our shelves now?
Finally, and perhaps unfairly, I
wonder if Golomb's conclusion that
"a thorough reassessment of our con-
ception of the cognitive abilities of pre-
schoolers " would have been made if
she were an active teacher of these
emerging human beings. Whose con-
ception is she talking about? Do those
of us who keep in the swim of teaching
have any doubts about the "dormant
abilities" of youngsters? One of the
routes for waking these abilities has
been the challenge offered by aesthetic
activity, play unconstrained by prede-
termined theories of graphic imagery
or the assumptions that some adult
patterns of symbol-referent relation-
ships are the way all children evolve.
"Child art" is indeed a part of the learn-
ing scheme of maturation. But if we're
to muck about with this process, we
had better understand art as well as
child development. I fear Golomb comes
up a bit short on the former require-
ment, if this study is a fair example of
that knowledge.
Kenneth Marantz
Department of Art Education
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210
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RESPONSE TO GOLOMB
Marjorie Wilson
Pennsylvania Furnace
In this paper, Golomb has chosen to
question some of the long standing
suppositions about child art and to
shake the foundations of these beliefs.
As usual, she is thorough and insight-
ful and sees the child, rather than a
mechanical design maker, as a think-
ing and knowing human.
The first questions concern the de-
velopmental patterns espoused by
Rhoda Kellogg. Golomb asks whether
the "block-building" process outlined
by Kellogg, which proceeds from scrib-
ble to diagram to combine to aggregate,
actually describes the graphic develop-
ment of the child, a question that re-
quires an answer such as Golomb is
able to supply — one based on more
than systematic collection techniques.
In summarizing Kellogg's position:
"child art evolves from non-pictorial
designs, unaffected by the visual at-
tributes of the object," Golomb reveals
her own prejudices toward "visual at-
tributes." While I am in agreement with
the premise that most of the child's
early drawing activity is based upon the
simple and undifferentiated configura-
tions of the circle and the line and that
the "building-block" notion is indefen-
sible, I am a bit uneasy on the matter
of "visual representational logic."
Golomb continually refers to 'likeness
to the object," "standards of likeness,"
"impact of the visual world," and "per-
ception of the object." I am much more
comfortable with another statement:
'The forms, which the child uses to
represent his first objects, are indeed
forms of equivalence; they must serve
a symbolic function, and in some funda-
mental way, they must do justice to
the referent." I'm sure that Golomb
would agree that the referent refers
not only to the object in the visual world
but to the child's memory of the object
— the child cannot, after all, see an
actual giraffe when asked to draw one
in the experimental situation — the
child's memory of his last graphic rep-
resentation or some other graphic rep-
resentation, i.e., another child's draw-
ing or a picture in a book, on television,
etc.
What sets Golomb's work so far above
Kellogg's is not only rigorous research
but also attention both to the child's
drawings (scribbles) and to the child
as well. Kellogg has carefully cata-
logued hundreds of thousands of draw-
ings, but these finished products give
no evidence of a child's hand. We do
not know what the child intended; we
know only what Kellogg "implied." In
Golomb's work, it is clear that she at-
tends to the children, interacts with
them and is always aware of their ac-
tions and reactions and of the processes
involved in the making of their art.
The last question that Golomb asks
concerns what she refers to as the
"cognitive deficit hypothesis" of
Luquet and Piaget. Here, she lumps
with these earlier theorists and their
concept of "synthetic incapacity,"
Norman Freeman and his own theory
concerning the "production problem."
From Golomb's account alone, it would
not be possible to assess completely
Freeman's position, since that account
has certainly not only overly simplified
Freeman's theories, but has also been
colored by Golomb's own biases. It
is possible, however, without going
beyond the scope of this paper, to
say that Golomb's tasks, which have
been devised to replicate or to refute
Freeman's findings, are short of the
mark and tend only to obfuscate rather
than elucidate.
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The first problem lies in Golomb's
interpretation of what Freeman calls
a "production problem." In a series
of experiments, Freeman has sought
to delve into the anomalous tadpole
figure. The serial position effects,
that he suggests to account for what
may or may not be the missing trunk
and the frequently missing arms, do
not rely "heavily," as Golomb would
have it, "on a presumed verbal order."
I suggest that all of us suffer from pro-
duction problems in some form or
another. An example might be taken
from the experiences of a close friend
of mine. This intelligent, articulate and
knowledgeable friend, each morning,
follows the same dressing routine: he
first dons his trousers, zips them, puts
on his shirt, unzips his trousers, tucks
in his shirt and then rezips his trousers.
It would certainly be more efficient to
put on the shirt before the trousers,
but we would surely not attempt to
attribute this lapse to any "cognitive
deficit." It is equally ludicrous to even
consider that my friend would make the
same error in verbally describing his
mode of dressing; the "problem" is not
evident in any verbal ordering, but in
the act (of dressing) itself, in the pro-
duction, as it were.
The reversability and verbal order
tasks with which Golomb tested the chil-
dren seem, then, not to be relevant to
the problem. In demonstrating that
the child is able to name the body parts,
to reverse, upon request, the order in
which parts are drawn and, in the pro-
cess, to add more parts — certainly
when those parts have been suggested
by the experimenter — Golomb seems
to have confirmed Freeman's position
that the "problem" of the child who
draws head and feet only to stand for
a human, is not a "cognitive deficit"
but one of production.
In Golomb's criticism of Freeman,
perhaps the most important, though un-
expected insight for the reader, comes
as a result of her body proportion ef-
fect and aesthetic judgment tasks.
While the figures that Golomb uses are
said to be a "variation" of those used
by Freeman in his own studies, they
appear to be more aberrant than any
of Freeman's, the use of which he
justifies by citing their presence in
children's drawings. None of the figures
in the Freeman study, for example, were
possessed of the strange stumpy legs
with which Golomb endows hers; and
no figures were used that were not
found in any number of studies (Free-
man's among others) to have been within
the realm of the child's drawing experi-
ence, e.g., arms placed on the top of
the head segment. In spite of these
obvious discrepancies, Golomb's find-
ings were the same as Freeman's— that
the child tends to place "arms" on
the larger of the two circular body seg-
ments, regardless of position. In a
further attempt to show that these
"figures " were not "meaningful" to
the child, Golomb asked the children
to select the best/worst figures in two
separate aesthetic judgment tasks.
The results indicate that while a child
will place the arms on the largest seg-
ment of a large head/small body config-
uration, he will nonetheless judge that
same figure to be unpleasing. What
Golomb has shown is not, as she states,
that children give unreasonable an-
swers to unreasonable questions, but
that children will follow their own intrin-
sically based propensities or, as Free-
man would have it, biases, and that
they are compelled to do so even when
they view the result as unaesthetic.
I would suggest that the drawing child's
"search for meaning and likeness" is
constrained not only by "the child's
experience with the medium, by his
interest, motivation, attention span
and playfulness" but by the inner dic-
tates of his biases as well, two of which
Freeman identifies as the serial order
effect and the body proportion effect.
Marjorie Wilson
Pennsylvania Furnace,
Pennsylvania 16865
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THE COGNITIVE DYNAMICS OF SYNESTHESIA AND METAPHOR
Charles E. Osgood
Institute of Communications Research
University of Illinois
I arrived at Dartmouth College in the
fall of 1935, firmly convinced that I was
destined to write The Great American
Novel, but after a course with the late
Professor Theodore Karwoski (af-
fectionately known as "The Count")
I forgot all about writing novels. Kar-
woski and a young associate, Henry
Odbert, were busily working on color
music synesthesia, and by my junior
year I was busily working along with
them. Rather than viewing color-music
synesthesia as a phenomenon in a
few freak individuals whose "sensory
wires are crossed," Karwoski and Odbert
viewed it as a fundamental character-
istic of human cognizing — more vivid
in some (who regularly indulge as a
means of enriching their enjoyment of
music) but shared by many others who
display the same "rules" for relating
sounds to sights.
In my own research with Karwoski
and Odbert (1942), three conditions
were used: In one, practiced synes-
thetes were asked to draw their "re-
sponses" to simple melodic forms
played on a single instrument — e.g.,
a tone which simply gets louder and
then softer, where typical drawings are
forms that get thicker and then thinner
again, bands of color that get richer
and then paler again, and explicitly
meaningful ones like a little car that
comes closer and then goes further
away. In a second, subjects who had
never even thought of "seeing things"
when they heard music, were told that
they had to draw something for each
auditory stimulus; they produced ex-
actly the same types of "synesthetic"
translations. In a third experiment, 100
unselected sophomores were given
a purely verbal "metaphor" test, in
which the auditory-mood and visual-
spatial relations observed in complex
synesthetes were simply translated
into pairs of polar adjectives (e.g.,
LOUD-SOFT; SMALL-LARGE); once
again the relations displayed by "real"
synesthetes were chosen, here, 96%
linking LOUD with LARGE. We sum-
marized our research with this state-
ment: the cognitive processes in both
color-music synesthesia and in meta-
phorical use of language can be de-
scribed as the parallel alignment of two
or more dimensions of experience,
with "translations" occurring between
equivalent regions of the continua.
After graduation and marriage in the
summer of 1939, I decided to stay on
for an extra year at Dartmouth, and I
also was able to work with Ross Stagner,
who had just arrived. Stagner and
Osgood (1946) adapted the notion of
"parallel polarities" to the measure-
ment of social attitudes and stereo-
types, by using sets of 7-step scales
defined by pairs of opposites (e.g.,
rating PACIFIST against scales like fair-
unfair, valuable-worthless, and strong-
weak). Later at Illinois (in the early
1950's), this became the Semantic
Differential Technique. Much later, this
SD technique was to be extended
cross-linguistically across (now) 30 lan-
guage-culture communities; the results
clearly demonstrate the universality of
An earlier version of this paper has been
published in Cognition and Figurative Lan-
guage (a volume edited by R. P. Honeck and
R. R. Hoffman), 1980.
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three affective features of meaning,
Evaluation (E), Potency (P) and Activity
(A). My undergraduate thesis at Dart-
mouth was a study of synesthetic and
metaphorical relations in field reports
on five widely separated primitive cul-
tures; the generality of certain paral-
lelisms was quite striking, e.g., good
places and things being up and light,
but bad being down and dark — and
members of a privileged clan calling
themselves "white bones" as against
all others who were "black bones"!
My lecture is organized under three
major topics, each with certain major
subdivisions. The first is simply Syn-
esthesia, and it falls easily into cross-
modality, purely perceptual, syn-
esthesias, and perceptuo-llngulstic
synesthesias; the second topic is titled
Congruence Dynamics, and it divides
naturally into gross affective vs. fine
denotative cognitive interactions; the
third topic is simply Metaphor, where
a useful distinction between meta-
phoricity in phrasing and in sentencing
is made.
SYNESTHESIA
Synesthesias appear in a wide variety
of forms, but all involve meanings in
non-linguistic perceptual cognizing,
which surely was much earlier in the
human species than linguistic cogniz-
ing. The evidence falls rather naturally
into two types: (1) Cross-modality
perceptual synesthesias, with which
much of the earlier research was con-
cerned. Here, meaningful translations
are made between one sensory domain
and another (e.g., auditory/visual mo-
dalities). A transition M\a phonetic sym-
bolism leads naturally into (2) per-
ceptuo-llngulstic synesthesias, with
which much of the most recent research
has been concerned. Here, meaningful
parallelisms are drawn between per-
ceptions in one sensory modality
(usually vision) and words in language
(usually polar adjectives).
Cross-modality Perceptual
Synesthesia
The earlier research was often de-
signed, and interpreted, in terms of
the "freak individuals" who have neu-
ral "cross-circuiting of the sensory
fibers" for two modalities. For exam-
ples: Langfeld, in 1914, reported the
case of a girl who associated certain
specific colors with different notes
on the musical scale, with very high
consistency over an interval exceed-
ing seven years; Dallenbach, in 1926,
tells of a subject who associated col-
ors with the notes of bird calls. There
was a man who consistently "saw" #1
as yellow, #2 as blue, #3 as red. . .
and, of course, #8 as black — and any-
one who has played pool will recog-
nize these as the colors of the balls
having these numbers!
In his Words and Things (1958, Ch.
4), Roger Brown provides an extended
review of the literature relevant to pho-
netic symbolism. As early as 1929, Ed-
ward Sapir reported a study relating
syllabic speech sounds to meanings
(e.g., given mal and mil, both said to
refer to "table," subjects were to de-
cide which one would refer to a large
and which to a small table); he found
impressively consistent agreement on
the relative "sizes" of vowels. In my
own informal experimentation with
male students in my psycholinguistics
seminar, I ask them which of three
girls they would like to date and then,
with gestures, to describe their prob-
able body builds; they definitely would
prefer l\/llss Lavelle (described like an
8) to either Miss PIm (more like a 1)
or /W/ss Bowioav (definitely a big fat 0)!
Returning now to Dartmouth, in an-
other study Odbert, Karwoski and Eck-
erson (1942) first had ordinary sub-
jects indicate the dominant moods of
short classicial excerpts on the Hevner
"Mood Circle" and then had them, on
a second run-through, say what colors
seemed appropriate for each excerpt.
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There was rather remarkable consis-
tency in the colors chosen: for exam-
ple, the color green for Delius' On
Hearing the First Cuckoo in Spring
and red for Wagner's Rienzi Overture.
Again anticipating verbal metaphor,
when subjects were merely given the
mood adjectives — going around the
Hevner "circle " from vigorous through
gay and leisurely to sad and solemn
— and asked to give the appropriate
colors, even more consistent relations
appeared.
My student Murray Miron completed
a doctoral thesis at Illinois (1961) which
was a cross-language (American En-
glish vs. Japanese) demonstration of
lawful affective connotations in pho-
netic symbolism. When CVC syllables,
which were nonsense in both lan-
guages, were rated on appropriate
Semantic Differential scales, American
and Japanese subjects displayed cor-
relations with each other of .57 for
vowels and .91 for consonants, re-
spectively, on the Potency factor —
low frequency sounds being associ-
ated with felt power and size. On the
Evaluative factor, front consonants
were rated more pleasant than back,
again for both languages. Brown, Black
and Horowitz in 1955 (Brown, 1958)
selected 21 antonymic word-pairs of
about equal length (e.g., warm-cool)
and these were translated into Chi-
nese, Czech and Hindi by native speak-
ers of these languages, who also re-
corded their pronunciations of the
word-pairs. Eighty-five Harvard and
Radcliffe students guessed which of
the paired English words corresponded
to each of the foreign words as spoken.
Not only was there significantly higher
than chance agreement in choice
among the subjects, but their guesses
were correct twice as often as incor-
rect, where "correct" means choosing
the appropriate English translation.
Question: Are such cross-modality
perceptual synesthesias innate or ac-
quired? Although one may grant an
innate predisposition toward synes-
thetic relations, just what color, sound,
smell, taste, etc. "translations" develop
would seem to depend on learning,
and, in my variety of Neobehaviorism,
what is called mediated generalization
would seem to be responsible. Take
the case of auditory pitch and visual
size: It is characteristic of the physical
world that large-sized resonators pro-
duce low frequency tones and small-
sized ones high frequency tones (think
of series of organ pipes, bells, drums,
or even hollow logs, and of the
"voices" of men vs. boys, big dogs vs.
little ones, or even of lions vs. mice).
This implies that any meaningful pro-
cess that comes to be associated with
the perceptual signs in one modal-
ity (e.g., the danger significance of
threatening big dogs vs. the safety
significance of playful little dogs) will
tend to spread (generalize) to the cor-
related perceptual signs in the other
modality. After we consider perceptuo-
linguistic synesthesias, I will detail the
affective (grosser) and denotative
(finer) cognitive dynamics involved.
Perceptuo-linguistic Synesthesia
As was noted earlier in connection
with the Karwoski et al. research, when
one of the "sensory" dimensions of
perceptual parallelisms was repre-
sented by words — thus a shift away
from synesthesia toward metaphor—
the lawfulness of the process became
even more apparent and stable across
individuals (e.g., LOUD going with
verbal near rather than far, TREBLE
being up and BASS being down, and
so forth). Very similar notions have
been expressed by some gestalt psy-
chologists. Kaden, Wapner and Werner
(1955) have contributed a delightful
experiment in which subjects were to
adjust luminant words projected in
front of them in an otherwise totally
dark room "to subjective eye-level"
by raising or lowering the projected
words with a hand dial; the striking
finding was that words like rising and
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climbing had to be lowered relative
to the pre-experimental determination
of "eye-level," while words like plung-
ing and falling had to be raised (i.e.,
the upward-meaning words seemed
visually higher and the downward-
meaning words seemed lower to the
subjects)!
In the late 1950's, while in the South-
west doing psycholinguistic field work
sponsored by the Social Science Re-
search Council, I turned back to my
interests in synesthesia and metaphor
(Osgood, 1960). Four language-cul-
ture groups (Mexican Spanish, Navajo,
American English, and Japanese) were
used as subjects. They were to "rate"
each of 28 verbal concepts, presented
singly in random order, against the
pairs of visual "opposites" to be con-
sidered next. Note that these words are
mostly from oppositional pairs, like
HEAVY-LIGHT, HAPPY-SAD, UP-
DOWN, STRONG-WEAK and BLACK-
WHITE, but never presented as pairs,
of course.
The visual alternatives, on the other
hand, were shown as graphic pairs,
each pair being presented on one of
the cards in a deck, the cards being
randomized across the subjects in
each cultural group. Note that the
pairs of visual alternatives displayed
in Figure 1, without the verbal defini-
tions, of course, tap most of the synes-
thetic oppositions found in the earlier
Karwoski, Odbert and Osgood studies:
thus (going down the outside columns)
BLUNT-SHARP, HAZY-CLEAR, DARK-
LIGHT, HOMOGENEOUS-HETEROGE-
NOUS, THICK-THIN, VERTICAL-HORI-
ZONTAL, NEAR-FAR, and DIFFUSE-
CONCENTRATED. Now, keeping this
visual display in mind, let's look at the
major results.
Rotated factor loadings for the ver-
bal Concept Matrices (as rated against
the visual alternatives) yielded clear
evidence for a "universal" Evaluative
Factor I: for all cultures, particularly
good, happy, and white were "^E and
bad, sad and black were ^E. Also, there
was a "universal" Potency Factor II:
strong, heavy and man were *P and
weak, light, yellow and woman were
P. However, Activity seemed to spread
across Factors III and IV: energetic,
excitement and noisy were "^A and lazy,
calm and quiet, along with slow, were
"A on Factor III, but light, tight and
white, along with fast, were ^A and
heavy, excitement (??) and woman
were "A on Factor IV.
Some of the consistent visual char-
acterizations of oppositional verbal
concepts are interesting in their own
right, and they also tie in with the
earlier Karwoski et al. findings: Happy
is UP, COLORFUL, LIGHT, and CLEAR,
but sad is DOWN, COLORLESS, DARK
and HAZY; heavy is DOWN, THICK,
DARK, and LARGE, but light {weight
having been specified) is UP, THIN,
LIGHT and SMALL; excitement is VER-
TICAL, COLORFUL, CROOKED and
SHARP, but calm is HORIZONTAL,
COLORLESS, STRAIGHT and BLUNT;
woman is COLORFUL, THIN (except
for Mexicans), LIGHT, BLUNT and
ROUNDED (except for Navajos), but
man is VERTICAL (woman tending to
be HORIZONTAL), COLORLESS, THICK,
DARK, SHARP and ANGULAR. These
trends for four cultures suggest cer-
tain "universal" tendencies.
As regards the "synesthetic" appli-
cation of terms based on sensory con-
tinua to human personality character-
istics, an early study by Solomon Asch
(1955) examined adjectives of this
type in a number of historically unre-
lated languages: Biblical Hebrew, Ho-
meric Greek, Chinese, Thai and several
others. Just like English, all of these
languages describe many personality
traits with words or phrases that have
obvious sensory bases. For just one
example, in English the word straight,
when applied to persons, implies hon-
esty and trustworthiness, whereas its
opposite, crooked, implies dishonesty
and untrustworthiness; exactly the
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Figure 1. Pairs of Visual alternatives.
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same synesthetic (or is it metaphoric?)
parallelism was found by Asch in all
of the languages he analyzed. Brown,
Leiter and Hildum (1957) asked stu-
dents to describe operatic voices by
selecting (a) from a list of ten antony-
mous adjective-pairs and (b) from a set
of 20 music-critic-derived adjectives
(e.g., cold, pinctied, gravelly, dulcet,
voluptuous) those which best de-
scribed each voice. Generally, for
example, baritones tended to be dull,
heavy and thick as compared to bright,
light, and thin tenors!
The 20-year/30-culture project of
our Center for Comparative Psycho-
linguistics has generated the affective
meanings of and attribution of feelings
to some 600 diverse concepts, orga-
nized into some 40 conceptual cate-
gories for statistical analysis, all using
carefully equivalent semantic differ-
entials for teen-age males in each in-
digenous language. It has provided
ample evidence for the universality
and pervasiveness of primitive Evalu-
ation (E), Potency (P) and Activity (A)
features of affective meaning. Given
this massive evidence, the prospect for
creating a non-linguistic Graphic Dif-
ferential seemed bright indeed. At our
Center, in 1967, Leon Jakobovits ini-
tiated research on developing just such
an instrument. However, although this
early effort yielded clear evidence for
a cross-culturally "universal" E-factor,
there was minimal evidence for either
"universal" P or A factors. Further-
more, there was clear evidence for
what might be called "denotative con-
tamination" — e.g., ANGULAR vs.
ROUNDED pictograms separated con-
cepts like chair, triangle and house
from cloud, smoke and snake — and
we concluded that most of the picto-
grams were too complex, lending them-
selves to caricatures of real objects.
A few years later, Patrice French,
then a graduate research assistant in
our Center, picked up this problem.
After developing and testing a series
of short-form GDs (Graphic Differen-
tials), she came up with a final version
that yielded highly satisfactory results
(see French, 1977, for details), and
there was little evidence of 'denotative
contamination." Figure 2 presents this
finalized GD, with the visual alterna-
tives organized according to the three
affective factors: note, first, that the
clearly Evaluative alternatives are ver-
balizable as smiling vs. frowning faces,
t/pward-directed vs. c/own ward-di-
rected arrows, a living vs. a dead orga-
nism, a growing vs. a cut-down tree,
and a whole vs. a cracked plaque; sec-
ond, that the Potency alternatives are
a large vs. a small spot, a thick vs. a
thin line, a solid cube vs. a plane
square, a ^eai//7y-lined vs. a finely-
lined drawing, and a densely vs. a
sparsely dotted square; and third, that
the Activity alternatives are an active
vs. a passive signal, a very jagged vs.
a rather smooth descending line, an
object rolling down a line vs. resting
on it; an animated dot vs. a relatively
passive dot, and an in-flight vs. a col-
lapsed bird-like creature.
However, dimensions are not pre-
sented in factor sets in an ordinary
Semantic Differential form, and neither
can they be presented so in a Graphic
Differential. Rather, the dimensions
representing the three affective fac-
tors must be mixed in ordering and,
as well, the dimensions for each fac-
tor must be randomly directed, left to
right, within factors — thus, as shown
in Figure 3, the ""E pole sometimes to
the left and sometimes to the right,
and similarly for the P and A factor
dimensions. This Graphic Differential
has already been applied very success-
fully to a variety of subject populations
for whom the usual (verbal) Semantic
Differential is inapplicable — to brain-
damaged patients like aphasics, to
thought-disordered schizophrenics, to
children younger than about six years
of age, and to members of non-literate
cultures.
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The Intimate Parallelism of
Perceptual and Linguistic Channels
Here I will first offer two very general
principles of Neobehaviorism — and
"Ernie" Principle and an "Ambiguity"
Principles — both of which can be
shown to operate in linguistic as well
as perceptual channels. Then I'll briefly
review some evidence for interaction
between and for parallel processing
across perceptual and linguistic chan-
nels (see Osgood, 1979b, 1979c, for
details).
An "Emic" principle. On the perceiv-
ing/comprehending side, we usually
have situations where percepts are
variable but their significances are
constant. By virtue of the fact that
both things and organisms are mobile
with respect to each other, the per-
cepts produced by the distal signs of
things will be variable through many
stimulus dimensions. Thus, for exam-
ple, the size of the percepts produced
by APPLE object must vary with dis-
tance; yet, given the stable visual fea-
tures (roundness, redness, stemness)
of the percepts, their meaningful sig-
nificance will be constant. It follows
that these will be differences that do
not make a difference in meaning. This
constant significance is ttie constancy
phenomenon, long familiar to psychol-
ogists — the "thingness," "thatness"
and "whoness" in perception.
On the behaving/expressing side,
we usually have situations where in-
tentions are constant but the programs
for behaving must be variable. Thus,
as the percepts of APPLE object vary
with distance, the child will learn
to vary his behavior to the common
apple-getting intention appropriately
— APPLE-on-table (some distance
away) eliciting locomotor approach,
APPLE a bit beyond reach yielding
reaching-and-grasping, APPLE at
crooked-arm's distance perhaps pro-
ducing "inspection for bugginess,"
and only very big APPLE image a few
inches from the face eliciting biting
movements.
Why do I call this the "Emic" Prin-
ciple? Because it is the behavioral
equivalent of the phonemic, mor-
phemic and sememic principles of
linguistics. But even more than this:
One can claim that there is a syntax
of behaving just as there is a syntax
of talking, and, of course, the former
is prior in development. For a child to
make biting, then grasping, then reach-
ing movements in that order — all in
thin air — as he approaches the. de-
sired APPLE would be just as "un-
grammatical" as it would have been
for Caesar to have announced "vici,
vidi, veni"!
An "Ambiguity" Principle. On the
perceiving/comprehending side, signs
(linguistic or perceptual) are often am-
biguously related to more than one
significance. Just as many words in
a language are to some degree poly-
semous — witness, as familiar exam-
ples, he went to the BANK, it was a
LIGHT one, the SHOOTING of the hunt-
ers was terrible — so too are many
perceptual signs, not only classic am-
biguous figures like the Necker Cube,
but everyday cases like the signifi-
cance of the facial expressions of men
on a picket-line as seen on TV (sullen
anger or grim determination?) or of
the combination of a tight-lipped smile
with shaking of a fisted hand (intent
to threaten or to display pride at com-
pletion of some effortful task?). On
the behaving/expressing side, although
the intention of the actor/speaker is
always unambiguous to him at the
moment, he will often use the same
outputs to express quite different in-
tentions — the same smile for plea-
sure, confidence, or derision, for ex-
ample.
Given the ubiquity of ambiguity for
signs in both perceptual and linguistic
channels, why aren't we hopelessly
ambiguated much of the time? The
answer is that, in most cases, conver-
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gent contextual signs serve to dis-
ambiguate, in language, he ROWED
to the bank, it was a light PLAY, and
the shooting of the hunters BY THE
NATIVES was terrible; in perception,
the tiglit-lipped-smile plus shaking-of-
a-fisted-hand BY A BOXER will be inter-
preted as "threatening" just BEFORE
the fight but as "prideful satisfaction"
just AFTER his winning it.
Evidence for interaction between lin-
guistic and perceptual channels. First,
some casual (but still very convincing)
observations. Gestural pointings, look-
ings, head-bobbings/shakings, and the
like normally accompany conversa-
tions. Gestures often substitute for
phrases (e.g., "I could/SLITTING MO-
TION ACROSS SPEAKER'S THROAT/
the bastard!") or even whole clauses
("They've got our car back in the shop
again, so/ ... PRAYERFUL POSTURE
OF HANDS PLUS HEAVENWARD-
LOOKING EYES!). It is also most sig-
nificant that emphatic gestures typi-
cally parallel linguistic stress ("I will
not!/FISTED-HAND-DOWN-SHARPLY/
wear the ridiculous tie!") and appear
utterly ludicrous when displaced from
stress points ("I will not wear that
ridiculous tie/SAME GESTURE/").
Second, some evidence for parallel
processing across channels. The most
ordinary of human communicative com-
petences — and those most often used
in research with young children — are
Simply Describing and Simply Acting
Out. In Simply Describing, the mean-
ings of perceived states and events
are comprehended and then expressed
in appropriate sentences; in Simply
Acting Out, the meanings of words
and sentences are comprehended and
then expressed by appropriate facial
expressions, gestures and postures.
My favorite example here is this: two
coeds, walking along a campus path,
see a third girl approaching with a
m/n/-miniskirt on; after she has passed,
one coed says to the other, "She also
dyes her hair!". Note that the use of
anaphoric she implies an immediately
prior cognition (which could only be
perception-based) and that the also
identifies it as something like [THAT
GAL / IS WEARING / A REALLY SHORT
SKIRT].
The evidence — experimental as
well as casual — supports the follow-
ing inescapable conclusions: (1) that
the "deep" cognitive system is essen-
tially semantic in nature; (2) that this
same cognitive system is shared by
both perceptual and linguistic infor-
mation-processing channels; and (3)
that there is continuous interaction
between these channels in ordinary
human communication. Yet, with only
a few exceptions (my own research
and theorizing being among them), in
linguistics and even psycholinguistics
there has been relatively little concern
with the semantics of non-linguistic,
perceptual cognizing.
CONGRUENCE DYNAMICS
Now we must look into the role of
cognitive congruence dynamics in
human perceiving, thinking and talk-
ing, my second major topic: first the
gross affective dynamics, on which
we have amassed a great deal of in-
formation over the past 20 years; sec-
ond, the fine denotative dynamics,
where we have less research evidence,
but which leads naturally into the na-
ture of metaphor.
Gross Affective Dynamics
There now is no doubt that Evaluation,
Potency and Activity, as affective di-
mensions of meaning are, indeed, hu-
man universals (see Osgood, May and
Miron, 1975, Oh. 4). In the Semantic
Differential technique, sets of teen-age
subjects in each of (now) 30 communi-
ties rated concepts (concrete ones like
FLOWER, CHEESE, SNAKE, LIPS and
TABLE; abstract ones like ADOLES-
CENCE, ENVY, ZERO, INFINITY, and
SEX) against short-form 12-scale dif-
ferentials, each 7-step scale being de-
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fined by bipolar adjectives like nice-
awful (E), big-llttle (P) and fast-slow
(A).
Now, since subjects are required to
rate all items — yielding judgments
like SNAKE (is) quite fast and ADOLES-
CENCE (is) slightly little — W. follows
that in many cases our native speak-
ers are forced to produce "sentences"
that would be semantically anomalous.
Literally speaking, TORNADO cannot
be either fair or unfair (only humans
can have such attributes), so subjects
sfiould check the middle of the scale
(defined as neither qualifier applying
or both equally). In fact, most subjects
check the -3 position, thus creating
a "sentence" which says TORNADO
(is) very unfair! This is obviously meta-
phorical usage of the scale, — by vir-
tue of the shared affect, both TOR-
NADO and unfair being ^E. In other
words, often the SD technique liter-
ally forces the metaphorical usage of
scales.
In our analysis of each of the 40 or
so conceptual categories tapped in
our Atlas of Affective Meanings we
always include a componential anal-
ysis in which we intuit the possible
denotative features that might be de-
termining affect attribution. The small
(8 concept) Color Category will serve
as an example: Here we "intuited" the
obvious physical dimensions and se-
lected appropriate concept-pairs for
testing: thus, for Brightness (WHITE/
BLACK, WHITE/GREY and GREY/
BLACK), for Hue (RED/BLUE and
YELLOW/GREEN), for Saturation (RED/
YELLOW and BLUE/GREEN) and for a
Color component (COLOR/GREY,
COLOR/WHITE and COLOR/BLACK).
When we checked for cross-cultural
Universals, we found the following:
Brightness is universally Good, Active
and Familiar as compared with Dark-
ness, but Darkness is more Potent and
Conflictual. Since humans are pri-
mates and depend much on vision,
this pattern of universals seems en-
tirely reasonable. As to Hue, our cross-
cultural data strongly confirm that the
red end of the spectrum is more active
than the blue — RED and YELLOW
being universally more Active than
BLUE and GREEN, but BLUE being
universally the more Good. For primi-
tive man, REDish sun and fire meant
warmth and liveliness, but the BLUEs
and GREENs were probably associated
with life-giving water and the fertility
of growing things. Saturated REDs
and BLUEs tend to be universally more
Potent than Unsaturated YELLOWs *
and GREENs, and this universal may 1
well have a physiologically-based af-
fect determination. Finally, as to the
Color/Non-color component, we find
that the concept COLOR is univer-
sally more Good, more Active and less
Conflictual than the non-Color con-
cepts GREY, WHITE and BLACK —
which certainly fits our metaphorical
uses of terms like colorful (attractive,
lively, healthy, etc.) vs. white and black
(often pale and sickly or gloomy and
threatening).
As part of a larger study on affective
relations among our Colors, Emotions,
and Days of the Week categories, our
Yugoslav colleague, Vid Pecjak (1970),
had subjects in seven of our cross-cul-
tural communities pair the terms in
each category with those in each other.
The correlations between Color and
Emotion concepts were quite high
across these communities ("^.63), but
those between Colors and Days of the
Week were lower (^.30). However, there
were definite clusters between the Col-
ors and Days. GREY goes with MON-
DAY for six of the seven communities
but never with SATURDAY, GREEN
and BLUE tend to go with WEDNES-
DAY (5 communities) but never with
SATURDAY, YELLOW and GREEN go
with THURSDAY (5 communities) but
again never with SATURDAY— but
RED does go with SATURDAY (6 of
the 7 communities), yet never with
MONDAY or SUNDAY! — and WHITE,
as might be expected, goes with SUN-
DAY for five of the seven communities.
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Now let me say something about the
pervasiveness and primitiveness of E,
P and A. In a 1969 paper I tried to ac-
count for the pervasiveness of these
affective dimensions of meaning by
noting, first, the marked similarity of
the E-P-A factors to the dimensions
of feeling and emotion: Wundt's Pleas-
antness/Unpleasantness, Tension/Re-
lief and Excitement/Quiet; Schlos-
berg's Pleasantness/Unpleasantness,
Rejection/Attention (P?) and Activa-
tion/Sleep; and my own "naming" —
in a 1966 study on the semantics of
communication via facial expressions
— Pleasant/Unpleasant, Controlled/Un-
controlled, and Activated/Unactivated.
Then I suggested that it is the primi-
tiveness and innateness of this emo-
tional reaction system of the human
animal that underlies the universality
of the affective E, P, and A components
of meaning.
Testimony to this primitiveness is
the fact that visual-verbal synesthesia
does not appear to be lost even in
severely impaired anomic aphasias.
Sylvia Scheinkopf (1970), using mainly
the visual graphic-pairs developed in
my 1960 study of the cross-cultural
generality of visual/verbal synesthesia,
clearly demonstrated that such apha-
sias perform very much like normals
on this task. They could point appro-
priately to visual alternatives for the
verbal concepts presented to them,
despite their manifest difficulties in
naming and work-finding, or even de-
scribing the graphic pairs verbally. In
other words, these primitive affective
aspects of meaning survive even the
effects of severe brain damage.
Fine Denotative Dynamics
I must begin with a brief sketch of some
relevant aspects of my Abstract Per-
formance Grammar (APG), since this
will lead to statement of the crucial
rules for fine semantic interactions in
the processing of sentence-like cogni-
tions. Then we will see how such inter-
actions function to shift the meanings
of words and phrases. And finally I will
summarize just a bit of the most rele-
vant experimental literature.
At the most central Representational
(meaningful) Level of my APG, four
structural mechanisms are proposed
— a LEXICON, an OPERATOR, a BUF-
FER and a long-term MEMORY — of
which only LEXICON and OPERATOR
will concern us here. It is LEX which,
given the acquisition of meanings via
sign- and feature-learning principles
in the theory, performs the feats of
transducing meaning-less (in them-
selves) sensory percepts into meaning-
full code-strips of semantic features in
comprehending and of transducing
meaning-full semantic code-strips into
meaning-/ess (in themselves) motor
programs for behavior /n expressing.
Whereas LEX functions on a "word-
like" unit basis (cf., Osgood and Hoo-
sain, 1974), the OPERATOR functions
on a "v\/hole-constituent" unit basis
(subject and object noun phrases and
the verb phrases relating them). Thus,
in comprehending, the "upcoming" se-
mantic code-strips for word forms from
LEX are assigned by OPERATOR to its
postulated three constituents for sim-
plexes, utilizing language-specific cues
for constituent boundaries. In express-
ing, this process must be reversed, with
the "down-coming" whole-constituent
semantic information from OPR being
analyzed by LEX into sets of code-strips
for word units and these being ordered
by LEX according to the within-con-
stituent rules of its language for talk-
ing via motor-skill programs. At the
grossest level of analysis, simplexes are
assumed to be tripartite in structure.
For simplex sentences expressing sta-
tive relations we would have [the ball
(FIGURE) / is on (STATE) / the table
(GROUND)] and for those expressing
action relations [the little boy (SOURCE)
/ picked up (ACTION) / the poodle
puppy (RECIPIENT)].
At the finest level of analysis, the
semantic features elicited by Signs
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are assumed to derive from the overt
behaviors made to Significates (things
signified). Therefore these semantic
components will (1) be bipolar and
reciprocally antagonistic in nature be-
haviorally speaking, it is just as impos-
sible to have a simultaneously -mu as
it would be to simultaneously open
and clench one's hand) and (2) be
non-arbitrarily Positive vs. Negative
(+/-) in the signing of their antago-
nistic poles. Note that — once mean-
ings are transduced "upwards" via
the LEXICOH— everything that tran-
spires in information processing by
this APG is entirely semantic in nature;
and note further that the same cogniz-
ing system operates in non-linguistic
perceptual/behavioral processing.
Given the reciprocally antagonistic
nature of semantic features, it must
follow that, functionally, within any
constituent of a simplex cognition,
each semantic feature can have only
one sign and one value at any one mo-
ment. Given this basic theoretical con-
straint, the rules for feature fusions,
both within and between constituents,
will be the following:
(1) that same sign fusions (+/+ or
-/-) of unequal intensities will
yield intensification of meaning
(e.g., in combinations like violent
anger or plead v\/ith humbly);
(2) that fusions of signed v\/ith un-
signed (zero) codings {+10 or -/
0) will yield modification of
meaning, the whole constituent
assuming the polarity and inten-
sity of the signed term (thus lively
hope making the hopefulness
more Active and plead v\/ith sin-
cerely making the pleading more
Moral); and
(3) that fusions of opposed signs on
the same feature (+/-) will yield
cancellation of meaning or even
"mind-boggling" anomalies (like
casual excitement; plead with tol-
erantly).
With regard to rule (3), it should be
noted that opposed signs only yield
cancellations toward zero if they are
imbalanced (e.g., a +1 fusing with a
-2) and that the "true" sense of anom-
aly should only occur if they are both
polar and balanced (-^3 and -3). We
often use such anomalies effectively,
as in he's sure a youthful old duffer!
Now let's look at within-constituent
congruence dynamics. With the Se-
mantic Interaction Technique (see
Osgood, 1970, for details), the appo-
siteness/acceptability/anomalousness
of words brought into syntactic con-
frontation within noun phrases or verb
phrases can be investigated. Using
judgments of interpersonal verb/ad-
verb and emotional adjective/noun
confrontations, clearly supportive re-
sults have been obtained; for examples:
in verb/adverb sets, attack suddenly is
judged apposite, attack deliberately ac- J
ceptable, but attack casually is anom- 1
alous; in adjective/noun sets, sudden
surprise is apposite, sudden interest
acceptable, but sudden contemplation
is anomalous.
What about between-constituent
congruence dynamics in processing
simplex cognitions, either linguistic
or perceptual? Again, given the recip-
rocally inhibitory nature of semantic
features, it must follow that cognitions
as wholes will be PERFECTLY congru-
ent only when, for each feature, the
algebraic product of the codings across
the three constituents (e.g., SOURCE-
AGTION-RECIPIENT) is positive and
the absolute values (intensities) of the
codings are the same (e.g., all three
constituents being 2 on the feature).
And this implies, of course, that given
the signs and intensities of any two
constituents of a simplex cognition on
a given feature, the congruent sign
and intensity of any third component
is predictable.
Of course, in ordinary cognizing of
simplex sentences perfect congruence
is rarely the case. And this implies that
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there will usually be semantic interac-
tions across constituents, resulting in
subtle meaning shifts. Our research
indicates that fusion shifts are typi-
cally "leftward" — from the "com-
ments" into the "topics" of sentences.
Thus, hearing that Tom I is I a lively
guy, the "liveliness" (^A) is likely to
be carried into the meaning of Tom,
but given a negative Relation (is not),
it may be "dullness" ("A) that carries
into Tom. It is here, of course, that the
dynamics of metaphors and similes
will be handled in APG,,, as we will
see later.
A general theory of semantic feature
interactions and fusions in determin-
ing similarity judgments and meaning
shifts in a wide variety of perceptual
and linguistic materials has recently
been presented by Amos Tversky in
a paper titled "Features of Similar-
ity" (1977). It is related to the notions
I have offered above, but just one of
many experiments he reports will have
to suffice here. The two sets of sche-
matic faces displayed in Figure 4 were
both shown to two groups of subjects.
For Group A, the four faces in each
set were presented in a randomly or-
dered row {not as shown here), and
the subjects were instructed simply to
partition the set into two subset pairs
of faces on the basis of overall similar-
ity. The most frequent partition of Set
1 was c/p (smiling faces) vs. a/b (non-
smiling faces) and of Set 2 was a/c
(nonfrowning faces) vs. b/q (frowning
faces), the substitution of q (Set 2) for
p (Set 1) thus changing the grouping
of faces. All this is mute testimony to
the dominance of affective Evaluation.
For Group B, the faces in each set
were presented as shown in this slide,
and the subjects were instructed sim-
ply to select that one of the three faces
below most similar to the "target" face
on top. As is evident in the percentages
below the three faces in the "choice"
set, face b was chosen most frequently
in Set 1 (but rarely in Set 2) while face c
was chosen overwhelmingly in Set 2.
These results confirm what Tversky
calls his diagnosticity principle — as
well as the dominance of the Pleasant-
ness/Unpleasantness affective factor
in facial communication (cf., Osgood,
1966; Cuceloglu, 1970).
A series of papers by Richard 0.
Anderson and various associates in
the Center for the Study of Reading
here at the University of Illinois has
provided evidence for what they call
"instantiation" of particular meanings
of the polysemous topics of sentences
— and these "instantiations" are clearly
cases where certain features of the
commentaries move "leftward" into
the topics. Anderson and Ortony (1975)
found that — given either the con-
tainer held the apples or the container
held the cola — and then being given
either basket and bottle as probes,
basket was a better probe for the for-
mer sentences (apples) and bottle a
better one for the latter (cola). In other
words, the "instantiations" of the fea-
ture code-strip for the general topic,
container, had been differentially mod-
ified by the "leftward" fusions from
apples (solid) vs. cola (fluid) in the
original comprehension of the sen-
tences. Anderson, Pichert, et al. (1976)
demonstrated that, for a wide variety
of sentence types with polysemous
topics, giving the predicted "instan-
tiations" as cue words yielded signifi-
cantly better recalls of the remainder
of the sentences than the general topic
words actually presented originally.
Thus, given the fish attacked the swim-
mer, the word shark was a better cue
than fish; given the man planned the
house, the word architect was a better
cue than man.
Metaphor
Semantic and syntactic rules are made
to be broken. When a Black youngster,
accused of a felony, exclaims "Ah ain't
nevah done nothin' to nobody nohow!",
he is guilty of a quintuple negative at
the very least, but his claim to honor-
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Set 1
44% 14% 42%
Set 2
12% 8% 80%
Figure 4. Schematic Faces Used to Test Tverskys Diagnosticity Hypotht
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able character is being vividly made.
However, if rules are to be broken,
then there must also be rules for break-
ing rules. "When I use a word,"
Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scorn-
ful tone, "it means just what I choose
it to mean, neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether
you can make words mean so many
different things." "The question is,"
said Humpty Dumpty, "Which is to be
master, that's all." There are grains
of both truth and untruth here — being
master of one's words is not synony-
mous with being entirely arbitrary in
one's use of them — and, as we shall
see, metaphors can vary from the tell-
ingly apposite, through the tamely
acceptable, to the ridiculously anom-
alous.
Metaphorical use of language falls
naturally into two sub-types. There are
within-constituent semantic interac-
tions in phrasing — witness Winston
Churchill's coinage of the phrase the
iron curtain, which certainly provided
an apt characterization of the Cold
War situation at that time. There are
between-constituent semantic inter-
actions in sentencing — my favorite
example here is a TV beer advertise-
ment, in which, after dropping bottles
of the brew from skyscrapers, running
them over with steam rollers, and fling-
ing them against brick walls (with nary
a scratch to the glass bottles), the as-
sertion is brightly made that this beer
has indestructible flavor!
In Phrasing
The smallest unit of potential meta-
phorical usage would seem to be
single-word nouns and verbs. The
names of many commercial products
provide examples. Just poking around
my wife's kitchen cupboard, I find
these: Meritene (a 'protein-vitamin-
mineral supplement") and Rose-milk
(skin care cream), both ^E; Ajax (a
cleanser that "bleaches out the tough-
est food stains"), obviously "^P; and
Off! ("keeps bugs away"), rather ^A.
Our frequent exhortations to inanimate
entities provide VP examples — Wake
up! (to a "grumbling" coffee pot in the
morning), give! (to a "recalcitrant" slot
machine) and charge! (to one's "id-
ling" car as the light turns to green).
"Live" vs. "dead" metaphors. Ac-
cording to Roger Brown (1958), "the
metaphor in a word lives when the
word brings to mind more than a sin-
gle reference and the several refer-
ences are seen to have something in
common. " Using the foot of the moun-
tain as an example, he points out that,
in the fresh use of this phrase, the
minus coding on Top vs. Bottom-ness
(to coin a feature name!) of foot can
fuse with mountain to yield the appo-
site bottom-of-mountain "live" meta-
phoric meaning. Of course, the foot
of the mountain is no longer a "live "
metaphor, but rather one long "dead.
"
However, the same vertical polarity is
used in many other (again, mostly
"dead ") phrasal metaphors, e.g., he
stands at the head vs. foot of his class,
but again fresh "live" ones can be gen-
erated, e.g., he's chipper at the head
of each day but gets droopy at its
foot (acceptable, even though "tem-
porality" is substituted for "vertical-
ity").
Affect vs. denotation based meta-
phors. While the foot of the mountain
is primarily denotation-based, the foot
of the class clearly involves affect
(Evaluation). In metaphoric usage many
superficially denotative terms actually
convey affective feeling-tones: a warm
person is typically differentiated from
a cold person in terms of social Evalu-
ation (E), not skin temperature; a hard
guy differs from a soft guy in terms of
social Potency (P), not the resiliency
of body — and Roger Brown (1958, p.
152) most appropriately observes that
"if Disney were to give a boulder a
voice it would be bass rather than
treble"; and a quick mind differs from
a slow mind in terms of mental Activity
(A). The affective-denotative difference
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can also be demonstrated by differen-
tial modifying of the same nominals —
thus compare a^^ecf/Ve/y apposite b/acA-
traitor, white hope, sweet joy and bitter
misery vs. anomalous (but usable, in a
mind-boggling fashion!) white traitor,
black hope, sour joy and sweet misery
with denotatively apposite disloyal trai-
tor, steady hope, wild joy and pro-
longed misery vs. anomalous (but
again, possible) loyal traitor, abrupt
hope, tame joy, and momentary misery.
The language of international rela-
tions (to say nothing of national poli-
tics) is loaded with metaphorical
phrases. Although many are stultifying
— the phrase underdeveloped coun-
tries is an insult to people whose writ-
ten histories often go back much fur-
ther than our own — the dynamics of
metaphor also encourage the creation
of potentially effective phrases. One
could speak of unevenly developed
countries — implying that some may
even be overdeveloped in certain re-
spects. The phrase mutual nuclear de-
terrence has a stable, reassuring feel
to it — almost like being in a medieval
suite of armor; but given its founda-
tions on the shifting psychological
sands of mutual fear and distrust, noth-
ing could be much less stable or re-
assuring — and it is refreshing to note
that one well-known strategist has
dubbed it the delicate balance of ter-
ror!
In Sentencing
Now I will detail the fine semantic inter-
actions involved in polysemy and in
metaphor — separately, because the
types of meaning-shifts are quite dif-
ferent: Polysemy involves selection
among alternative existing senses of
potentially ambiguous topics via inter-
active fusions from commentaries;
metaphor involves creation of novel
senses for topics via the same inter-
active fusions, in which certain old
features may be strengthened or weak-
ened and other new features may be
added. Finally, following a brief re-
view of some relevant empirical evi-
dence already available, I will suggest
a type of research that might serve to
distinguish among the somewhat com-
petitive theories of metaphor that have
been suggested by Tversky (1977), Or-
tony (1979) and myself.
It is interesting that etymologically
metaphor derives from the Greek meta
(trans) + pherein (to carry), i.e., liter-
ally "to carry across" or transfer —
which, or course, is precisely what my
"leftward" fusive interactions of se-
mantic features presume. Rather un-
fortunately, I think, this transfer notion
has subtly shifted in philosophical
treatments to one of comparison be-
tween the topic and the commentary.
I say "unfortunately" because the term
comparison implies a deliberate, con-
scious mental process rather than an
automatic interactive process among
constituent meanings of which one is
usually unaware. However, as Andrew
Ortony notes in a paper appropriately
titled "Why Metaphors Are Necessary
and Not Just Nice" (1975), whether we
call the process "transfer" or "com-
parison," metaphor is necessary if we
are to provide a reasonably faithful
portrayal of continuously variable
states with a language composed of
discrete symbols.
The semantic interactions that re-
solve polysemic ambiguities may be
either within-constituent or between-
constituent. I take some examples from
Michael Reddy (1973), the adjectives
ROCKi (derived from the noun rocA-,
referring to hard, granite-like sub-
stances) and ROCK2 (derived from the
verb to rock as a rhythmic motion):
In he works in a rock quarry vs. he
works in a rock band there is no am-
biguity since the w/?/7/>7-constituent
fusion of the features of quarry vs.
band with rock yield appropriately dif-
ferent total meanings. In they are rock
idols, however, the referent status of
they is ambiguous — but between-cor\-
stituent interaction easily disambigu-
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ates (thus, those musicians ... vs.
those monuments . . . are rock idols).
Or witness the multiple idiomatic uses
of the simple word hand: In the ordi-
nary usages of lend me a hand, deal
me a hand, I got it second hand, and
he rules with an iron hand there are
no confusions, due to the antecedent
contexts; but note the "mind-boggling"
effects of mixing the contexts, as in
lend me a second hand and deal me
an iron hand!
Particularly interesting are what
Reddy has called "conduit metaphors,"
in which the senses of simple verbs
like have and give are shifted polyse-
mously from Concrete to Abstract. In
/ have an apple and he gave me an
apple the senses of the stative HAVING
and the active GIVING are Concrete,
but in / have an idea and he gave me
an idea the senses are obviously Ab-
stract (there is no physical possession
or transfer). Reddy's paper provided
multitudes of examples — like none
of Mary's feelings CAME THROUGH to
me and try to PACK more thought
INTO fewer words. He suggests that
such polysemy makes it easier for
people to communicate their mental
and emotional states via language.
Imagine — immediately after youVe
told someone "I'm just buying time"
— the "mind-boggling-ness" of being
politely asked "How much are you pay-
ing for it?" (an abrupt shift from Ab-
stract to Concrete buying)\
Turning now to the creation and
comprehension of metaphors, Ortony
(1979, c, p. 22) says that "no adequate
theory of metaphor can ignore the dif-
ference between metaphor and simile."
He notes that, traditionally, the distinc-
tion has been made in terms of distin-
guishing between implicit comparison
(metaphor) and explicit comparison
(simile). While it is true that when a
wife creates the metaphor, my hus-
band is a teddy bear, no comparison
is directly expressed, as it is when
she creates the simile, my husband is
like a teddy bear, I would suggest that
the psychological difference between
metaphors and similes is primarily one
of intensity of coding of the commen-
tary on exactly the same semantic fea-
tures. To say my husband IS a teddy
bear is certainly a stronger "commit-
ment" by the speaker than to say my
husband IS LIKE a teddy bear (which
is a kind of waffling), and hence the
polarization of the "cuddly," "cute,"
"playful" meanings will be greater for
the former than the latter.
As was the case for within -constitu-
ent metaphors in phrasing, between-
constituent metaphors in sentencing
must optimally break semantic rules
if they are to be effective, let alone
comprehensible. In the literal use of
English one cannot say the thunder
shouted or even the panther shouted
— only humans can shout — yet,
speaking poetically, one might well
say the thunder shouted down the
mountainside. However I, at least,
could not say the breeze shouted
down the mountainside — without
making it a gale! Note that while thun-
der and shout share enough features
(like affective Potency and denotative
Loudness) to "override" the opposi-
tion on Humanness — the fusion, in-
deed, serving to "humanize" the thun-
der — breeze and shout do not.
My suggested rules for semantic fea-
ture interaction (presented earlier) gen-
erate explicit predictions for potential
metaphors and similes. Rule (1): when
a feature has the same sign (+ or -)
in both topic and commentary, equal
intensity of coding yields no change in
topic meaning, greater intensity in com-
ment increases polarization in topic,
and lesser intensity in comment reduces
polarization in topic. Rule (2): when a
feature is signed (either + or -) in the
commentary but unsigned (0) in the
topic, the topic assumes the same inten-
sity and polarity on that feature as the
commentary. Rule (3): when topic and
commentary have opposed signs on a
feature, unequal codings yield reduc-
tions in intensity toward zero coding in
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the topic, nonpolar equal codings (like
+ 1 vs. -1) yield cancellation of that
feature in the topic, and polar equal
codings ( + 3 vs. -3) yield the sense of
anomaly.
Table 1, titled simply John and Mary,
offers several sets of sentence types
which will serve to illustrate the as-
sumed functioning of these rules —
the use of John and Mary as contras-
tive topics serving to minimally code
them on -SEX and ^Maturity. Sentences
that are literally informative are marked
+
,
uninformative (redundant) -, or
anomalous with an !, respectively. Sen-
tences that are potentially metaphori-
cal are marked by signs in parentheses
— ( + ) if they are apposite (that is, in-
formative via metaphor), (?) if they are
acceptable but clearly not apposite,
(0) if they are simply "mind-boggling-ly"
empty, and (!) if they are anomalous
(that is, incongruously mis-informative).
In what follows, we will see how the
postulated rules of semantic feature
interaction and fusion (here, across
constituents) would predict the ex-
pected effects upon listeners — as
checked by your own intuitions, of
course!
The first set of sentences (Roman I)
are redundantly uninformative since
in ordinary English the personal names
John and Mary are already coded for
Humanness and Sex — these features
of the commentary are already entailed
in the coding of the topic. On the other
hand, those in Roman II are literally
informative, since new "^Maturity and
"^Cleverness features from the commen-
taries are transferred to the topics
where they were coded zero. In con-
trast, note that in Set Roman III, while
John is handsome and Mary is pretty
are similarly informative via fusion,
John Is pretty and Mary is handsome
are literally anomalous, because hand-
some and pretty are coded "^Sex and
"Sex — thus in opposition to my Rule 3.
We come now to the potentially
metaphorical sentences in Set IV. The
commentary is a teddy bear is clearly
congruent with the Maleness of John
because of the teddy ?) — and hence
the Cuddliness, Playfulness, etc., fea-
ture-sets can be informatively fused with
the meaning of John, riding over the
opposition on Maturity; this same Male-
ness, along with the Immaturity, are
equally clearly incongruent for Mary
as a topic, and hence the anomalous-
ness of Mary is a teddy bear. Exactly
the reverse of course, applies to John
is a kitten (!) vs. Mary is a kitten ( + ).
A similar comparative analysis holds for
John is a bull-dozer: both topic and
commentary are coded Masculine, thus
allowing the Potency, Determination
and Ruthlessness of bull-dozer to
transfer to John, overriding the single
opposition on Humanness. For Mary is
a bull-dozer, however, the oppositions
on Sex and possibly Potency as well,
added to that on Humanness, render
the whole rather anomalous. The anal-
yses of John is a sewing machine vs.
Mary is a sewing machine would be
the same — on the assumption that
the "femininism" of sewing machine
not only fits Mary but makes a busy
little demon out of her! Either John
or Mary might be acceptable as topics
for.../s a radio (making them loud-
mouthed, gossipy bores??), but the
sentences surely are no\ apposite meta-
phors — hence the (?) rating.
As they stand without any context,
the sentences in Set V are "mind-
boggling-ly" empty (0) when the fea-
tures of the commentaries {paper-clips,
formulas, and ideas) are fused with
those of the topics John and Mary. But
note that if a prior context Is given, or
even the commentaries expanded, an
apposite metaphor can be generated:
Thus, for paper-clip, either prior sen-
tences about John or Mary "holding
the family together" or an expanded
commentary . . . is a family paper-clip;
and for formula, prior talk about either
John or Mary providing exactly the
"solution" for the other's family prob-
lems.
All of the sentence types so far have
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involved the simple verb to be (is) as
the relation of the connmentary. How-
ever these can be much more complex
semantically. Set VI illustrates the po-
tential metaphorical functions of verb
phrases, and again the topics, John
or Mary, undergo interaction-based
meaning changes. While John growled
at the salesman would be a literal state-
ment as far as the salesman is con-
cerned, growled at contains features
which, when fused with John, make
him at least momentarily rather mean
and nasty and even (Dog-like) a bit
more Masculine. On the other hand,
when Mary is the topic we must code
the sentence (?) because of this op-
position on Sex. Conversely, since
purring is clearly Cat-like — and hence
a bit more Feminine, Mary purred at
the cop is coded (-I-) but John purred
at the cop is coded (?). Both of these
potentially metaphoric relations via
verb phrases contrast with laughed
at, where either JoA7n (or) Mary laughed
at the clown may have some effect on
the meaning of clown, but certainly
not on the topics Mary or John.
My last Set VII makes it even clearer
that metaphoric interactions between
topics and commentaries are by no
means limited to simple verb to be
relations. Note that while John will
make someone a nice husband and
Mary will make someone a nice wife
are entirely acceptable literal asser-
tions, if we reverse these object noun
phrases we get metaphoric assertions
that forcefully modify the "images" of
both John and Mary and are in no way
"mind-boggling." To say Mary will
make someone a nice husband actu-
ally makes her somewhat Masculine
(one imagines her to be rather big,
strong and domineering); to say John
will make someone a nice wife, simi-
larly, makes him somewhat Feminine
(one imagining him to be rather small,
weak and submissive). The last two
examples indicate, first, that John (or)
Mary will make someone a nice cousin
(with cousin neutral on Sex and much
else) has no such effects, and is in fact
quite ''empty" (0), and, second, that
John (or) Mary will make someone a
nice parent is merely literally informa-
tive and in no way metaphorical.
There is one very interesting thing
that appears when informative literal
sentences are compared with informa-
tive metaphorical sentences — and I,
at least, have seen nothing about it in
the literature. This is the fact that,
whereas negation of literals serves to
cancel (or even reverse) the features
embodied in the commentary, nega-
tion of potential metaphors apparently
serves only to shift them into literal
sentences — i.e., cancels their meta-
phoric potential. Negating the sen-
tences I have coded simply + (liter-
ally informative) — e.g., John is NOT
clever, Mary is NOT pretty, John did
NOT laugh at the clown, and Mary will
NOT make someone a nice parent —
clearly cancels the meanings of the
commentaries as applied to John or to
Mary, and even seems to reverse the
codings in some (like John is not clever
suggesting that he's pretty stupid!).
On the other hand, negating the rela-
tions I have coded (+) (metaphorically
informative) — e.g., John is NOT a
teddy bear, Mary is NOT a kitten, John
did NOT growl at the salesman, and
Mary did NOT purr at the cop — seem
more like literal denials (albeit rather
obvious ones) and certainly do not re-
verse the meanings. And as to nega-
tion of my last sentential examples —
Mary will NOT make anyone a nice hus-
band and John will NOT make anyone
a nice wife — they are absolutely
"mind-boggling," and about all one
could say to them (and that after a
pause for trying to comprehend) would
be "of course, not!"
Now a brief review of some particu-
larly relevant research with children
and adults. Ortony, Reynolds and Arter
(1978) provide a critical review of much
of the literature here, of which only a
few particularly relevant studies will
be noted. Gardner (1974) reports an
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experiment which explicitly relates
synesthesia to metaphor in children
tested in three groups with mean ages
of 3.5, 7.0, and 11.5 years. Given sets
of stimulus-word pairs, the children
were asked to say how the pairs should
be related — a test item being, e.g.,
blue-red: "Which color is cold and
which is warm?" Errors (in terms of
adult synesthetic tendencies) were
shown to decrease with age, with 11-
year-olds performing much like adults.
Winner, Rosentiel and Gardner (1976)
postulated three levels of development
in comprehending metaphors like the
prison guard was a hard rock: A "magi-
cal" level (that the guard was turned
into a rock); a "metonymic" level (that
the guard worked in a prison with rock
walls), and a "primitive metaphoric"
level (that the guard was physically —
not psychologically, at this stage —
hard and tough). Whereas children 6
through 8 gave predominantly "primi-
tive metaphoric" interpretations (and
even the youngest gave more "met-
onymic" than "magical"), "genuine
metaphoric" interpretations were dom-
inant for children 10 to 14 years of age.
In a relevant adult study, Verbrugge
and McCarrell (1977) proposed that
metaphors are comprehended only
when the unexpressed ground between
the topic and the commentary is in-
ferred. For example, billboards are
warts on the landscape will be com-
prehended only if the ground — here,
something like "ugly protrusions on a
surface" (i.e., the affective and deno-
tative features transferred from com-
mentary to topic) is inferred. They then
predict that unexpressed grounds will
also be effective as prompts for recall
of the metaphical sentences. Their
results showed that, although topics
and commentaries were the best
prompts, relevant grounds worked
nearly as well. Again, whether "infer-
ence" of the unexpressed grounds is
a deliberate mental process of which
comprehenders are aware, or is sim-
ply the awareness of a particular
"fresh" meaning of the topic due to
automatic semantic feature transfers,
remains a basic theoretical issue.
And, finally, a proposed experiment
on metaphor comprehension. The pur-
pose would be to see if reasonably pre-
cise predictions can be made (and
tested) for shifts in the meanings —
both affective and denotative — of
the topics of metaphorical sentences.
The predications would come from
my own theory, but also (competitively)
from the theoretical notions elaborated
by my friend and colleague at Illinois,
Andrew Ortony (cf. his 1975 and 1979
a, b, c papers) and from the seminal
paper by Amos Tversky (1977), titled
"Features of Similarity," as extended
by Ortony to apply to metaphor. I
would, of course, invite Ortony and
Tversky to make their own predictions
for topic meaning-shifts in the experi-
mental sentences.
For the set of illustrative metaphoric
sentences here, I will use only encyclo-
pedia as a common topic — there
would be a variety of topics in the
actual experiment, of course. Hypo-
thetical sentence (1), an encyclopedia
is a dictionary, is essentially literal,
and little topic meaning-shift would be
expected. Sentences (2) through (4)
— ^n encyclopedia is a goldmine I a
coal mine I a junk yard — would be
designed to modify topic affective
meanings (from "^E through "E to "E),
since, denotatively, all are places where
one must "dig around" to find things.
Hypothetical sentence (5), an encyclo-
pedia is an oil well, is deliberately in-
apposite, given the conflicting features
of "digging out" {encyclopedia) vs.
"gushing forth" {oil well). While the
Animate and "Human commentary in
(6), an encylopedia is a vacuum cleaner,
strikes me as rather apposite ("suck-
ing up a mass of information"), the
similarly coded (denotatively) chicken
coop in my (7) seems entirely "mind-
boggling." And whereas the ^Animate
and *Hu man professo/" in my hypotheti-
cal (8), an encyclopedia is a professor.
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seems apposite (after all, professors
are collectors and sources of informa-
tion), the similarly coded secretary in
my (9), being typically a recipient of
information, seems rather inapposite.
The measuring instrument for the
proposed experiment would be a se-
mantic differential, but one designed
to tap more specific denotative fea-
tures as well as generalized affective
ones — e.g., scales Wke abstract-con-
crete (encyclopedias vs. vacuum clean-
ers), organized-disorganized (coal
mines vs. junk yards), animate-inani-
mate (professors vs. vacuum cleaners),
giving-receiving (oil wells vs. junk
yards), simple-complex (dictionaries
vs. encyclopedias), and so forth. One
group of subjects (control) would rate
both topics and commentaries as iso-
lated words or phrases on the SD
scales; the other group (experimental)
would rate only the topics and in the
context of the metaphorical sentences.
The control group data would be used
to predict (via each competing the-
ory) the meaning-shifts of topics — and
these predicted topic meanings would
be evaluated against the actual topic
meanings, as given by the experimen-
tal group in the metaphor contexts.
Although shifts in the meanings of
commentaries could be predicted and
measured, no such shifts would actu-
ally be expected. There is a very sig-
nificant characteristic of reversible
metaphors that has not been suffi-
ciently highlighted in the literature —
namely, that it is the meanings of the
topics that are shifted, not those of
the commentaries (thus the transfer
is always "leftward" from comment to
topic). Compare butchers are surgeons
(where butchers acquire affective ^E
and denotative "^Skill) with surgeons
are butchers (where surgeons become
clearly "E and very "Skill). But note
that there is no intuitively detectable
shift in commentary meaning in either
case. Whereas billboards are warts on
the countryside conveys ~E and "^Prom-
inence to the billboards with no appar-
ent effect upon the meaning of v\/arts,
the reversal to warts are billboards on
the face adds denotative ^Magnitude
and "^Communication (advertising one's
ugliness!) to the already "E of the
warts on the face, again with no felt
shift in the meaning of the commen-
tary {billboards). It might be noted that
in the encyclopedia sentence-set (with
the possible exception of a professor
is an encyclopedia) all reversals pro-
duce "mind-boggling" sentences —
like a goldmine is an encyclopedia (!)
or a vacuum cleaner is an encyclo-
pedia (!). This seems to be the case
for many (perhaps most) metaphor and
simile reversals. Again borrowing an
example from Ortony (1979), witness
the effect of reversing the apt simile
cigarettes are like time bombs into time
bombs are like cigarettes (!).
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RESPONSE TO OSGOOD
Harold McWhinnie
University of l\/laryland
Professor Osgood's paper is important
to researchers in the arts on three
grounds:
(a) It provides empirical data to vali-
date intuitive speculations of artists
such as Klee and Kandinsky.
(b) It provides for a model to measure
verbal meanings and reactions to
works of art.
(c) it provides some useful insights
into a non-verbal measure of per-
ceptual and visual meanings.
Kandinsky, writing in his classical
epic, Concerning the Spiritual In Art
(1912), speculated on colors which
had sounds and shapes. Klee, in his
lectures at the Bauhaus, took up the
theme of cross-modality perceptual
synesthesias in his own intuitive spec-
ulations on forms which had sounds.
The idea of synesthesia was one of the
fundamental beliefs of, not only the
Bauhaus, but much of the modern
movement as well.
As Professor Osgood points out very
early in his paper, synesthesias be-
comes accepted as a more normal
phenomena and not restricted to the
behaviors of "freak individuals." In
this part of his paper it was interesting
for me, as a design historian and critic,
to see the psychological validation for
these ideas which are important cor-
nerstones of the art and ideas of our
century.
Many of the design exercises and
learning experiences of the Bauhaus
Art School, such as texture charts,
painting to sounds, etc., have a basis
in the psychological concept of synes-
thesias.
In my own design history courses,
I have for the past several years, ex-
perimented with playing musical com-
positions which somehow relate to
the perceptual and visual qualities in
various types and periods of modern
art. The question of "aesthetic equiva-
lences" has always interested me. This
concept that lines, shapes, forms, col-
ors, and textures have their aesthetic
equivalence in compositions and pas-
sages from music, seems to be an im-
portant conceptual principle which un-
derlies much of aesthetic and arts
education.
Professor Osgood's paper concen-
trates most of its attention on the Se-
mantic Differential Technique. While
this method has been developed to
measure meaning in a linguistic sense,
it provides an important research meth-
odology for work in aesthetic measure
studies. Studies in aesthetic prefer-
ence have been handicapped through-
out much of their histories by the use
pf methodologies which recorded pref-
erence in terms of like and don't like.
The history of such studies has dem-
onstrated that aesthetic behaviors need
to be measured with instruments that
are far more sensitive to a wide range
of aesthetic qualities. The Semantic
Differential Technique has been used
by researchers in Europe over the past
10 years to give us more reliable read-
ings on aesthetic judgment and prefer-
ence variables.
In discussing the work on the far
less developed Perceptual Differential
Scale, Professor Osgood indicated the
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difficulties encountered, as well as mental psychology. In this sense Pro-
hopes and potentialities for such an fessor Osgood's speculations seem to
instrument. The need for this instru- parallel earlier work by Heinz Werner
ment still persists, and the work men-
tioned by Pat French should be con-
tinued within art education research.
The innateness and primitiveness of Harold McWhinnie
this affective meaning system gives University of Maryland
rise to important questions in develop- College Park, Maryland 20742
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Ron Neperund
University of Wisconsin, Madison
The work of Professor Osgood has
been familiar to many researchers in
art education through his very influen-
tial 7^76 Measurement of Meaning
(1957). The acquaintanceship with his
work has been principally through the
use of the semantic differential tech-
nique associated with his research into
meaning. His current paper is particu-
larly significant in bringing to a diverse
range of art education researchers the
essential import of his work; it places
the full range of Osgood's research
into perspective. The psycholinguistic
ideas which he discusses should be
of real value to art educators and re-
searchers, particularly when recogniz-
ing our dependence on verbal commu-
nication, whether in teaching art or
assessing aesthetic behavior.
Even though I have used the semantic
differential technique and am familiar
with its development and theoretical un-
derpinnings, my initial reading and re-
reading of "The Cognitive Dynamics of
Synesthesia and Metaphor " presented
some difficulties. However, the presen-
tation of the paper by Professor Osgood
made the paper come alive and was in
the process an apt demonstration of
some of the very ideas he was present-
ing. It is an important paper serving as a
state-of-the-art review of some of his
major contributions to psycholinguis-
tics.
The semantic differential, (SD), tech-
nique has been frequently used as a
research tool by art educators, by re-
searchers in the area of environment
and behavior, and by social scientists,
both here and abroad. Implicit in the
use of the semantic differential in as-
sessing aesthetic behavior are the as-
sumptions underlying cognition and
perception. These are drawn from Os-
good's conclusions in Part I of this
paper: (1) "that the 'deep' cognitive
system is essentially semantic in na-
ture; (2) that this same cognitive sys-
tem is shared by both perceptual and
linguistic information-processing chan-
nels; (3) that there is continuous inter-
action between these channels in ordi-
nary communication." In effect, when
we ask subjects to respond to a paint-
ing on a bi-polar adjective scale, such
as good-bad, we assume that we are
assessing or retrieving something of
the affective orientation to the work
along evaluative, potency, and activity
dimensions encoded in the deep se-
mantic space. Invariably, the overrid-
ing dimension is an evaluative one
whether the stimulus object is a paint-
ing or a work.
The great advantage of the semantic
differential technique, in studies that
might be loosely categorized under the
term experimental aesthetics, is that
it permits the use of "real" art objects
as the stimuli eliciting responses. How-
ever, this freedom contains certain
problems. Unless great care is taken
in selecting art objects as representa-
tive of particular properties, the resul-
tant evaluation or assessment of a work
is of a very general nature. Thus,
while the semantic differential tech-
nique may reveal gross affective dif-
ferences among subjects on styles,
greater specificity in definition of re-
sponse variables is best advanced by
use of a synthetic approach to the
study of single visual attributes such
as Berlyne's investigations of visual
complexity. Nonetheless, the SD tech-
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nique is very useful in revealing re-
sponse variables with the further study
advanced by the study of single visual
attributes.
So the SD technique is particularly
useful in revealing the connotative,
the universal affective dimensions of
meaning. Within this domain Osgood
and associates have convincingly es-
tablished pervasive and primitive af-
fect dimensions of evaluation, potency
and activity. These EPA dimensions
are found among art as in other con-
cepts. It seems to me that the problem
in using the semantic differential as a
research tool, particularly in experi-
mental aesthetics, is that the product
becomes something of an artifact of
technique rather than a contribution
to real aesthetic insight along particu-
lar theoretical lines of thought. We
know that individuals use EPA dimen-
sions in responding to art, at least as
revealed in using the SD technique,
but we are at the point of asking: So
what? Where do we go from here?
The metaphorical use of language,
which is an extension of congruence
dynamics, suggests both research and
instructional relationships to the talk
about art. Important critical processes,
such as the rather classical process
of description, analysis, interpretation
and evaluation as described by Feld-
man in Art as Image and Idea, or the
phenomenological process, as de-
scribed by Kaelin in Cemrel's The
Guidelines, Curriculum Development
for Aesthetic Education, use meta-
phorical language in joining the visual
with the verbal world. We know very
little about individuals' metaphorical
use of language relative to the visual
arts. In effect, Osgood has, through
his insights into the creation, struc-
ture and comprehension of metaphors,
presented art education researchers
with, at least, a starting point in the in-
vestigation of metaphorical use of lan-
guage in communicating about art.
Eventually some might find his be-
haviorist model a bit constraining, but
it is a place to begin.
The framework of metaphorical use
of language, then, not only suggests
that developmental studies be ex-
tended to the visual arts, but also
that instructional strategies might be
developed using the best state of exist-
ing knowledge in this area as a means
of extending the use of critical pro-
cesses in art education. We are in
debt to Professor Osgood, as we are
to solid researchers In other disci-
plines, for providing insights and tools
adaptable to art education research
and instruction.
Ronald Neperud
Art Department
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
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As Review Panel members, our task
is not easy. In essence, our charge is
to provide key linkages from a kaleido-
scope of "Osgoodian" concepts and
"semantic aerobatics." Let us not fool
ourselves. Osgood's paper, though
scholarly, is lengthy and difficult to
attend to as a talk.
Nonetheless, with careful reading,
creative applications and relevancy
for visual arts researchers can be sug-
gested. My response will not attempt
to explicate scientific application for
such relationships, but rather to illus-
trate one perspective for relevancy.
A portion of my research attempts to
provide accounts of the methods by
which art students assign meaning or
interpret meaning from teacher talk
about visual phenomena. Metaphoric
description, though usually ambiguous
and often inadequate, does provide
instructional communication for aes-
thetic phenomena.
As a classroom ethnographer and
a researcher of teacher talk and inter-
action, I am intrigued with Professor
Osgood's concept of "non-linguistic
cognizing" and the classroom achieve-
ment of this level of knowing. I am fur-
ther intrigued by the complexity of the
translation of non-linguistic cognizing
to linguistic or descriptive learning
equivalencies, or what Osgood has
called "perceptuo-linguistic synes-
thesias. " I shall attempt in this response
to illustrate how such concepts mani-
fest themselves in the art classroom.
There should be little question that
teacher talk about visual art phenom-
ena provides the basic communication
tool of studio classroom instruction
and evaluation. Nevertheless, aesthetic
understanding can occur without reach-
ing a level of verbal interpretation.
Aesthetic phenomena are nonverbal
and evade verbal equivalency trans-
lations. It is indeed the skilled teacher
who can communicate aesthetic values
through talk or lecture.
It should not be surprising for us to
discover that the student's primary
learning objectives center around the
discovery of situational cues (or what
Osgood would call "convergent con-
textual signs") to provide increasing
clarity of meaning for that which is
spoken in relation to the visual work
being produced. This cue searching
behavior reduces the degree of talk
ambiguity and, in essence, is the basic
evidence teachers will use to deter-
mine whether or not aesthetic learn-
ing has taken place. In other words,
the student's ability to grasp the mean-
ing of aesthetic terms and concepts,
his ability to use such language and
his ability to demonstrate evaluative
application of such criteria to his work
are the essence of success for any
given classroom context. Though this
may seem all too simple an explana-
tion, my research would indicate that
these processes are often the taken-
for-granted and rarely attended to es-
sence of the art teaching/learning
dynamic.
Students engage in both subcon-
scious and systematic searching for
"convergent contextual signs" to clar-
ify ambiguous terms and abstract
concepts. The study of this ongoing
interplay among ambiguous communi-
A paper presented to the National Sym-
posium for Research in Art, October 9, 1980,
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign.
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cation, situational cues and aesthetic
understanding would seem initially
better suited to case study methodol-
ogies which allow for the controlling
variables of time and context. Yet it
appears to me that the investigation
needs to stop there. Semantic differ-
ential testing seems quite possible for
future studies.
The very term "semantic differen-
tial" appears to be in contrast to the
visually oriented person, and conse-
quently, less than inviting to the visual
arts researcher. I urge reconsidera-
tion and offer a note of encourage-
ment. This process is indeed quite
natural to that which we do both as
artists and as teachers. Interestingly
enough, the semantic differential tech-
nique is a basic mechanism that stu-
dents usually employ to assign aes-
thetic value to that which is being
produced in the studio classroom. Indi-
vidual and informal semantic differen-
tial scales help students to assign eval-
uative and potency meanings to a
teacher's classroom appraisals or utter-
ances about studio products. Students
select contrasting verbal descriptors of
negative to positive equivalency, then
interpret the degree of negative or posi-
tive equivalency for each statement
made in relation to their work. I call
this process "continuum ranking be-
havior." These student rating systems
are comprised of contrasting polarity
achievement pairs. As an example, con-
sider the following typical ones:
TABLE 1
(plus) + to (minus)
wonderful to —— horrible
fixed it to —— ruined it
better to —— worse
he likes it to —— he hates it
favorable to —— unfavorable
correct to —— wrong
interesting to —— boring
good to —— bad
"neat" to —— "yuckie"
A+ to —— D-
Invented expressions also serve in
this capacity. Consider for example the
pre-schooler whose semantic differ-
ential scale bridges "oou" to "ickey."
Though not a sophisticated use of
metaphor, the differential is sufficient
as a means to rank the work in positive
or negative values.
Without question, our profession
could profit from extended research
to gain knowledge and awareness of
the ongoing interplay between poten-
tially ambiguous aesthetic and meta-
morphic descriptors and the aesthetic
learning process.
For the sake of brevity, allow me to
simplify the studio appraisal behavior
into "private" and "public" appraisal
stages. At least three types of "private"
appraisal precede "public" dialogue
about the work. These are:
(1) Boundary patrolling of the con-
ditions or the antecedent criteria
related to the task assignment;
(2) Forecasting and anticipating out-
comes, and
(3) Aesthetic experiencing or arousal
produced by the emerging work.
Although these processes are gen-
erally meant to be "private," students
still will search for non-verbal appraisal
cues to assess a teacher's state of af-
fect toward the work during moments
of direct encounter. At some point,
the teacher decides how much commu-
nication about the work he is able or
willing to disclose through gestural or
spoken language. The studio teacher
is faced with a bewildering task of
selecting appropriate terms for con-
veying his aesthetic judgment, in es-
sence, translating his visual knowing
to metaphoric communication. During
a critique, the student assumes his task
to be that of assigning a positive or
negative value to the terms or phrases
that the instructor utters. To do so with
any degree of accuracy, he must have
shared understandings of the terms
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and concepts which are the topic of
discourse. This is not an easy tasl< in
the initial weel<s of a new course.
Allow me to illustrate this point. The
following utterances were recorded
during the initial meeting of a draw-
ing course. The statements were made
in reference to slides of work com-
pleted by students who had taken the
course previously. They are typical of
the semantic referents (italicized)
usually used in studio classrooms.
Consider both the potential ambiguity
for the beginning level student as well
as the implied differential value scale
assumed by the teacher:
TABLE 2
teacher utterance
implied differential
+ to -
"This one is nice — real direct"
"Lots of nice stuff going on in this one!"
"This one has real efficiency of line."
"This one is a bit too predictable."
"The darker elements are a bit too localized."
"This is the nicest drawing I think I ever got from a
student."
(spontaneous-to-overworked)
(nice stuff-to-boring stuff)
(simple-to-too complex)
(surprising-to-trite)
(balanced values-to-unbalanced)
(outstanding-to-worst)
Though as an experienced teacher,
I can anticipate an implied differential
criteria, consider the difficulty the be-
ginning student has in interpreting
what is meant by "nice stuff." Con-
sider, as well, that teacher classroom
talk is uttered as neutral and serves
simply to describe what is being per-
ceived. This neutral value range causes
the students to be confused as they
continue to attempt to differentiate
positive or negative assessment to
such utterances. In addition, each
teacher employs unique language
adaptations which are not so easily
translated into differentials. Consider
the following:
"The imagery is haunting."
"This one falls apart a little.^'
"The color \s particularly strange."
"This one works better, it's fairly
complex."
"There is really nice closure going
on here."
We can see that even in this sample
episode students could easily be con-
fused between the use of "real effi-
cient" and "fairly complex," which
appear to be opposite, and yet are both
delivered as positive judgments. If the
words or the topic of appraisal is am-
biguous, meaning and production ap-
plications for the talk are difficult to
determine. Hence, the initial learning
task for the beginning student is to
gain a knowledge of the way in which
the teacher employs such specific
terms as "nice stuff," "real direct,"
"localized color," "falls apart a little,"
etc. Initially, the student may have just
the hint of favorable of unfavorable
judgment, but the comprehension of
the meaning of specific terms or cri-
teria will generally be somewhat am-
biguous. As a student participant in
this case, I wrote the following in my
field notation log:
Mr. Allen showed eight drawings and
spoke of the qualities he admired in
them. It helped me to grasp a sense of
the product expectations for the course.
One drawing was called, "The best he'd
ever gotten from a student. " My impres-
sion was that it was incorrect in terms
of anatomy; however, I did establish
that the course would emphasize a
spontaneous and direct approach. (As
the samples were shown, I wrote the
following descriptors on my sketch pad
cover): fuzzy, loose, sketchy, smear,
non-academic, non-modeled, impres-
sionistic, gestural, positive-negative,
textural, vehicle for drawing qualities
rather than subject for drawing.
(Field notation, 6/22/76)
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My selection of descriptive terms
reflects a negative affect of a personal
assessment of the example. Nonethe-
less, the selected value terms were
employed as pointers which guided
my attention, as student, toward phe-
nomena and sensuous qualities that
would be relevant to successful studio
production within this particular con-
text.
We assume that the apprentice ar-
tist is naive in his awareness of the
sensuous elements that make works
"better." Language can help students
discover those sensuous phenomena.
For instance, a frequent expression
employed by Mr. Allen was "nice stuff."
With repeated reference to "nice stuff,"
a student formulates a visual typifica-
tion of what is meant by the phrase.
Ambiguous value-laden terms become
clearer as courses evolve.
Subconscious cue searching of the
visual referents that accompany ap-
praisal talk contribute toward a tacit
learning. That is, aesthetic knowing is
a result of an inductive process which
is motivated to reduce the ambiguity
of value reference terms. The flash im-
pressions that are associated with the
value term soon build to an aesthetic
typification of the aesthetic concept
or qualitative isolate which was spoken
in the interaction. This learning activ-
ity results in a visual knowledge, which
is different from linguistic knowledge.
This knowledge has often been asso-
ciated with intuitive knowing: "feels
right." It is strongly anchored in the
subconscious, and as such, often finds
itself lost to the student's explicit
awareness or beyond his range for
verbal description.
As part of the validation for this as-
sertion, I asked "key informants" to
define the meaning of certain terms
often used by Mr. Allen. In reference
to the term "predictable," one student
responded, "I really have no idea what
he meant by that." My interview ques-
tion served to focus her attention to
a key term which she had not yet found
meaning for. As a consequence, she
engaged in a more conscious effort
to discover an interpretive meaning
for the term. That this did occur is
evident in the following interaction
recorded a few weeks later with two
students:
Me: When Mr. Allen showed those slides,
did it tell you anything about how he will
judge our work?
Lynn: He doesn't like predictable things,
(giggle) Brad and I started laughing when
he used the word.
Me: Because I had asked you what he
meant by that word a week or so ago, and
you didn't know.
Lynn: Yeah, it's— I know exactly what he
means by it. It's — It's . . .
Brad: (Brad interrupts with "predict-
able." (laughter follows)
Lynn: (laughter) Well, it's really the best
word for it — Well, it makes the distinc-
tion between a 'decorative' and an
'aesthetic' pattern.
(Student Respondent, 2/18/77)
Value terms or expressions such as
"nice stuff" or "too predictable" can
be assigned meaning only in terms of
the context for which they are em-
ployed. Such contextually-bound terms
or expressions are referred to as in-
dexicals. Learned meaning is achieved
when an indexical label triggers some
qualitative visual equivalent in the in-
terpreter's mind.
When ambiguity exists in classroom
encounters, most students are willing
to accept the ambiguity under the pre-
sumption that the meaning will be-
come clear over time. This gives teach-
ers a false sense that students already
understand, because unclear informa-
tion is allowed to pass while clarify-
ing information is sought. Convergent
contextual signs are sought over time
to fill the ambiguity of indexical ex-
pressions.
Although this audience's initial re-
action to Professor Osgood's paper
may have been to dismiss the method-
ology as being appropriate only to
linguists, the importance of gaining
understanding of this dynamic cannot
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be over-stressed, for it is the essence
of what art teachers regard and ac-
knowledge as aesthetic learning.
If one does acknowledge the innpor-
tance of this dynamic, it follows that
visual arts researchers should begin
to concern themselves with at least
the following research objectives:
1. to understand the potential role
of appraisal talk in the total in-
structional experience;
2. to know that there are alternative
approaches to critical talk about
art;
3. to understand the nature of stu-
dent interpretations of teacher
talk about art;
4. to understand the effective use
of talk about art in studio teach-
ing;
5. to become aware of the ways stu-
dents learn terms and concepts
related to visual phenomena.
Let us now return to the task at hand.
I found it interesting to note that Pro-
fessor Osgood's early undergraduate
interests explored the possibility of
bridging anthropological data with
psychological techniques. Those of
you familiar with what I promote as
Triangulated Inquiry may sense that
I would indeed be receptive to the tri-
angulation of my findings through an
application of semantic differential
techniques. If Professor Osgood would
respond by suggesting methodologi-
cal applications, the relevancy for his
complex techniques might be per-
ceived as having stronger potential
for more visual arts researchers. I con-
clude with this challenge and solici-
tation.
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RESPONSE TO OSGOOD
Marilyn Zurmuehlen
The University of Iowa
My initial response to Professor Os-
good's presentation is a recollection
of nny excitement upon first encounter-
ing his work while I was a graduate stu-
dent. The title of one of his major
books, The Measurement of Meaning,
reflects the dream of quantifying the
qualitative which has inspired hun-
dreds of studies employing a semantic
differential. This instrument, as devel-
oped by Osgood and his colleagues,
allows people to indicate the degree
to which a concept is expressive of an
attribute, or of its opposite, by check-
ing one of five to seven intervals sepa-
rating pairs of bipolar adjectives. Al-
though most of the experiments they
reported involved rating the meanings
of words, Osgood, Suci, and Tannen-
baum (1957) discussed a number of
instances in which a semantic differ-
ential was a means for measuring re-
sponses to visual material: Tucker's
application to paintings and drawings,
Osgood's investigation of differing re-
sponses to color changes in several
nationally advertised products, and
his continued probing of the meanings
associated with various colors as these
were superimposed on reproductions
of nonrepresentational sculptures. Be-
cause the rating instrument reflects
affective or connotative similarities
among either the objects being rated,
and/or the people doing the rating,
Osgood, in this early publication, rec-
ommended it as a technique for the
development of tests of aesthetic ap-
preciation and communication. Thus,
the attraction for many of us who are
curious about people's aesthetic re-
sponses was, at first, a utilitarian one.
The technique offered the possibility
that we might learn not only that cer-
tain groups of people regarded spe-
cific works of art as better than other
ones, but also what qualities, such as
controlled or uncontrolled, they asso-
ciated with these evaluations. This kind
of information, obviously, is useful in
a discipline which hopes to educate
values.
However, Professor Osgood's ad-
dress at this symposium challenges us
to consider possible relationships of
his conceptual and theoretical bases
to the study of the visual arts. He re-
minded us that a semantic differential
demands a metaphorical use of the
scales, responding to a particular color
as hard or soft, for example. The pri-
macy of metaphorical responses, and
to some extent, of cross modality per-
ception in his theory of cognition,
may recall for many of us the pedagogi-
cal practices at the Bauhaus where
students in seminars might consider
which colors corresponded to the cir-
cle, the square, and the triangle. Pap
(cited in Neumann, 1970) recalled one
of these sessions: "They were just
discussing yellow. Someone said it
reminded him of the high twittering of
the blackbird, and yellow paint seemed
close to the triangle. Klee replies that
the yolk of an egg was yellow, too, but
still circular" (p. 79). This kind of think-
ing resembles the Odbert, Karwoski
and Eckerson (1942) .study which Pro-
fessor Osgood related. He Spoke of a
rather remarkable consistency among
the colors named by people when they
were asked which ones seemed appro-
priate for several excerpts of classical
music. This finding confronts us with
the question of whether these consis-
tencies indicate that the respondents
were using the color/music relation-
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ships as cliches, or stereotypes. Os-
good (1964) defined a culturally stereo-
typed concept as a substantive to
which many subjects give the same
response. In the discussions of such
possible associations at the Bauhaus,
I assume that it was the act of focus-
ing upon these relationships that was
valued rather than any agreement at
which the students arrived. Can agree-
ment become so general that it no
longer is metaphor? If so, how can we
recognize such a transformation?
Langer (1951) provided a theoretical
guide for the distinction in her discus-
sion of metaphor as the source of gen-
erality in language. She maintained
that frequent use caused metaphors
to lose their power to evoke interven-
ing symbolic images; in her example
of a rumor running through the town,
we no longer think of leg action. She
adopted Wegener's designation of
such a word as a "faded metaphor"
along with his argument that "faded
metaphors" constitute the basis of our
literal language. Thus, she maintained
that "Only the novel predication can
be metaphorical" (p. 124). In her con-
struct, the Bauhaus discussions appear
to have been generating metaphors,
but the consistency of the colors
chosen to be associated with certain
musical compositions suggests a trans-
formation in the metaphorical process.
In the first instance the associations
may be thought of as forming new
meanings which, in a sense, are still in
the future; in the second case, the rela-
tions of the colors to the music prob-
ably were linked in the past so that their
discovery is a kind of archaeological
one. Langer (1951) described the his-
tory of metaphor in the development of
language. She wrote: "Every new ex-
perience, or new idea about things,
evokes first of all some metaphorical
expression. As the idea becomes fa-
miliar, this expression 'fades' to a new
literal use of the once metaphorical
predicate, a more general use than it
had before." So she conceived of meta-
phor as "forever showing up new,
abstractable forms in reality, forever
laying down a deposit of old, ab-
stracted concepts" (p. 125). Most of us
make a pedagogical distinction, as
well, between metaphors and cliches.
Teaching students that "Yellow is a
happy color," or that "Lines that turn
down are sad," is asking them to think
in stereotypes (Langer's "old, ab-
stracted concepts"). Of course, art
education may be conceived of as a
means of transmitting such stereo-
types; however, since, among other
reasons, this kind of information may
be regarded as superfluous because,
presumably, it already has been learned
from the culture, most art educators
view their role as that of encouraging
the creation of new metaphors.
There is an overt resemblance be-
tween some of Itten's teaching meth-
ods in his basic course at the Bauhaus
and the bipolar adjective pairs which
compose the usual semantic differen-
tial instrument. Itten (1975) wrote:
Finding and listing the various possi-
bilities of contrast was always one of
the most exciting subjects, because the
students realized that a completely new
world was opening up to them. Such
contrasts are: large-small, long-short,
broad-narrow, thick-thin, black-white,
much-little, straight-curved, pointed-
'blunt, horizontal-vertical, diagonal-cir-
cular, high-low, area-line, area-body,
line-body, smooth-rough, hard-soft,
still-moving, light-reavy, transpar-
ent-opaque, continue us- intermittent,
liquid-solid, sweet-sour, strong-weak,
loud-soft, as well as the seven color
contrasts, (p. 12)
His pupils not only listed such con-
trasts but produced drawings and mon-
tages which represented them. It is
easy to imagine that these art students
from the 1920s would have felt quite
comfortable in responding to a seman-
tic differential instrument. Both sys-
tems are evidence for the structuralr
ists' faith in the power of oppositions
to clarify.
The art historian, Gombrich (1963),
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maintained that contrasts "would not
be so effective if we all were not in-
clined to categorize the world around
us in such basic emotional metaphors"
(p. 140). So it is not surprising that he
presented models of Osgood's seman-
tic space in Meditations on a Hobby
Horse and in Tiie Sense of Order. In-
deed, Gombrich (1963) discussed as-
sumptions underlying the expression-
ist theory of art by contrasting the
extremes of expression vs. communi-
cation.
EXPRESSION COMMUNICATION
of
EMOTION
works through
SYMPTOMS
which are
NATURAL (and
unlearned)
of
INFORMATION
through
CODES or SIGNS
which rest on
CONVENTIONS
He used a diagram which simplified
Osgood's semantic space to illustrate
that it suggests "a natural code of
equivalences that represents, I think,
the core of the expressionist argument.
Every colour, sound or shape has a
natural feeling tone just as every feel-
ing has an equivalence in the world
of sight and sound" (p. 59). However,
he contended that the principal weak-
ness of the expressionist theory of art
is its inability to account for structure
because "whatever message unstruc-
tured blue on a blue canvas may con-
vey to the applauding critic is not in-
herent in the blue paint like a fluid or
essence, but derives its meaning from
its shock effect, its unexpectedness"
(p. 60). His conception is similar to
Langer's (1951) construct of context
and novelty as the elements of dis-
course: the context, seen or stated,
modifies a word and determines its
exact meaning, but it is the novelty
which we are interested in expressing,
and the context makes this possible.
Professor Osgood demonstrated the
tension between context (which deter-
mines the expected) and novelty in
the examples he gave which classified
metaphors along a dimension of appo-
site, acceptable, and anomalous. He
further modified these dimensions by
differentiating between primarily de-
notation-based and affect-based meta-
phors. While his instances are verbal,
the categories suggest some applica-
tions in the visual arts. Can we con-
sider Claes Oldenburg's limp electrical
appliances and gargantuan lipsticks
to be affectively anomalous meta-
phors? Are Marilyn Levine's ceramic
"leather" jackets and suitcases deno-
tatively anomalous metaphors? Was
soft sculpture, at one time in the his-
tory of art, a denotatively anomalous
metaphor? Certainly by now it has
moved into the acceptable or even ap-
posite realm for most people (the Old-
enburg and Levine works probably are
shifting in a similar direction). Of
course, artists are aware that they are
working metaphorically and, usually,
they seek the deviant metaphor (Os-
good's anomalous). Indeed, if I were
to generalize these dimensions of
metaphor to correspond with occu-
pations, I would expect artists to pre-
fer anomalous metaphors, while critics
favor acceptable metaphors, and the
authors of how-to-do-it books might
consider only apposite metaphors. The
latter seem very close, if not corre-
sponding, to "faded metaphors," or
cliches.
Professor Osgood, in discussing the
Harris (1979) experiments, recognized
this issue when he distinguished
among "live" metaphors, "dead"
metaphors, and non-metaphors. The
finding of a significant trend for recall-
errors that were meaning-preserving
to be less metaphorical than the input
sentences, may have profound impli-
cations for responses to the visual arts.
Does the indication that metaphoric
effects are ephemeral hint at the re-
newed appeal of great works of art? Do
we remember them as shifting toward
"everydayness" so that new encoun-
ters are perceived as fresh metaphors?
Such an explanation would give prl-
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macy to metaphors, not only in creat-
ing works of art, but also in respond-
ing to them.
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NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM FOR RESEARCH IN ART: CONFERENCE OVERVIEW
June King McFee
University of Oregon
Orientation
This symposium will have long reach-
ing effects on our study of child devel-
opment in art, as well as on our study
of art itself. For these reasons, we are
indebted to the University of Illinois
and the institutions within it that sup-
ported the work. Particularly, we are
most indebted to George Hardiman
and Ted Zernich, whose dedication to
furthering research and whose multi-
disciplined perspectives led to the de-
sign and implementation of the pro-
gram we enjoyed.
The overall focus has been on
graphic expression as metaphoric figu-
rative language. It has brought the
study of child development in art,
which has had a sporadic and incon-
sistent development over the last hun-
dred years, into interface with the
larger question of the nature of graphic
expression in terms of semantics, per-
ception and cognition. Biases towards
perceptual realism in Western culture
have been examined in terms of other
structural equivalents.
Each speaker has pioneered a par-
ticular area of inquiry. Each one has
focused on different aspects of the
central theme. Our task, as members
of the symposium, is to try to see how
each research focus may relate to the
other and to an even larger framework
of research related to the subject. This
task can only be touched upon in a
short review that also attempts to draw
implications for the field of art edu-
cation.
First we must acknowledge that any
given researcher has to set limits. They
have to focus on researchable topics
and build on them. People like Arn-
heim and Osgood, who have consis-
tently and thoroughly researched their
topics over many years, have been able
to build broader bases for their inquiry.
Osgood had a background in both an-
thropology and psychology before be-
coming a psychologist specializing in
the cross culture structure of linguistic
and graphic meaning. Arnheim has fo-
cused much of his work as a psycholo-
gist in the arts. In his presentation Arn-
heim has dealt with only a small part
of his lifework, while Osgood has
drawn on many aspects of his. To com-
pare their work, far more of Arnheim's
work needs to be reviewed.
The other researchers have built a
solid basis of work in child develop-
ment. Gardner and Winner and their
associates in Project Zero are develop-
mental psychologists concerned with
art. Golomb is a developmental psy-
chologist whose interest is in symbolic
formation which includes children's
drawings.
The larger field of this subject in-
cludes research in art education, cross
cultural psychology, anthropology, and
experimental aesthetics. People in
these fields address questions that are
also variables in some of the phenom-
enon we have been addressing. These
include the effects of learned cultural
values, the symbols and complexity of
visual detail that express these values,
the contribution of these visual quali-
ties to the learning environment of
children, and the selective motivation
of certain categories of people to excel
in graphic expression.
A comprehensive review of all the
work in child development in art, in
all the contributing fields, needs to be
made to fully understand the implica-
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tions of this symposium. In my review
of the conference, I will try to set our
field and its relation to psychology in
this broader context. In a way, it re-
flects some of the interdisciplinary
concerns of Martin Engel in his com-
prehensive opening address.
Let me digress a bit to let some of
our younger members know my back-
ground, which influences this present
review. As an art student of Archi-
penko's in Chicago in 1939, I was ex-
posed to the influence of the Bauhaus
school being transplanted there at that
time. Their central mode of inquiry was
multivariant problem solving in design
— part logic, part intuition. Later in
the fifties I worked on my doctorate
at Stanford, where a multidisciplinary
foundational base was required: an-
thropology, educational sociology, phi-
losophy, as well as a concentration in
psychology. This included study of the
Gestalt psychology and field theory
where wholes are seen not as the sum
of the parts but rather the total dy-
namics of the whole of all of the parts.
Comprehensive examinations included
these areas, as well as an area of spe-
cialization.
My own research focused on percep-
tion and psychosocial factors that
would affect performance in drawing
and design in classroom learning situ-
ations. The main purpose of my Per-
ception Delineation Theory I, II, and
III, as it has developed over the years,
was to help teachers deal with the
complexity of teaching diverse stu-
dents various aspects of human be-
havior in and through art, and the
continuing need to feed related inter-
disciplinary research findings into the
teaching process as they developed
(McFee, 1961, 1970; McFee & Degge,
1980).
As some of my older colleagues know,
I had the temerity to question Lowen-
feld's theory of child development in
art twenty-three years ago, because I
felt not enough questions had been
asked. In New York in 1957, I met a
young man named Kenneth Beittel.
I had my new dissertation in hand,
which he read and asked if his advisor
could see as well. The next morning
I was invited to meet the great Viktor
Lowenfeld. He said I had made impor-
tant observations, raised new ques-
tions, and he thought that we were in
our infancy in understanding child art.
I doubt if many people felt that this
was his evaluation of progress in this
area of research.
Please keep these perspectives in
mind as you respond to the following
review of the ideas of our major speak-
ers. Many of my observations have
been picked up by the panels respond-
ing to each paper; so some of this will
be review. But there are also some
questions that come out of my particu-
lar interdisciplinary background and
experience. I will review briefly each
address, make some comparisons be-
tween them and then begin to think
about implications for our field.
Howard Gardner and Ellen Winner
Gardner and Winner posit that child
development in art has a regular pro-
gression which follows a U-shaped
curve. From a high of being expressive
and original at age four, to a low of be-
in^ conventional and predictable by
age ten, only those who go on to be-
come artists become more expressive
and original again and rise to another
high. In other words, the U-curve holds
for those who become artists, but for
the other children expressiveness and
originality only go down with age. This
work is very substantial, extensive and
thorough. But there are some ques-
tions we must ask ourselves as we, as
a special interest group, use their
findings.
Is child graphic art solely the result
of psycho-physical development pat-
terns? Would living in different visual
environments, with different cultural
styles in art, or other cultural defini-
tions of what is accepted as art influ-
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ence child development? What effects
do learning in perception and in art
have on development? What are the
factors that enable some types of
people to go on to be artists and not
others? Do some cultures generate
more creativity among their members
than others? Gardner and Winner al-
luded to these cultural factors, particu-
larly in the discussion that followed
their presentation.
I am reminded here of Wayne Dennis'
work with children in Beruit concern-
ing varying degrees of variation from
strict to less strict Moslem training
(Dennis, 1960). The longer children
experienced the more strict Moslem
value of not symbolizing the human
figure, the more their scores on the
Draw-A-Man test decreased from nor-
mal acceleration as established in non-
Moslem countries.
Also we need to ask how much it is
chronological age or the social con-
text of a given age that most affects
children's art at a given period, such
as the ten year old child. What are
the differences in external influences
that affect the four and ten year old,
such as peer influence and rewards
for verbal rather than visual excellence
in school? What is the relative impact
on child behavior of six more years of
experience compared to six more years
of physical and psychological matura-
tion? Can maturation and experience
be separated?
Perhaps most important, what are
the effects of different kinds of learn-
ing? For example, when the child of
ten is asked to draw like a four year old
he or she may be drawing a stereotype
of a young child's work and not be
tapping what may be a latent ability
to be freely expressive. We would need
to experiment with varying the time,
motivation and social reinforcement to
see if the ten year old can reuse his or
her prior abilities to be expressive and
original. I realize that I may be missing
some very fundamental understandings
of developmental psychology when I
ask these questions, but as an inter-
disciplinary art educator concerned
with ways to stimulate creativity and
expressiveness, I have to ask them.
Also, I would like to ask questions
about the artists at the adult end of the
U-curve. Are all great artists deliber-
ately asymmetrical in the organization
of their work or are some intuitively
achieving asymmetrical balance at a
preconceptual level or synthesis, which
the less affected four year old may also
be doing? Another question I find un-
answered is how they identify and mea-
sure the degree of intentionality of chil-
dren compared to adults. The question
about the nature of what is "good"
adult art is far from resolved. Though,
as these researchers report, Goodman
has done much to try and analyze the
components of some aspects of art,
we are far from identifying universals
about adult art. If we are talking about
child development in art as if it were
free from cultural influence, then the
adult art used as a comparison also
needs to be universal and not cultur-
ally influenced.
Also, questions about development
which consider originality need to be
related to studies on the nature of cre-
ativity and creative development. My
own study in which academically su-
perior 15 year olds significantly in-
creased their divergent originality
scores on paper and pencil tests by
being rewarded for unusual responses
in the production of art, needs to be
replicated with younger children to
see if their behavior can be changed
as well. We need to know how much
performance can be affected by in-
struction (McFee, 1968).
Claire Golomb
Claire Golomb reported on the meth-
ods she used to analyze child develop-
ment in symbol-making. She wanted
to find out if a pattern of development
existed and the nature of development
if it occurred. She also evaluated the
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methodology and findings of Kellogg
and Freeman by contrasting their work
with her most careful research.
She asked children to draw from free
recall and observed their sequencing.
Then she gave them new sets for pro-
ceeding. Most children draw the fig-
ure beginning with the head; so she
asked them to begin with the legs. This
led to much more detail in their draw-
ings. Uninstructed toddlers who drew
scribbles without visual controls, used
visual controls when asked to draw spe-
cific things. They apparently brought
both memory and visualization into
play. She found that children could
verbalize more details than they could
draw. Their verbalizations were about
their experience with the environment
rather than their visualizations. Since
her sample was from a highly verbal,
rather than visual society, it would be
interesting to see what would happen
if the study was replicated in a society
where much more stress was made on
visualization.
Kellogg assumes that psycho-physi-
cal growth is the most central factor
in the child's art development and not
affected by experience. Yet as we have
seen, Golomb was able to help chil-
dren remember more images by re-
versing sequences, and scribblers were
encouraged to symbolize by being
asked to draw specific things.
This indicates that children do learn
from their environment, whether using
verbal or visual modes of communi-
cating about it. For example, a half
Eskimo, half white young woman raised
in a remote Alaskan village by white
culturally oriented parents, was in a
class I taught which examined our dif-
ferences in learning to see. She rec-
ognized that she didn't see as an Es-
kimo, and her visual environment for
learning was bleak. Both her verbal
and visual development in dealing with
visual qualities of things appeared lim-
ited, but she was clearly very intel-
ligent.
Golomb also found that growth pat-
terns had gaps; growth was not as
smoothly sequential as Kellogg's model
indicated. Also, we know much more
about Golomb's sample of subjects
than Kellogg's, who was working with
the drawings from her vast collection
rather than samples of specific groups
of children working under controlled
conditions.
Golomb also retested Freeman's
work upon which he developed his
theories of cognitive deficiencies as
the reason for differences between
children in responding to his paired
figures. She felt that his figures were
not appropriate for children to judge.
The question as to the appropriate-
ness of drawing figures for different
samples of children should also be
considered. Just as it is difficult to
make culture-free IQ tests, it may be
difficult to create universal visual tests,
not only in the familiarity of subject
matter but also in the amount and kind
of detail used. Osgood cited French's
attempts to construct a graphic differ-
ential which was value free.
One question that neither Golomb
nor Gardner addressed was the dif-
ferences between children's drawing
from memory and drawing from ob-
servation. Twelve years ago, Lovano-
Kerr studied elementary school age
boys' drawings from memory and from
observation and found they scored
differently (Lovano-Kerr, 1969). Those
drawing from observation had much
more detail and more advanced spa-
tial organization in their drawings.
Also, she found a consistent increase
in modal scores through the elemen-
tary grades, but the range of develop-
ment increased with each year, with
the lower end of the range changing
very little.
When we compare the work of Go^
lomb to Gardner's, we find that they
are asking quite different questions
about the same phenomenon. Gardner
and Winner are more concerned with
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the relation of child art to certain quali-
ties of adult art, or at least some types
of adult art which they clarified for us
on questioning. They are more con-
cerned with the affective qualities of
art rather than changes in the use of
graphic detail which concerns Go-
lomb.
For these reasons the work of Go-
lomb and Gardner can't be directly
compared. Both make most important
contributions to our understanding.
Also, there is much room for research
in the interface of these two kinds of
inquiry. For example, what would hap-
pen if Golomb's methods were used
to interject expressive qualitative sug-
gestions to children? Would this
change Gardner's results?
Development in art, as I see it, in-
volves more than the psychobiologi-
cal. It includes the nature of the visual-
physical environment the child grows
up in and the way people who share a
cultural value system select or moti-
vate the making of an artist. Boys are
motivated far more than girls in many
societies. The role of drawing in the
culture may affect children's develop-
ment. In some societies it is important
to be an artist; in others it is not. As
you remember, Dennis found that chil-
dren had the highest IQ scores on the
Draw-A-Man test in societies where
there were high incidents of drawing
and painting of the figure (Dennis,
1966). Whether the kind of learning
stressed is more visual or verbal is
critical. Some of Dennis's highest scor-
ing children were from Japan, where
figure drawing is a major art form.
Also, the fifty year old study of Orot-
chin children showed they had highly
developed perceptual skills which
they needed to survive. Food, shelter,
clothing came from reindeer they had
to closely observe, as they stayed with
the herd in their nomadic life. These
children had not seen drawings be-
fore. Ten to twelve year olds drew
reindeer in perspective but people as
tadpoles in the same drawing. Selec-
tive perceptual development seemed
apparent (Schubert, 1936). This op-
portunity appeared to affect their draw-
ing. These two studies suggest that
when perceptual learning is stressed
either by exposure to art or critical
observation, drawing development is
increased.
This does not mean I reject or ques-
tion Golomb and Gardner's important,
careful work. It is just that I do not
think we, as educators, can accept the
variables they controlled as the only
factors involved as we devise implica-
tions from their research for practice.
Children who grow up in similar envi-
ronments and value systems clearly
are more conditioned to follow some-
what similar growth patterns than chil-
dren from different environments and
value systems. But growth involves
differentiation even within similar cul-
tural physical environments. So we
need to know from developmental psy-
chologists what patterns of develop-
ment they discover and the range
within patterns even when studying
children from one culture. In practice
teachers have all kinds of children in
school. Since by tradition, children are
grouped in schools by age, each class
has much diversity. The assumption
that biological age is the most impor-
tant determinant of change in behavior
is too simplistic a basis for assessing
children's readiness for given tasks
in art.
Also, we must recognize the great
wealth of research on cognition, cog-
nitive style, on perception and on the
eyes themselves as selecting expres-
sions of the brain. All these point to
the complexity of the human organism
as it sorts and organizes information.
The more differentiation ability is ex-
ercised the more complexity it can
sort and organize (Gregory, 1977; Cole
&Scribner, 1974; Roy & Schwartz, 1978;
Haver, 1978).
Arnheim's clear description of the
layering effect may well be what we
are talking about. Some developmen-
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tal psychologists work with younger
children whom they assume to be less
affected by culture, and thus hope to
discover universals which are more
fundamental than culture.
But at the other layer of Arnheim's
construct, cultural learning and learn-
ing during culture change, goes on
for life. We teach art for lifelong learn-
ing, and with greater learning more
differentiation takes place. Even
though we may share a culture, we all
learn it somewhat differently. Most peo-
ple apparently have a need for cultural
identity or conformity to cultural norms
but also need a sense of indepen-
dence from the norms. In the same
way, growth is both patterned and
differentiated. Norms can be reported
to show both central tendencies and
variations from it. We need both kinds
of information for teaching art.
Charles Osgood
The background paper of Osgood's
presentation, which was sent to me
before the conference, was a review
of the trends of his work over the last
forty years. There is much material
that would be invaluable to us in the
visual arts and art education for under-
standing art as a form of communica-
tion. Much of his work is with verbal
semantics, the meaning of the written
and the spoken word. But he is also
interested in the semantics of non-lin-
guistic metaphors — messages that
substitute for things or events and do
not use language as form.
He reviews the small amount of re-
search on graphic differentials to study
the ways meanings are carried across
from idea to graphic metaphor. By
contrast with research on the verbal,
he says study of the graphic is in its
infancy.
One of his basic principles in deal-
ing with the visual is that "Percepts
are variable, but their significances are
constant." In other words, we can per-
ceive an object from multiple view-
points, and its appearances will vary,
but the meaning does not.
Artists could make a contribution in
this analysis. For us, the significance
may be the visual appearance itself.
If we were viewing an apple, its size
would vary with its distance from us,
and that may be what is significant to
us. Osgood says the change in visual
size of an apple is variable, but the
constant is its roundness and redness
which are its significances. Our ques-
tion is, "Can the change in size modify
the significance of its meaning in the
color of an object?" Don't artists
weaken the intensity, that is, the "thing-
ness" of the color, in areas of lesser
importance to strengthen the impact
of a more important object shown with
greater intensity? We also know that
either the field of an object or the view-
point of a non-round object can change
the nature of visual metaphor. We think
it could change the affective meaning,
just as the quality and kind of letter-
ing can modify the meaning of a lin-
guistic message. For example, car il-
lustrators, when bigger was better,
foreshortened drawings of smaller cars
to make them look bigger.
These are areas that would need to
be considered as a graphic differen-
tial is developed. If all the kinds of
configurations could be handled —
almost dreamable with a computer —
the underlying systems that produce
variations in significance might be
identified.
Another interesting area in which we
could use Osgood's work is to analyze
children's drawings to see which of
them draw visual images, and which
conceptual metaphors. His work on
the interaction between perceptual
and linguistic channels may give us
help in working with students who have
not developed enough in one of these
channels. Analysis needs to be made
of Osgood's obvious sexist stereotyp-
ing which may have influenced the
categorizing of some of his results. It
may not hold as strongly, since these
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stereotypes are changing, as is their
influence on children's behavior.
These are but brief examples of the
many points where our interest in
communication in art and child devel-
opment in art can profit from Osgood's
work.
Rudolph Arnheim
Thirty years ago I ordered a book
from the University of California Press.
I can still vividly remember the ex-
citement I had when I began to read
Art and Visual Perception by Rudolph
Arnheim. It was my first entry into a
long time interest in the relationships
of perceptual psychology to art, and
interest in Arnheim's work.
In his presentation to this meeting
he has raised two points. One, he
questions what he considers to be
ethnocentricism in Western concepts
of art in which we assume that realism
is the natural form of art and other
forms are deviations from that. He
would have us consider that perspec-
tive realism is the distortion. Two, he
posits that the materials used are the
strongest determinants of style.
A central question underlying Arn-
heim's work is whether bioptic per-
ception in humans and the informa-
tion processing of the eye and brain
lead to more conceptual or more opti-
cal realism in peoples' expression of
their experience. This question was
raised at the turn of the century by
Boas in his study of ethnic arts. He pro-
posed that we could not tell whether
objective realism or abstraction came
first in cultural evolution (Boas, 1955,
pp. 64-87). What he called abstraction
and what Arnheim calls cognitive meta-
phor appear to have considerable over-
lap. Boas's work also is supportive of
Arnheim's point that the materials avail-
able or selected have a strong impact
on the styles developed.
Arnheim supports his position with
examples of:
— selective content in a scene.
— use of the most characteristic as-
pects of a thing rather than its ap-
pearance in foreshortening.
— portrayals of more than the outer
surface of things and of one thing
surrounding another.
Arnheim adds some critical and im-
portant dimensions to the perceptual-
conceptual controversy in art. Resolu-
tion of the question needs to be sought
in terms of cross cultural, as well as,
Western traditions, which Arnheim is
doing in his analysis of art in different
periods by different peoples.
If Arnheim is right and representa-
tional realism is not the central reality
of drawing style with all other drawing
styles being variations from it, then
the task of identifying the major dif-
ferences in style must be undertaken.
Then those of us interested in child
development in art would have to see
if young children are moving toward
the style of their own group or not. In
1931, Anastasi and Foley studied the
drawings Boas had collected from
Northwest Coast Indian children, and
they found that the cultural factors
were the dominant determinants in
style (Anastasi & Foley, 1936). Very
little work has been done since that
time. But Arnheim has now raised the
question from still a different perspec-
tive, that of the world of art itself, and
he does so cross culturally. In conver-
sation after his lecture, Arnheim said
his point was not that children should
not learn to observe, but rather, that
realism was not the only structural
equivalent they might be working to-
ward.
There is evidence that experience
can interfere with the use of percep-
tual evidence. Bruner and his associ-
ates show that not only culture but the
differences in living in rural or urban
areas predispose people to depend
more on their conceptual knowledge
or their percepts of things to solve
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problems (Bruner, 1966). They found
that urban children, faced with so
much visual complexity, tend to de-
pend more on what they know; rural
children depend on what they observe.
It is interesting to note that, 'when non-
Western rural children are put into
Western schools, they tend to depend
less on solving problems perceptually
and more on solving them conceptu-
ally. It would appear that this dominant
value in Western education of concep-
tual learning using words, is different
from the emphasis on realism in art
by others in the society, which Arn-
heim questions. It seems to me that
Arnheim is saying that in many soci-
eties graphic expression is used to
express concepts and feelings more
than geometric perceptions of things.
The emphasis on conceptual learn-
ing, which Bruner identifies, may be
an important factor in the decline in
artistry of fourth grade children found
in the Project Zero studies. They were
not equating artistry with use of real-
ism, but the emphasis on conceptual
learning, using linguistic tools, may
be a factor in development, either to-
wards realism and/or artistry, because
it tends to channel percepts and con-
cepts into linguistic rather than graphic
expression.
Implications from this Symposium
One of the most important things we
need to consider about classrooms is
the variability teachers must deal with.
Developmental psychologists are in-
terested in the patterns of change over
time and look for the average or cen-
tral tendencies of change within cul-
tures. Differential psychologists look
for individual differences and the
ranges of variability in development.
Anthropologists look for value and
behavioral patterns that identify dif-
ferent groups. Experimental aestheti-
cians are trying to find out the funda-
mentals of human response to things
called aesthetic. Cross cultural psy-
chologists look for the differences in
patterns of perception and cognition
between cultures. Ideally, art teachers
need information from all these groups.
They need to know the central ten-
dencies in behavior that differentiate
a second from a sixth grade class. They
need to know the range that they may
find within a given class, in all the be-
haviors in art, even before mainstream-
ing is considered. The higher the
grade, the greater the range in all
the behaviors involved in art. A sixth
grade teacher may have children draw-
ing at norms from primary grades up
to high school. They may have a class
composed of representatives of one
or many different cultures whose ex-
periences in and through art vary.
As I have briefly reviewed this con-
ference, I have tried to raise questions
that could make the material more ap-
plicable to our field. We need an ex-
haustive review of all the research in
these many fields that help us under-
stand art as metaphor and children's
development in it. Osgood and Arn-
heim have substantially contributed
to the first, and Gardner and Golomb
to the second. As art educators, we
must develop the tools for bridging
the gaps between such researchers'
questions and ours, using their work
on.|y as we can make reasonable link-
ages.
Certainly we need to look long and
hard at Osgood's findings and Arn-
heim's penetrating questions. We are
all culture bound, to some degree, to
Western realistic art, perhaps — or in
our attempts to break out from it. Both
are conditioned by cultural experience.
Now, to finish I would like to make
a few observations of highlights of
the last few days. The clear focus of the
Symposium, the concentration of the
work, the quality of the key speakers'
presentations, peoples' attendance and
involvement, the composite of ideas
presented, were all most impressive. I
could not in any way hear all the indi-
vidual presentations, but I did hear
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some exceedingly professional papers.
For example: the critique papers on
Project Zero by Rush and Lovano/Kerr
were excellent examples of the practice
of criticism by art educators, the Wil-
sons' analysis of cultural interventions
that they find appearing at different
times in the history of children's draw-
ings, and the theoretical paper on the
use of metaphor by both teachers and
students by Kuhn and Hutchins pointed
out our need to consider the teaching-
learning domain of art education, not
just the learner. The panelists who
reacted to the speakers each brought
careful, thoughtful questions into the
dialogue.
The highlight of the conference, for
me, was the interaction panel of the
speakers, under the gentle hand of
Harry Broudy. Clarifications, modifica-
tions, and contrasting points of view
were constructively dealt with in a
warm climate of mutual respect for
individual inquiry.
This conference has not only set
an example for our field in terms of
concentration and level of inquiry, but
also of interdisciplinary cross fertil-
ization of ideas. We all are indebted
to the designers and directors of the
symposium and to all who contributed
and participated in it.
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